

EDITORIAL.

GA GASCED AR A RAGAM INDIU?

The crest which appeared on the cover-design of previous issues is now official and, as such, can no longer figure in an unofficial Journal. It is with genuine regret we note its disappearance—for it means severing an intimate and direct link of association with our early military history. Still its official adoption is an official declaration of the continuity of the Army with the earliest military bodies in our history, and in this consideration there is compensation for the loss which the Journal sustains.

In the epic tale "The Cattle Spoil of Cooley"—more affectionately referred to as "The Táin"—a question is put on each successive morning of the three days' fight at the ford: "What kind of warfare shall we have to-day?" and the daily answer proposes the use of weapons of progressive complexity. This suggestion of rapid change in methods of warfare within a limited period is very appropriate to modern conditions, and the question in its archaic form replaces the crest which has disappeared.

The "Fight at the Ford" has its setting some two thousand years ago. The questioning voices of our predecessors borne upon the winds of tradition through many generations were caught up and preserved in a MS. now almost a thousand years old. "An t-Oglach" adopts the question in the form in which it has been thus preserved, not only because of its anticipation of and its suitability of application to the military problems of to-day—but because it constitutes a bond of association with our distant past and proclaims the solidarity of our ancient and modern ideals.

In passing it may be mentioned that the motto of the Army Medical Services—*Comraind Legis* (equal treatment for friend and foe) is derived from the same source.

* * * * *

We take this opportunity of stressing the unofficial character of the "Army Quarterly." An article that is a *bona fide* expression of desire for amelioration and progress must occasionally display a spirit of healthy constructive criticism; in so far as this is essential to the development of the theme it will not constitute a barrier to acceptance of such article for publication. Such an article will undoubtedly be welcomed by all concerned. This must not be misconstrued as an invitation to unloose the flood-gates of all kinds of criticism. A contribution which has nothing but carping or destructive criticism—even faultlessly expressed—to recommend it, must be considered unsuitable for publication in AN T-ÓGLACH.

The Defence Plans Division.

We direct the special attention of our readers to the introductory address of the Director at the inaugural session of the Defence Plans Division (Temp.)—which appears in this issue. As Major-General MacNeill points out, the gradual transition from Volunteer Force to Standing Army was violently interrupted by more pressing demands. The formation of a permanent

Army—applicable to the wider needs of the nation—must now be proceeded with. The situation and the proposals for the solution of the problems arising therefrom are clearly outlined in the address, and a close perusal of the latter will afford the key to many future steps in the evolution of the Army. The programme outlined in "Stage A" has already been completed, and "Stage B" is already well under way. For some time to come the Defence Plans Division will represent the centre of maximum Army activity. That is a further reason why the inaugural address will repay close study.

We are privileged to reproduce in this number a few impromptu remarks by the Minister for Defence on the occasion of an informal visit to the Defence Plans Division. As an expression of Ministerial policy in so far as it affects the future of serving Officers it will afford welcome reading at the present juncture, and most readers will associate it with the prospect of stability implied in the promise in Dail Eireann to introduce legislation of a permanent nature dealing with Army organisation—possibly during the current financial year.

The Lesson of the Trans-Atlantic Flight.

All honour to the German Trans-Atlantic Fliers and to their associate—an Officer of the Irish Army. According to an old Persian saying "the prudent learn much from the experiments of the daring." It is in the practical reactions of the Bremen's flight that its value will be indicated and the sincerity of the tributes to it more fully decided. Public vociferation may be part of the reward that daring adventurers are accorded, but no man risks his life merely for a cheer, and the three fliers are the most insistent in denying that this was a "stunt" to secure the limelight for a temporary flash on the world's stage. It was a venture deliberately undertaken—

- (a) To test the fitness of air-craft in its present stage of development to undertake the hazard of such a journey.
- (b) To note the effect of such a journey on these machines so that weaknesses hitherto known only to the brave men and women who have flown to an Atlantic grave may be provided against.
- (c) To ascertain for the guidance of others the varying (climatic and atmospheric) conditions obtaining over this great stretch of water, and lastly
- (d) To establish the suitability of Ireland as the final jumping-off station from Europe in such flights.

When public acclamation has finally subsided, and public interest in the human aspect of the venture has waned, the data collected by these men will continue to be examined by the scientists of aircraftsmanship—and it is this data that will be the final justification of the flight. Those who see in it only a madcap undertaking successfully carried through would also have failed to see the historic significance of the great marine prototype, Columbus, were they antedated to the 15th century. It will be as pioneers in trans-ocean travel development that the crew of the Bremen will be remembered.

Has Ireland anything to learn from this enterprise? That is the question that the thoughtful amongst us are asking, and an answer in the form of concrete action must be sought from those charged with the development in Ireland of this mode of travel. Are the rewards of this venture to be reaped by others for other countries, while we who have provided facilities by which it was accomplished and participated in the peril of its execution take no practical steps to retain for Ireland the place it has temporarily secured in the eyes of the world as the country best fitted by nature for the start of the great stride from East to West? It is important that the problem should be faced immediately, for as there is a tide in the affairs of men, it is no less true that great opportunities present themselves to nations and then withdraw if a nation is too blind or too indolent to seize them. So far as this nation is concerned *now* is the opportunity in the matter of action.

World-flying routes are still tentative and malleable, and will continue so for some little time; but they will become less flexible, and just as we lost our position as a trans-Atlantic sailing terminal for Europe we will lose our great potentialities as an air terminal unless the problem is faced forthwith. We must assert ourselves now and proclaim our natural advantages which almost proclaim themselves in spite of us. In a word, we must shout in the world's ear what the map shows to those who but glimpse at it, that Ireland, at the end of Europe, is the beginning, in an aerial sense, of the North-American continent. This is the propaganda aspect of it; but there remains to be demonstrated our own especial interest in the affairs of the air. Can we develop the air sense in our own people? What steps can be taken towards this end?

Let us suggest the following as a reasonable outline of a practical programme:—

1. The moral and financial encouragement of civilian flying, i.e., the encouragement of civil aero clubs by providing training facilities, financial assistance towards the provision of machines, the provision of awards to civilians who become qualified pilots, etc.

2. Exploitation of the possibilities of providing aerial services to work in conjunction with trans-Atlantic liners in the speeding-up of mail deliveries and, perhaps, of passengers.

