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GUERRILLA WARFARE.

It has been already pointed out that the position of the Irish Volunteers has now come to resemble a native army waging guerilla warfare against a foreign army of occupation. It is the duty of Volunteers to take this fact seriously to heart, and to recognise in all their plans, in their methods of training and study, and in their general outlook, the existence of this state of guerilla warfare and all that it implies. It is our business to develop those guerilla tactics which we have found most serviceable in dealing with actual conditions in Ireland at present, and to bring them to the highest pitch of perfection of which they are capable. It is our business to wage war against the forces of the invaders whenever and however we find it can be done most effectively. Circumstances have largely determined the training and tactics of the Irish Volunteers, and we have developed methods of working admirably suited to our present position. When the Volunteer force was established in 1913 it suffered severely from the incubus of the British-army-trained drill sergeant, with his barrack-square ideas; but subsequent to the outbreak of the great European war this evil began to disappear. The Volunteers began to develop a system of training of their own, based on a recognition of the actual facts in Ireland, and the kind of warfare they would have to wage when the time came for taking the field. The value of these methods of training was demonstrated triumphantly in Easter Week, 1916. The close of that brief but glorious campaign brought about certain changes in the position of the Irish Volunteers. They had to encounter obstacles in their work which had not previously existed, and they had to devise new means of meeting these difficulties. The result has been striking. The Army of the Irish Republic is now more numerous, better organised, armed, and equipped than ever before; and the men throughout the country have answered splendidly to the calls made upon

their courage and endurance. The most daring and difficult feats have been carried out triumphantly by them, and the words "Irish Volunteers" have come to be regarded by the people of Ireland as a symbol of efficiency.

It is an axiom of warfare that one must reserve one's strength in order to strike when and where one is able to do so most effectively. A force greatly inferior to the enemy in numbers, armament, and equipment may strike very heavy blows against their enemy and ultimately render his position in the country untenable by the adoption of guerilla tactics.

Prior to the last great European war, for practically a hundred years (excluding the "muddling through" of the Crimean War) English soldiers were never called upon to face any enemies save such as were greatly inferior to them in organisation, armament, equipment and resources. Consequently, a great deal of British military studies was concerned with the tactics and strategy of what they termed "small wars." Books were written to instruct British officers in the art of crushing ill-armed troops, devoid of the equipment and resources of modern armies. Of all the forms of "small wars," that most dreaded by Imperialist armies of conquest is a prolonged guerilla warfare in which they are unable to obtain a moment's security nor gain any opportunity of effectively crushing their ubiquitous foe. Particularly do they dread the adoption of well-organised guerilla tactics by a civilised foe of keen intelligence and courage. Surprises, ambushes, raids on their fortified positions, sniping at their stragglers, captures of their arms and equipment, interruption of their communications, interference with their intelligence, are to be apprehended by them daily; and their forces are driven more and more into the position of invested garrisons in the midst of a hostile country, afraid to venture from their strongholds except in force, living in a state of perpetual apprehension. That such a state of affairs exists to a great extent in Ireland at present is obvious to all; and it is

the business of the Irish Volunteers to see that it continues, grows more intense and more menacing to the invader.

The histories of former fights for freedom in other lands when guerilla tactics were resorted to are full of lessons for the Irish Volunteers. The Tyrolese peasants, by guerilla warfare, were able to baffle and even to inflict crushing defeats on the best troops of the great Napoleon. A British War Office publication points out that "resolute, well-armed patriots" are most formidable in guerilla warfare, and particularly in the work of raids and surprises. In some respects the methods resorted to in Ireland are something similar to those employed by the Cuban insurgents with such success for years against Spanish forces numerically far stronger and much better armed and equipped. But it may be remarked that no other body of troops who waged guerilla warfare against an invader had anything like the organisation of the Irish Volunteers. To aid in keeping all the services of this organisation at the highest state of efficiency is the business of every member of the Republican Army. There is one branch of service in which we possess a great superiority over the enemy—intelligence. It is a department in which guerilla troops, operating in their own country, amid a friendly population, against a foreign invader, will always have an immense advantage. It is a vital service, and one on which our strength largely depends. No effort should be spared to make this department of our work as efficient as possible. Every individual Volunteer should co-operate in this work, both during his hours of active service and his hours of leisure. No information bearing on the strength, resources, machinery, and intentions of the enemy should be neglected. Full information should be collected as to his forces and machinery in each locality, so that any offensive move on his part can be effectively countered and the machinery by which he operates against us can be injured in its most vital parts. Recent occurrences have shown that Volunteers throughout the country are alive to their duties in this and other respects. A number of daring and successful achievements stand to their credit. That number will probably be largely added to in the near future.

NOTES FROM HEADQUARTERS.

NOTES ON TRAINING.