3. Organisation of civilian aerial flights, reliability flights, etc.—perhaps as an adjunct to such a function as the Tailteann Festival.

4. The maintenance of aerodromes not necessarily required in connection with military aviation, and their improvement. (How many flight projects from Ireland have been abandoned for lack of ground facilities?)

5. The encouragement of, and the provision of facilities for, the apprenticeship of youths to aerial engineering and mechanics by scholarships, etc. Such an arrangement could be worked out with our own Air Corps as a training centre with perhaps higher specialist training in foreign centres.

Our own military needs, apart from the general interest of the country, demand the exploitation of proposals such as these. A nation such as ours cannot provide and maintain the military air arm for defence on the scale on which we require it, if we do not develop civil aviation to its utmost. It is doubtful

indeed if any country can. Just as we will depend in war for man-power on the male civilian population, and for supplies on our general industrial resources, so we will be compelled to rely on our civilian pilots and engineers for the building up to effective strength of our air forces. The nation's general peace-time interests and its war-time demands are in this, as in other phases of activity, inseparable; as we build in peace we become self-reliant in the vital factors of defence.

One should not lose sight of the fact that Canada, because of its geographical position, played a very important part at a very critical point of the flight. In paying tribute to this participation it is not inopportune to quote a question in the British House of Commons on 9th May, 1928. "Mr. Hurd asked the Secretary of State for Air whether he has under sympathetic observation the movements in Ireland and Canada to follow up the trans-Atlantic air flight of Major Fitzmaurice and his comrades by establishing air ports in Ireland on the one hand, and at the entrance of the St. Lawrence on the other for the collection and distribution of trans-Atlantic sea-borne mails, and whether he and the Postmaster-General will consider the advisability of conferring with the Governments of Ireland and Canada as to this means of quickening Empire mail services." "Sir Samuel Hoare—The establishment of air ports in the Irish Free State and Canada is a matter for the Governments concerned. I can promise, however, that any development which, as a result of the employment of aircraft, will expedite the delivery of sea-borne trans-Atlantic mails, will have the sympathetic co-operation of both the Postmaster-General and myself."

The fact that good fortune has attended the two attempts at trans-Atlantic flight from Ireland—(Captain MacIntosh and Comdt. Fitzmaurice having succeeded in the former attempt in turning back from adverse weather conditions and effecting a safe landing on the Irish coast)—should be accepted as a good omen for the future of Ireland in aviation. The Bremen has blazed the trail where the world will soon build a road. Will we co-operate in the building or content ourselves with watching others build and possess it?

" Other Ranks."

A contribution expressing the viewpoint of Non-Commissioned Officers and Men—for the sake of brevity usually referred to as " Other Ranks "—is a welcome addition to the present number. It is the ambition of the Journal to speak for the Army as a whole, and contributions in article form from any rank, if considered suitable from the point of view of subject-matter, will be published. It would not be in the best interests of the Journal to allot a definite number of pages to any group of contributors. There is no guarantee that the space proposed by our contributor in the present instance would always be utilised—and on the other hand we hope that it will be frequently exceeded.

The Cross of the Chevalier of the Legion of Honour has been awarded to ex-Major-General Francis Joseph Morrin, formerly D.M.S., National Army.

ADDRESS BY THE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE.

THE following is an extract from an address delivered by the Minister for Defence at the Hibernian Military Schools during the first study session of the Defence Plans Division:—

“ I am particularly glad to have this opportunity to speak to the Officers attending these lectures. I have heard from sources that I can rely on—(I have enquired discreetly and perhaps indiscreetly)—that the standard of the lectures reflects great credit upon the Officers giving them. I have heard also that the attendance at the lectures, the zeal, application and work of those attending show an earnestness and seriousness that promise well for the future. My own impressions to-day confirm what I have heard.

“ An army is a necessity, for all countries are at all times either actually or potentially threatened. Our work is simplified to some extent by the fact that our circumstances and our national policy give us a very good assurance that active service for the army will be exclusively of a defensive nature.

“ I am a civilian—I do not pretend to any military knowledge. In all such matters I defer to you, Major-General MacNeill, and to all our Officers, but I am satisfied that the development of modern military science tends to multiply the effectiveness of the defender as compared with the aggressor. I am satisfied that, though we are a small country, it is possible for us to defend ourselves effectively against any attack that we can regard as reasonably possible—and to do that within the limits of our resources, financial and otherwise. Decent citizenship demands that when the nation is threatened our man-power be co-extensive with our population, and our resources the resources of the nation.

“ Human experience has taught a science of war, the general principles of which apply to all places and all times. We propose to avail ourselves of what human experience has taught and to learn that science. It has also taught the value of discipline in the effective use of war-like power and the economy of lives.

“ The particular application of the general military science to our own special circumstances has to be discovered, codified and applied. I believe that you are now laying the foundation of that Irish military science. Out of this institution there will evolve slowly a body of knowledge that will be handed on to the Irish Army for all time, like a tradition, modifying itself from time to time to meet changing circumstances. That knowledge will be built up from the cumulative experiences and thought of our Officers. Your business is the laying of the foundations.

“ I have said that it is the business of every man to serve and to defend the nation. But when a man dons the uniform he announces that he accepts that duty in a very special way, that his ordinary daily life and thought are devoted to that service before all things. It is a serious matter. It demands application,

hard work, and a real unflinching devotion to that work. It is not merely a matter of attending for a number of hours from nine to five. It is a noble task, and those who undertake it may not be slacking in its service. Its discipline is rigid and should not be relaxed.

"We must expect more from you than is expected from Officers of other armies, for where they have merely to maintain you have to build; the knowledge that they inherit you have to discover. Our resources are limited and you have to make up for that limitation by being unlimited in your service.

"Such service as I have indicated means that the army should be the life-work of an Officer. That being so, the Officer who accepts that as a duty may well regard it as a right that he should have some assurance that he will be allowed to make the army his profession with such security as attaches to most professions. With that point of view I am entirely in accord. But the permanent Officer personnel must be composed exclusively of Officers ready and willing to give such service."



TO SUBSCRIBERS.

To ensure prompt delivery of each issue of "An tOglach" you are requested to notify any change of address to:—The Manager, "An tOglach," 2 and 3 Yarnhall Street, Dublin.

Immediate notice should be given of any delay in receipt of the Journal.

THE DEFENCE PLANS DIVISION.

INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS.

By MAJOR-GENERAL H. MACNEILL,
Director, Defence Plans Division (T).,
General Staff, Department of Defence.

Delivered on February 6th, 1928, at the Hibernian Military Schools, Dublin, on the occasion of the formal inauguration of the programme of Study and Research conducted by the Division.

GENTLEMEN,

SUCH remarks as I intend to make this morning are described in your Schedule as an "Introductory Address," that is, a general introduction to your work here with the Defence Plans Division. To enable us to execute that work efficiently it is necessary that we should all thoroughly understand exactly what this Division is, what it stands for, and what it hopes to achieve. Before we can do this it is also necessary that we should first of all understand the circumstances which led up to its formation. I am therefore going to crave your patience for a few moments while I attempt to make a brief survey of the most important of these circumstances.

To do this we must commence by going right back to the very formation of our Army in its present form. We all, I think, have a pretty good general idea of the situation early in 1922 when the process of transition from a Volunteer Force to a Regular Army was under consideration, and indeed to some extent in course of execution. If that gradual process of evolution had been allowed to develop undoubtedly the subsequent history of our Army would have been altogether different. However, as we all know, that was not to be. Long before the responsible military authorities of that time had any opportunity of arriving at sound logical decisions as to the exact requirements of National Defence in this country, they were called upon, almost overnight, to raise, train, and equip a complete Army for the purpose of suppressing internal disorder. The result of this was that the old Volunteer Force, and the nucleus of the new Regular Army, both lost their identity in what has since gone down to history as the "National Army"—an Army raised for the express purpose of suppressing internal rebellion. Now I want to emphasise that point—raised for the express purpose of suppressing internal rebellion. For the next year or so all the energies of the Army were concentrated towards the accomplishment of this mission, in which it was successful by the end of 1923.

Almost immediately the Army was flung into the throes of demobilisation, which almost inevitably means disorganisation, and apart from this factor a certain amount of uncertainty as to the possibility of recurrence of civil strife continued to exist until well on in 1925. This meant that for over three years the Army was practically entirely occupied with what is only a minor aspect of National Defence in most countries, although of course circumstances made it a very major one in ours.

We can therefore say that it was not until well on in 1925 that any real effort could be made to get the Army to think at all collectively on the major aspects of National Defence, that is, on the defence of our country against all enemies, not alone against internal ones.

From that time on some very useful ground work was carried out. Through the medium of the Army School of Instruction and other agencies some attempt was made to tackle the all important subject of Combat Training, an effort was made to systematise training generally throughout the Army, individual officers began to study conscientiously, and as thoroughly as possible under the circumstances the problems confronting them.

However, it was apparent that if any really effective progress was to be made we could not rely entirely upon our own resources. We lacked the background of the necessary higher staff and tactical training among our senior officers. We had to get some idea of how the problems confronting us were met and overcome in other countries. The first result of this conclusion was the despatch of a mission of six officers to the United States in the summer of 1926, charged with the study of American Strategic, Tactical, and Logistical principles in general, and of Infantry, Artillery and Tank Tactics in particular. This mission was followed in due course by another to England, charged with the study of a particular technical aspect of modern warfare, while a very commendable effort to utilise some of our own "outside" resources was made in the recently completed Ordnance Survey Course.

Meanwhile the Army School of Instruction, reinforced now by decentralized N.C.O.'s Schools, and such technical agencies as the Air Corps Schools, the Signal Corps courses, the Medical Training Depot, and so on, continued to lay the foundation of higher progressive training. Officers, here and there, continued their individual studies, while a few of you were fortunate enough to be brought up against some of the realities of our defence situation at the last Imperial Conference.

Gradually it became apparent that we were beginning to lose what was described so aptly recently by one of our officers as the "Internal Disorder complex."

Now, all soldiers are proverbially "growlers," and we are certainly no exception to that rule, but I think that the most hardened pessimist amongst us must admit that all this represents progress—sound rational progress. Perhaps it has not been as rapid as we would desire. It might have been better systematised. It may not have coincided in sequence and method with that of other Armies, but we must all realise the gigantic nature of the task that confronted us. Modern armies are not built in a day, or a year, or a lifetime, even by the most highly trained staffs. The work is never finished; something always remains to be completed.

Now don't imagine that I mean to state that this affords us any justification for taking a pessimistic view of the future, or that we should be even satisfied with the rate of progress maintained so far. Of course I know that individual officers

will hold the view that we are never likely to be called upon to handle large units in our lifetime, that the army will continue to decline in numbers until it reaches the vanishing point, that it is out of question to think of ever raising even one complete Division.

It seems to me that our recent history provides a very adequate answer to any such outlook. After all if anyone had ventured to suggest in 1919 or 1920 that the opportunities of to-day would ever present themselves, the prophet would promptly be classified as insane. Similarly, some of you gentlemen may hold the view that we could never raise even one complete Division in time of emergency. Now a war-strength Division would not normally exceed 20,000 men, and might I remind you that in 1922-23 we raised over 60,000 troops, or the equivalent of a modern Army Corps in this country to quell what was after all a mere domestic disturbance.

Looking back on the past in this way, and making a brief survey of the present, I think we can all agree that whatever progress has been made to date has been in the nature of clearing the ground, of laying the foundations for a permanent military system. But let there be no mistake about it, we have achieved nothing more—we have simply laid the foundations. Now, foundations, as such, are useful only as something upon which to build; therefore it would appear that our next step should be to begin that building up process we all so much desire.

How shall we commence? Someone will say at once that before any real further progress can be made we must give our senior officers an opportunity to acquire some higher training, that we have a few officers available trained in America and England, that they should be utilised for this purpose. Now let us consider what that would mean. We have certainly a few officers available who have been trained in foreign military schools—in the schools of America and England. For some years past we have all tended to look upon a Military College as the panacea for all ills in this Army. Suppose we decide to organise this College immediately and staff it with these foreign-trained officers? What happens?

These officers have been trained, as I emphasised before, in the Military Schools of England and America, in the Tactical Doctrines of these two great World Powers, in Tactical Doctrines based on the definite Theories of War developed to meet the particular requirements of these countries. For example, does anyone think for a moment that the Theory of War developed to meet the needs of National Defence of a huge wealthy territory like the United States could have any direct application to the defence of a small weak country like Ireland? Decidedly not. Therefore if their Theories of War are not applicable neither are their Tactical Doctrines, their Schemes of Organisation, of Supply, of Equipment, of Command and Administration, all of which are based on their Theories of War, and which in their turn form the basis of all instruction in their Armies. We have no equivalent for them in our Service, therefore we have *no basis of instruction at all*. So what are we to do?