Examination of Officers. It is the intention of General Headquarters to hold examinations

for qualification as Officers of the Irish Volunteers. All existing officers will be obliged to pass, and in addition Section Commanders and other men selected by their Superior Officers will be permitted to enter. The examination will not be on competitive lines, the intention being rather to insist on a standard of qualification for officership. The syllabus, list of suitable books for study, and other necessary information will be duly issued, and pending this officers and others concerned are advised to lose no time in starting their preparations. Close study of all available military books, strict attention to lectures, and application of military principles on the parade ground and in the field are the surest lines to go on, and the candidates who work in this direction need have no hesitation or nervousness; besides, they will have the consciousness of having made themselves more fitted for their responsibilities.

Practical Training. The following is suggested as a simple exercise in attack and defence applicable to any average company, irrespective of district.

To defend and attack a cross-roads, the holding of which might be important to either side.

Preliminary. Divide up company, $\frac{1}{4}$ defence under first lieutenant, the remainder to attack under 2nd lieutenant, the captain acting as umpire. Explain to men the object intended. At initial stage the attackers are to be at least three miles away from cross-roads; this is to allow the defenders time to make their dispositions.

Defence. Post scouts for the double purpose of giving warning of the enemy's approach and of reconnaissance. Instructions to scouts should be clear and defined. Information should be sought under the following headings:—(1) number of enemy; (2) how composed, whether infantry, cavalry, cyclists, etc.; (3) how armed, machine guns, artillery, etc.; (4) distance away, and where seen; (5) at the halt or on the march; (6) whether in close order or deployed; (7) how protected. Written reports may not be possible, but accuracy of verbal reports must be strongly insisted upon.

Taking up Position. Examine ground carefully, pick out suitable cover, take advantage of every piece of rising ground, always keeping in mind the necessity of having a clear field of fire. In disposing of men do so having regard to armament; don't place a man with a revolver a mile away from the front. Take advantage of trees for the purpose of observation, and, if possible, for sniping. Keep at



least one-third of force as reserve, to be used for counter-attack if the chance arises. Protect flanks, particularly where a wall is used as cover. In firing down a road, use the left hand side, except where there are left-handed men. In course of attack, keep calm and collected, and be prepared to take advantage of the slightest mistake the enemy may make.

Attack. Before definitely committing oneself to any line of action it is essential to have collected every possible piece of information touching the dispositions of the defence. Scouts therefore must be sent well in advance for this purpose. In the meantime the main body will advance towards the objective, every care being taken to have protection not only in front, but also in rear and on the flanks. On the receipt of the reports from the scouts the mode of attack must be decided upon. The force should be divided into a firing line, supports, and reserve, the reserve being almost a large as half, and certainly not less than one-third. The point of deployment is then fixed, and as this will depend on circumstances and the nature of the country, it is not possible to deal with the matter here. Subsequent operations must be left to the discretion of the commander; he may rush the position, or he may use a feint attack, throwing his reserve into the main attack. The feint attack should, however, be pushed forward boldly and with vigour. It would be useful if the roads permitted him to use cyclists as the reserve, as owing to their greater mobility the possibility of surprise is rendered greater.

In both the case of the attack and defence, and especially in the latter case, the possibility of retreat must be faced, and arrangements made accordingly. When, in the opinion of the captain, the action is over the company should be brought together, either on the spot or at a subsequent lecture, and the whole operation discussed.

ENGINEERING NOTES.

CONVENTIONAL SIGNS USED IN ORD- NANCE SURVEY MAPS.

The six-inch to one mile Ordnance Survey (O.S.) maps of some sector of country in the neighbourhood is invaluable for military education in other matters than map-reading. Any differences (as in the representation of railway lines) between the six-inch and the small scale maps should be noted.

Buildings are represented in plan. Main

roads are one thin line and one thick; minor roads, two thin lines. Footpaths are represented by dotted lines. Portions of roads of any class which are unenclosed have dotted lines. The river may be distinguished by its meandering course, and by the arrow showing direction of flow; the canal by its towing path.

Remark the difference between the railway, double line and single line, and the tramway. Understand the difference between the bridge over the railway, the railway over the bridge, and the level crossing. If the railway passes through a cutting, the hachuring (shading) runs down to the railway (the thin ends of the shading lines are the lower ends); if it passes along an embankment, the hachuring runs down from the railway; hachuring being always in the direction of the fall of a slope (starting thick at the top, and thinning off towards the bottom). The same difference in the direction of the hachuring will be remarked between a quarry or a bank or mound. If the quarry or cutting is enclosed, the hachuring will also be enclosed by a line.

Distinguish between heath and marsh; marsh is indicated by spiky clumps of grass, heath by more rounded and even clumps. Little irregular circles are found marked in the middle of fields; these are pools or dry pits.

Contour lines are represented with stroke and dot, the line being broken at intervals to admit the figures representing height—300, 400, etc. A triangle represents a trigonometrical station, which is sometimes important for observation purposes.