Are we to adopt the Tactical Doctrines of America, or of England, from the mere academic point of view, and utilise these as an artificial basis of instruction? Obviously, that is not the solution.

Let us develop this line of thought a little further and try to visualise exactly what type of training our officers really require. With your permission I will attempt to answer that question by quoting from the "General Report of the Irish Military Mission to the U.S.A.," which, I think, deals with the matter fairly concisely:—

Quotation:

"The education our officers require is manifestly that which will enable them to deal with the problems which are peculiarly ours, as well as the military problems which are common to our and other Armies. They must get that tactical training which suits the type of combat they are likely to find themselves in, they must be trained to use the military machine which our policy and our resources permit us to have, and they must be trained to face all these problems in the light of the characteristics of our people and our State.

"In short, we must have our Doctrine of War, and when we have it we should then proceed to inculcate that Doctrine into our officers and prepare them for the task of carrying it into effect."

Now we are getting down to the immediate need of the Army—to what I feel is the kernel of the whole matter.

What exactly do we mean by Doctrine of War? It is described in United States Army regulations as follows:—

"Doctrine of War is the theory of the use of the Nation's forces under particular conditions, and is based on the national characteristics and resources. Decision to go to war having been made, operations will be carried into hostile territory, and every resource of the Nation—mental, moral and physical—will be utilised to bring about a definite, speedy, and successful conclusion."

The theory of the use of the Nations' forces: Now this is not to be confused with Defence Policy, which is an entirely different matter. Defence Policy is prescribed by the government, the Doctrine of War designed to implement that policy by the Military Authorities. Without betraying any secrets we can, I think, summarise the Defence Policy of the Irish Government as we know it, somewhat as follows: "The defence of Ireland is the responsibility of the people of Ireland, and is the duty of the Government and of the Army acting for the people." In other words, it simply tells us *what* to do—to defend our Country. The Doctrine of War is the Theory upon which this defence must be based, it must therefore tell us *how* to do it.

I hope that I have now made it clear that before any further progress is possible the formulation of an Irish Doctrine or Theory of War is essential, and that it is this Theory and the details of its application which must form the basis of all training.

It might be well therefore if we considered briefly what the formulation of this Doctrine involves, the steps and the studies necessary to enable us to formulate it, soundly and logically. These studies might be classified under four main sub-heads, as follows:

1. Possible enemies of this country.
2. Possible actions of such enemies, under particular circumstances.
3. Possible theatre of operations, or scenes of such actions.
4. Our General Theory of Defence, based on these first three factors, and on the characteristics of our people and our State, our natural and other resources, and of course on the facts of our geographical situation.

This Theory of War having been duly formulated, can we then consider this stage of our work complete? Decidedly not. The Doctrine of War in itself is insufficient unless we have several other things to implement it. These might be summarised as follows:

1. Tactical Doctrines for each Arm of the Service.
2. Schemes of Organisation for peace and war based on these Tactical Doctrines.
3. Schemes of Supply and Equipment.
4. Schemes of Command, Staff, and Administration.
5. Scheme of Military Education.

All these are essential to implement our Doctrine of War, and therefore they must of necessity be based explicitly upon the requirements of this Doctrine.

With a complete understanding on these matters, and the approval of the necessary regulations, Tables of Organisation, and so on, which will be required for use as text books, the establishment of a Military College becomes purely dependant on the provision of the necessary Faculty and material equipment.

However, apart from this factor at all, we should all thoroughly realise that this Theory of War, and the instruments required to implement it, are not alone desirable; they are essential. They form the very basis of justification for the Army's existence; without them further progress is impossible. The Army must know definitely where it is going, what it exists for, what it is expected to do under certain circumstances, and how it is to do it.

Until we know this it is an absolute waste of energy to attempt to think at all along any progressive lines of training, organisation, or administration; we would be simply working in the dark. Any civilian, layman or official, could come along and dictate to us what strength our Army should be, what type of organisation we should have—and who could contradict him? The Army would simply drift along, probably dwindle in strength and equipment year after year until it becomes impotent; morale would be shattered beyond hope of repair, and in case of war nothing but a miracle could avert national disaster.

Now these are not mere academic theories. As I said before, they are vital to the very existence of the Army itself, and they are of grave professional and personal interest to everyone of us. Naturally the importance and the urgency of these matters would be nowhere recognised so clearly as among the members of

the Defence Council, and they were immediately faced with the problem of how they were to be studied and by whom. It was recognised that if they were to receive the consideration their importance warranted it was essential that officers dealing with them should have some uniform degree of training and outlook, some knowledge of the fundamental Principles of War, some general idea of how these problems were met and overcome in other countries. Therefore the first step was to arrive at some decision which would afford officers concerned an opportunity of carrying out these necessary preliminary studies, or alternatively of utilising the services of the few officers who had already been given opportunities of acquiring the basis of such preliminary general knowledge as was required.

At first sight it would appear to be a very simple matter to utilise say the services of the American and British Missions, with perhaps one or two others, to constitute some sort of a small Board or Committee, and to assign the responsibility for the study and solution of these problems to such a body.

However, if we examine the matter more fully it will be found that these are problems that affect the whole Army. Every officer in the Service is interested in them, directly in some of their aspects, indirectly in all of them. They are so big that their solution demands the utilisation of all our existing resources, the close co-operation and co-ordination of every Branch in the Department of Defence, of all Headquarters of Special Services, of all training, record, administrative, and supply agencies. No small Board or Committee could possibly obtain this co-operation, nor could it bring to bear on the problems the necessary variety of outlook and interest that would be required.

This is perhaps the most important point of all. The modern Army after all is not composed exclusively of Infantry. Infantry certainly remains the basic Arm—the Arm whose success or failure spells victory or defeat for the whole Army. But of itself it is not all-powerful, or normally even effective. In battle it must have Artillery to support it, an Air Corps to see for it and to protect it from enemy aircraft, a Signal Corps to make it articulate, Engineers to build for it, a Quartermaster Department to supply and move it, a Medical Corps to attend to its casualties, an Adjutant's Department to replace them, a General Staff to plan for it, and so on. All together go to build up that great tactical team we call the Modern Army; the Infantry, like all the rest, is just an element of the team even if the most important one.

No one of these elements by itself can achieve victory; each one has its own part to play, and inefficiency in one re-acts throughout the team as a whole. It is essential that all these varied interests shall be considered in the solution of such problems as we are faced with (unless we wish to hopelessly weaken our team before we even commence to build it). For these reasons the small Board idea was definitely ruled out and it was decided that the services of all available responsible officers should be utilised, and that every Branch of the Service should be represented. To ensure the necessary co-operation and co-ordination it was further decided that these officers should be organised into a new temporary Division of the General Staff, to be known as the Defence Plans Division, functioning under the direct control of the Chief of Staff.

We have now reached the stage where we can with advantage consider in some detail the actual work of this Division. I hope that its purpose is by this time perfectly clear to all. If any one desires to examine it in greater detail he will find it set out as prescribed by the Chief of Staff in the "General Instructions" issued this morning. In the actual organisation of the work of the Division the first difficulty experienced was the fact that all its members had to be afforded an opportunity of acquiring some uniformity in preliminary training and general outlook before going on to consider concrete problems connected with the defence of this country. It was therefore decided to divide the work of the Division into two stages:—

Stage A.—Covering preliminary general studies, and

Stage B.—Covering the detailed study of our own problems and the formulation of recommendations as to their solution.

We are immediately concerned with Stage A, which commences this morning. Now I want to emphasise that in this Stage we are not attempting to train you as higher commanders or Staff Officers. We are simply going to attempt to touch on the "high spots," to try to tear aside some of the veil of mystery that it is easy to weave around the Military Art, and above all to show you how and what to study, so that when we come to Stage B, the study of our own concrete problems, we may approach these problems systematically, and with confidence. To do this we attempt in this first Stage to give you a general picture of different foreign military systems, with particular reference to the Army of the United States.

Here again I must digress for a moment. You will find that the basis of practically all your studies in Stage A will be founded on the policies, doctrines, principles and methods of the United States Army. It must, however, be thoroughly understood by everyone that these doctrines, principles and so on are not to be taken as ideal, or even suitable, for utilisation in the detailed consideration of our own problems. This particular foreign system has been adopted for preliminary study, simply because circumstances have enabled us to make a more complete and detailed study of it than of any other foreign system. We have a first hand knowledge of it; their text-books regulations, and so on, are available; their methods of instruction are familiar to us. Therefore we can cover it more completely than we could hope to cover any foreign system. Otherwise, however, the United States Army is studied purely as a basis for further study, to enable us, as pointed out earlier, to insure some uniformity in general training before proceeding to matters that concern us intimately in this country. So much for the basis of instruction in this first stage; let us now pass on to the details.

You will note that your work in this Stage is divided into a number of Sub-courses, covering various aspects of the Art of War, commencing with the more elementary principles, and gradually progressing to relatively advanced studies. For example, we commence at the bottom with "Military Organisation," through the medium of which we hope to acquaint you first with the basic principles of organisation, and subsequently show the application of these principles to the

detailed organisation of staffs and units of all formations. At the same time we introduce you to the Sub-course on "Combat Orders." This is designed to familiarise you with uniform methods in the issue of orders in the field, which is the vehicle you will generally use in solving tactical problems set for instructional purposes in this Division. For this reason some instruction in the actual mechanics of solving such problems is also included in this Sub-Course.

We next progress to what we call our "Tactics and Technique" Sub-Courses, covering the characteristics, capabilities, functions, and limitations of each separate Arm of the Service such as Infantry, Artillery, Air Corps, and so on.

Having studied these different Branches separately, we go on to consider the combination of them into Tactical Teams, or Units of all Arms. This is carried out through the medium of our Sub-Course on "Combined Tactics," which I may remark is by far the most important of all your Sub-Courses.

About this time we also take up the study of "Command, Staff, and Logistics," covering the command of troops in the field, Staff duties, and their Supply and Transport. This arrangement has been deemed desirable because history has shown that no Commander can arrive at a sound tactical decision until he has also studied the logistical aspects of the problem confronting him. For this reason the Sub-Courses on "Combined Tactics" and "Command, Staff, and Logistics" run practically concurrently.

Now in studies like these we are forced to fight our battles on maps instead of over actual terrain, with coloured pins or chalk instead of living flesh and blood. No matter how hard we try we can never give proper consideration to such factors as weather conditions, morale, fatigue of troops, deficiencies in supply and equipment, while of course the personal element cannot enter into the matter at all. As a result officers are liable to get a false idea of the simplicity of tactical operations, or rather of their execution. One comes to a decision, drafts a theoretical order, moves a few pins on a Map, and an operation, involving perhaps 20,000 men, is completed. In an attempt to counteract this we have introduced what is called a "Troop Leading" Sub-Course, through which we hope to be able to present to you clear pictures of the execution of tactical principles applicable to any given situation, and the necessity and means for securing tactical team work.

General subjects such as Personnel and Administration, Military History, or Military Intelligence, which do not definitely depend upon the progress made in tactical studies, are introduced at intervals throughout your whole course.

Finally, we conclude with a short sub-course in Strategy, illustrating by concrete examples the application of the fundamental Principles of War to actual strategical situations.

Before leaving Stage A may I again emphasise that no attempt is being made at this stage to start a school of any kind. Everyone of us here, whether members of the Directing Staff or attached for duty, are students to some extent, but we are primarily General Staff Officers, engaged in the execution of a highly important Staff Mission assigned to us by the Chief of Staff. In order that this Mission be satisfactorily executed it is essential that the training and outlook of

the Officers charged with its execution should be as uniform as possible. An attempt is made to achieve this uniformity in Stage A, which is purely preliminary to Stage B, the second and vital stage of our programme.

If we are to succeed in this object it is necessary that you should not expect too much, that you should make allowances, that you should recognise our limitation in time, equipment, resources, or even basis of instruction. We are not attempting to conduct any sort of a complete course. As pointed out previously, we will simply try to touch, and only touch, on essentials. To succeed even in this it is necessary that you gentlemen should co-operate by free and frank discussion, by open criticism where you think it necessary, by suggestions wherever you can make them.