Figures on roads represent the height above sea level of the road at a particular spot (spot level). Sometimes the spot level has the letters B.M. (bench mark) prefixed to it; in this case the spot level may be found marked with a broad arrow on some adjacent bridge, building, wall, or milestone. On the six-inch map churches and windmills are written.

Generally speaking, roads and railways disappearing on the margin of the map are indicated as From A . . . , From C . . . , when A . . . and C . . . are to the north and west, and as To A . . . , To C . . . , when A . . . and C . . . are to the south and east.

The following notes may be useful in identifying the lettering on the map:—B.P. (boundary post); G.P. (guide post); L.B. (letter box); M.P. (mile post); M.S. (milestone); P. (pump); P.O. (post office); S.B. (signal box); S.P. (signal post); U.D.By. (urban district boundary); °W. (well); while "Acres 707.716" records the number of acres (English) in the



parish.

Having acquired proficiency in identifying the conventional signs on a six-inch map, no difficulty will be found in the varieties on smaller scale maps; and these signs may be readily adapted to the requirements of military field sketching.

BOGS AS MILITARY OBSTACLES.

Any consideration of military operations in Ireland will inevitably include an estimate of the influence upon such operations of the Irish bogs. Over 2½ millions of acres, or nearly one-seventh of the area of the country, are covered by bogs of one kind or another. Some of these are situate on mountains, but the greater portion are ordinary flat bogs in the plains, and it is these that have played the chief part in the Irish wars.

In general a bog resembles all other military obstacles—such as a river, a mountain chain, a string of lakes—in that an army posted behind it can only be approached by very few routes. The roads across a large tract of bog are not plentiful, and are usually at a fair distance from each other. Of course, small parties of men can make their way across the actual bog itself, provided they know the ground; but no large formed body can do so. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that a bog offers no cover to an advancing force: it is a dead level without trees, rocks, buildings, or any other shelter. Sometimes, but very rarely, a very hard frost will make passable a tract that could not otherwise be passed over.

With reference to the roads over bogs, there are two points to notice. The road has to be built up artificially for its entire length, and consequently is made as straight as possible, to save labour: again, it is unfenced, because there is nothing on either side to be fenced in. A bog road, then, is a straight causeway at a fair height over the level of the surrounding country. It is consequently especially liable to be swept by fire, and any force advancing along it may be stopped by a few picked riflemen well posted at one end.

In short, a much inferior force is safe behind a bog as far as a frontal attack is concerned, if the commander has taken his measures with ordinary care. Only a turning movement offers a prospect of success, and the defender should be able to meet this if his force is considerable

or to withdraw in good time when the enemy is definitely committed to his flanking move.

In the case of a hostile army marching parallel to a long expanse of bog leaving the latter on its flank, it would seem that the marching force is covered by the tract of waste land. But as a matter of fact a long tract of this kind is usually not continuous, but is split up by slices of good land, where there will be good roads. Evidently such country as this is very suitable for raiding enterprises by small bodies of cyclists against the enemy's flank. Cyclists are just the kind of force for the "hit and get away" tactics required on such raids. Cyclists can cover the distance rapidly for a sudden attack, and can retire rapidly and safely where it would be impossible for infantry to do so.

The danger of fighting in front of a bog is naturally very great. There are numerous instances in the Irish wars of troops being driven into bogs and then helplessly slaughtered. On the other hand, a bog offers a means to escape to a small force with good knowledge of the district withdrawing into it at night. In one respect bogs give a kind of concealment, as they are but a poor background for a target. The moisture over them also causes error in the line of sight. For these reasons it will often be best to hold fire if the enemy advances over the moorish surface itself, and then overwhelm him at close range. Artillery is comparatively ineffective in such ground.

GENERAL NOTES.

Níor mhiste cógháirdeachus a dheunamh lesna rábairí acfuinneacha do fuair seilbh ar bheairric Charraig Tuathail i gConndae Chorcaighe. Dubhairt an tuairisc a bhí insna páipeuraibh gur thóg sé trí uair an chluig dóibh chun an bearraic do ghabháil, ach ní fíor son. Níor thóg sé leath an mhéid aimsire sin. Dheineadar a ngnó go cliste. Dream ana-bheag a bhí ann, cé go ndubhairt na píleáraí go raibh ceud nó dhá ceud nó trí ceud aca ann. Cúis ghéaire chughainn! Dubhairt na píleáraí leis gur mhol Ceann Urraid na nOglách iad i dtaobh "troid mhaith" a dheunamh agus go ndubhairt sé gur bh "Eireannaigh mhaithé" iad. Ní gádh dhúinn a rádh ná fuil éan fhocal den fhírinne san méid sin, ach dearg-éitheach ar fad. Go deimhin, níor dheineadar "troid mhaith" ach a mhalairt.