You will find that the "Open Door" policy will be rigidly upheld here. My office and every other office in the Division is open to you. If you want any help or assistance come and ask us for it. If we can't give it to you we will tell you so frankly, and try and put you on the track of getting it. At Lectures or Conferences if there is anything that is not quite clear to you don't hesitate to question the instructor; that is what he is primarily there for.

Now before concluding I want to touch briefly on Stage B of our Programme, although we will have plenty of opportunities to consider this in detail before we come up against it. You have seen that Stage A deals generally with what might be described as the study of the Art of War in the abstract. Stage B, on the contrary, will deal explicitly with the study and solution of our own problems of National Defence in all their aspects. Most of our work in this stage will be executed through the medium of Committees, working in close co-operation with, and utilising all the resources of existing Staff Branches, Special Services Headquarters, Training and other agencies. It is not necessary to do more at this time than to briefly consider the order in which we intend covering the various aspects of the problems before us.

Naturally our first step is the consideration and formulation of an Irish Doctrine of War. I don't wish for a moment to appear to minimise the importance of this matter, the lack of which is the real reason for the existence of this Division at all, but as it has already been covered fairly thoroughly there does not appear to be any reason for dwelling on it any further at this stage.

This Doctrine of War having been approved we next proceed to the determination of Tactical Doctrines for each Arm of the Service, commencing with the Infantry as the Basic Arm, and then considering the various other Branches. This portion of our work in particular will be executed through the medium of Sub-Committees, selected from Officers with special experience, training, or aptitude for the particular work concerned, and may I again emphasise, working in the closest possible co-operation with all existing agencies.

We next progress to the Organisation aspects of our problems, and consider these in the light of our Strategical and Tactical requirements, as outlined in our Doctrine of War and Tactical Doctrines.

Consideration of the Equipment and Supply of the Military Machine designed as I have outlined is our next problem. This will involve the detailed study, not

alone of the combat requirements of our troops, but also of our natural and other resources.


We next take up the study of matters connected with the Command of our Forces in Peace and War, a suitable Staff system, and schemes of Administration. You will find that this phase of our work will be probably broader in scope than any other, and one in which the personal aspect will of necessity intrude to a considerable extent, in such matters, for example, as tenure of offices, appointments, transfers, etc.

Now naturally we cannot hope to maintain our forces in Peace-time on a War footing, and we must therefore consider the transformation and expansion which would be necessary in time of emergency. This will entail the consideration of outline Mobilisation Schemes.

Finally, having outlined the skeleton of our military machine in this manner we must consider the training of it and of all its components, and this brings us on to our final mission, the formulation of a scheme of Military Education for the forces.

If this programme is carried out conscientiously to its logical conclusion, I think we can all afford to look to the future with confidence. For the first time in our history these grave problems of National defence can be studied systematically and thoroughly. They will be studied by Officers drawn from every Branch of the Service, comprising, I believe, every available responsible officer. They will be studied from every angle and every interest, and our conclusions must of necessity be as sound and as logical as the bulk of the considered military opinion of this country can make them. Our mission for the future will be clear and concrete, our organisation, training, equipment, administration, and supply will be based definitely on the requirements of this mission. We can at last see exactly where we are going, and be able to look ahead, not one or two, but ten or twenty years. Finally, we will be able to justify some measure of permanency and *stability*, and then, and only then, can we hope to be in a position to settle down to a sound progressive programme of adequate National Defence.

In conclusion, gentlemen, may I express on my own behalf, and I am sure on yours, our appreciation of the courtesy of the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General, and the G.O.C. Curragh Training Camp, in attending here this morning, and our regrets that owing to unforeseen circumstances the Chief of Staff, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, were unable to be with us also. By their presence here to-day these General Officers have given you a practical demonstration of the importance the responsible authorities attach to your work here. During the next few months your duties will call for very close co-operation and co-ordination between this Division and the two great Staff Branches controlled by General Brennan and General MacEoin, and with the training agencies at the Curragh Camp, controlled by General Sweeney. This will entail the closest possible liaison between us. The presence of these responsible General Officers is a guarantee of the best possible type of liaison—personal contact. I know that we all hope that this contact will remain close and effective until the conclusion of our task here.



DEFENCE PLANS DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF.

GROUP OF STAFF AND ATTACHED OFFICERS.

Front row (left to right)—Commndt. D. Stapleton, Ordnance Sub-Section; Capt. J. Flynn, Transport & Supply Section; Capt. J. Nolan, Topographical Section; Lieut. H. O'Neill, Topographical Section; Capt. S. O'Sullivan, Personnel Section; Capt. P. Berry, Transport & Supply Section; Commndt. P. Slattery, Engineer Sub-Section; Major-Gen. H. MacNeill, Director, D.P.D.; Colonel M. J. Costello, Command Section; Major J. Dunne, Infantry Section; Commndt. J. Smyth, Signal Sub-Section; Commndt. D. Bryan, Intelligence Section; Lieut. B. Donegan, Librarian; Captain E. Rooney, Staff Captain.

Middle row—Commndt. C. J. O'Donoghue, General Staff; Commndt. C. Stuart, Med. Sub-Section (D.P.D.); Commndt. C. McAllister, General Staff; Col. E. V. O'Carroll, General Staff; Col. F. McCorley, A.S.I.; Col. F. Bennett, Q.M.G. Branch; Major J. V. Joyce, General Staff; Major L. Hoolan, A.T.C.; Commndt. R. Daly, Infantry; Col. S. McGorran, General Staff; Major L. Archer, Signal Corps; Major M. Bishop, General Staff; Commndt. B. Sweeney, A.G. Branch; Commndt. L. Egan, General Staff.

Back row—Col. E. Moran, General Staff; Col. S. O'Higgins, General Staff; Capt. G. Carroll, Air Corps Sub-Section (D.P.D.); Col. T. O'Higgins, Army Med. Services; Major T. McGrath, Q.M.G. Branch; Capt. J. McLoughlin, Artillery; Capt. E. Butler, General Staff; Commndt. T. Fox, General Staff; Commndt. P. Paul, General Staff; Commndt. M. Gantly, Signal Corps; Commndt. C. Saurin, A.T.C.; Commndt. M. O'Connor, Corps of Engineers.

THE MANŒUVRE OF BANTRY BAY.

By COL. J. J. O'CONNELL, A.S.I.

CHAPTER II.

THE MILITARY SITUATION OF ENGLAND.

THE England of 1796 was in no condition to look forward with equanimity to the prospect of having to meet a powerful offensive effort. She had been waging continuous war—aided by numerous allies—against Republican France for four years; and that with singularly little success. Even at sea she had no really outstanding achievement to her credit. Instead of success, indeed, she had seen her coalition allies struck down and eliminated one by one. Two of them—Holland and Spain—had even passed over to the side of the enemy; and although neither of these could be described as a formidable Military power, either by land or sea, each represented a certain force of inertia which could not be neglected by England, but on the contrary entailed for her certain further commitments of some degree of seriousness.

PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND.

An insight into the opinion of the English people at this time will afford us some basis as to what their attitude would have been in face of such a reverse as the loss of Ireland. We are told that: "From the beginning of 1798 until the end of 1805 (if we except the brief respite given to men's minds on both sides of the Channel by the Peace of Amiens) the "to be or not to be" of the invasion was the all-absorbing and all-pervading topic of correspondence and conversation, and that from the palace to the cottage. It was an age of letter-writing, diary-keeping, pamphleteering; and Napoleon's projects are constantly mentioned in the Journals of women like Fanny Burney Bishops at their visitations; preachers in their pulpits; dramatic authors in their plays; poets in their verses; actors on the stage; Freemasons in their Lodges; magistrates at their county meetings; merchants on "Change"; shopkeepers at their counters; and labourers at the plough, all held the same language as to the common danger."* A mental state such as is here described certainly affords a *prima facie* reason to assume a readiness to peace and that the English "will to win" was by no means intact at this period is a matter of ordinary knowledge. There had for a long time been a definite "Peace Party," and there had been even disturbances arising out of the prolongation of the war and consequent distresses. In fact, all through 1796 Pitt had unofficially and semi-officially been in touch with the Directory with a view to peace. He even had brought pressure to bear on Thugut, the Austrian Chancellor, to the same end. Money was none too ready to hand in any event, and Austria had to be financed. The fact that English opinion was more in favour of a cessation than an intensification

* Wheeler and Broadley: "Napoleon and the Invasion of England." Intr.

of hostilities is all that is essential to make clear in a Military review of the crisis. Anybody desiring to get full information on these points can find it in general histories of the period.

One quotation, however, will be not without interest and a certain bearing on our subject: "He (Pitt) had been led to expect that the Directory would cede Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope (*i.e.* Dutch possessions) to England in return for a bribe of £450,000, and had already devised the means for depleting the Treasury of this sum without disclosure of the transaction to Parliament."[†]

It is not suggested that this policy of Pitt actually *did* explain the fact that Hoche did not get a larger measure of backing—but it easily *could* explain that fact. At least it is clear that such a government as the Directory was not the most helpful.

DISTRIBUTION OF ENGLISH MILITARY FORCES.

As the average student of History is practically certain to find no particulars of English military activity during the earlier years of the French Revolutionary Wars in the course of his reading; and as the activity of those years bears vitally on our present subject, it is necessary to review at some length the English effort of that time. It is common knowledge that England then maintained on the continent of Europe for the fight against France either a comparatively small number of troops or none. Where, then, were her troops—since presumably they were being employed somewhere? The following table will help us to understand:

BRITISH ESTABLISHMENT (ESTIMATES).

	1793	1794	1795	1796	1797	1798	1799	1800	1801	1802
HOME ...	17,344	60,244	119,380	49,219	60,765	48,609	52,051	80,275	75,619	70,299
PLANTATIONS...	18,194	41,490	40,261	82,182	64,227	34,320	31,445	41,719	72,829	25,494
INDIA ...	10,700	10,700	10,700	10,718	12,390	22,174	24,972	23,752	26,219	26,219
ARTILLERY ...	3,730	6,415	7,084	7,664	7,664	7,664	7,358	9,126	9,500	10,296
EMBODIED MILITIA and FENCIBLES) ...	17,602	42,803	62,791	65,662	66,096	62,202	134,786	56,522	104,619	—
						75,000				
FOREIGN TROOPS —	33,754	35,820	20,288	12,000	4,807	4,323	14,754	—	—	—

This table requires some little details of explanation—after which its full import will be the more readily grasped. First of all, it should be explained that the term "Plantations," which accounts for so large a proportion of the totals means the West Indies or Antilles, *i.e.*, the seat of the sugar plantations. In the second place, troops shown under the heading "India" must be definitely written off as unavailable anywhere else for an indefinite period. The voyage to India was a matter of half a year at least for a force of any importance; so that troops sent to India went there to stay. Finally, the term "Home" had a very loose application. If there were really on the spot in England at one time 50—60,000 troops it would be well enough, but this was never the case even approximately. For example, in June, 1795, there were as many as *fifteen battalions of Infantry serving on board ships in*

[†] Fortescue "History of the British Army," Vol. IV., page 536.

the navy. Nor could these be removed owing to the uncertain temper and discontent prevalent among the sailors at this time. Another important commitment to be met from the "Home" category was the garrison of Gibraltar; while the force in occupation of Corsica in the early years was another item.

DECLARATION OF WAR BY HOLLAND AND SPAIN.

Holland declared war on England early in 1796, and about the same time the French sent to the Indian Ocean a powerful light squadron under Admiral Sercey to be based on the Ile-de-France. The Dutch simultaneously sent reinforcements to the Cape of Good Hope. The English Government, which had always kept an interested eye on that outstanding Naval position, despatched an expedition of 6,000 strong to be followed by 3,000 more. The expedition was, it is true, successful; but the troops were out of reach for subsequent employment in Europe until at least the end of the following year—1797, and probably not even then.

Later—in November, 1796—came the Spanish Declaration of War. This, coupled with Bonaparte's Italian victories, resulted in the complete withdrawal of English naval forces from the Mediterranean—where now there was no country to provide a friendly harbour. Admiral Jervis was enjoined as to the advisability of: "making his Headquarters Lisbon, and acting in conjunction with the Portuguese fleet for the protection of Portugal, the keeping up of communication with Gibraltar preserving to us the friendship of Portugal without which we shall in a very short time have no port in Europe freely open to our trade south of Emden." The French Directory, in point of fact, did urge Spain to advance into Portugal in order to deny that country's ports of the English. Portugal begged for aid, and, for all England's complications, she proceeded to cast about for 5,000 troops to garrison Lisbon—a force not ready for long after, and which was eventually otherwise utilised.

Here, then, we see how important Military forces—to a total of 14,000, with naval resources to correspond—were tied up in what were really only secondary theatres. These forces, indeed, would amount to a full third of the English "Home" category troops—a far too important proportion to be thus immobilised.

Now, while English forces were being sent in dribblets here, there and elsewhere, it must be remembered that none were being gathered back from any place whatever. The "Home" forces, which should have constituted a strong central reserve—a force adequate to deal with any emergencies—could not in fact be regarded as a single force at all. On the contrary, they were simply a loose aggregate, normally parcelled out into petty detachments, and quite incapable of being employed with cohesion. Evidently an enemy seeking to strike at England near home could desire no circumstances more favourable.

GENERAL ORIENTATION OF ENGLISH EFFORT.

But from the French point of view the situation as a whole was much more favourable than this. Not merely were England's Home forces fractioned and separated so as not to be available, but her main strength had been exerted beyond the Atlantic, in the West Indies. Whether this orientation of the main English

effort—in appearance distant and eccentric—was wise or unwise in itself does not arise at the moment. The vital point to be grasped is that it reacted decisively on her power to deal with eventualities nearer home.

Large-scale transfers of troops and material were in those days so slow that forces sent to any given theatre of operation could be regarded as committed definitely and permanently. From England to India was a voyage of half a year ; from England to the Antilles was a matter of two months. A fast corvette sailing with orders could reduce those times by, say, one-third, but no greater gain than that was possible.

In these circumstances, evidently, the outcome of a campaign depended on a sound initial direction. Forces of any importance could not be subsequently transferred from one sphere of operations to another.

THE ENGLISH EFFORT ON THE CONTINENT.

A short resume is necessary for the purpose of showing how it came to pass that England at the end of 1796 had practically no soldiers in Europe. In 1793 she had entered the lists against Republican France and placed an army in Flanders under the Duke of York. This army was repulsed before Dunkerque in September ; but it was steadily reinforced, and all through 1794 took its share in the fierce fighting of that year—in the course of which France steadily forced her enemies back—out of Belgium first, and later out of Holland and the country west of Cologne.

After the allies were driven from Belgium—about the middle of 1794—the English retired north, the Austrians east. Steady pressure was kept up by the French, and the Dutch winter of 1794-95 was terribly severe. The English Army melted away under the hardships as well as the military pressure and early in 1795 the remnants were shipped home. Only a few thousand cavalry—forced entirely out of Holland—remained for the time being in Hanover. Thus England's continental army as such had been eliminated from the struggle ; nor was it for the present capable of serious effort anywhere else.

On February 13th, 1795, the Duke of York was appointed Commander-in-Chief with the task of re-organising the Army. He was not, however, given a free hand, nor even much assistance. As things were, the only sound procedure would have been to fill up the old depleted regiments of Flanders veterans with recruits and give them time to recover. This was not done. New regiments, regardless of their composition, were sent anywhere at a moment's notice. Nobody paused to consider whether they were numerically or in respect of training equal to the special work in hand.

CONDITIONS DIRECTING ENGLISH EFFORT TOWARDS THE ANTILLES.

When England joined the coalition against France in 1793 her army was numerically weak and under the cloud of the American War of ten years before. Her Navy, on the other hand, was at all times a factor to be reckoned with. The reverse was practically the case of France ; so that it was natural enough for Pitt to cast about for some way of turning his naval superiority to account. There seemed to offer a golden opportunity to definitely ruin French overseas trade and

thus cripple the enemy whose insolvent condition Pitt—a notable minister of finance—fully realised. The West Indies were an old—and in the circumstances a seemingly suitable—battle-ground.

These Antilles Islands were at this time an all but vital factor of English financial stability, of her commercial system and her carrying trade. It was in the general interests of the Coalition against France that their banker should be solvent, and consequently any policy furthering that solvency cannot off-hand be regarded as a false war-measure, no matter how much it seems to be such on the surface. Now from the Antilles during these war years England drew about one-fourth of the total of her imports. Of her exports she sent to the islands, directly about one-tenth; while the re-export of the island produce represented much more than another tenth. In sum, the Antilles represented one-fourth of her entire commerce. They thus constituted an evidently dominating factor that nobody could afford to overlook.

Their own islands were valuable to the English; it was reasonable to expect further acquisitions of wealth and further commercial development from the seizure of the French islands; and finally these latter were so many bases from which small, fast cruisers were continually preying on the valuable trading ships. If these raiding cruisers were to be fully overcome it could be done only in one way—by seizing and holding their bases. For a belligerent power that disposed of an overwhelming naval superiority it was at least natural to consider such a policy.

There were a number of other factors combining towards the same end. The proclamation of the "Rights of Man" and consequent liberation of the negro population—about a million in number on the French islands—had caused grave uneasiness among the English planters as to the attitude of the negroes in their own islands. These planters were wealthy and influential, as were also their commercial correspondents in England, and no Government could light-heartedly expose them and their possessions to the danger of a Slave Revolt. It was not surprising, therefore, to find the General Officer commanding on the station being told to get ready to receive fifteen battalions at Barbadoes shortly after hostilities begun.

Then, it was not to be expected that—when men and ships were available—England would refrain from as active a policy as possible. The French islands were in the main larger, wealthier, and in better strategic possessions than the English ones. It was perfectly natural to attack them systematically. All the more natural was this because certain exiled French planters represented to the Ministers in England that the islands would welcome any force seeking to stamp out the pernicious new republican ideas. All these contributory factors fell into line with the traditional English strategy of over-seas rather than continental campaigns. The casting of the die was easily understandable.

RESULTING DRAIN ON ENGLISH RESOURCES.

But, granting that a campaign on the largest scale, aiming at the complete conquest of the Antilles, was not an unreasonable form for England's war-effort; we none the less will find that such a campaign was bound to prove a costly business. A campaign in the Tropics is a costly business for white troops: in the

last decade of the eighteenth century it was for the English costly to the point of ruinousness. Their medical and hygienic arrangements were primitive; it was calculated that the wastage of white units was at the rate of 50 per cent. per annum from sickness alone. It was perfectly possible to lose the other 50 per cent. in a sanguinary ambush-warfare in tropical jungles. This last possibility was materially increased by reason of the fact that most of the regiments sent out to the islands were newly-raised from raw, young soldiers whose immature physique and constitutions left them an easy prey to the dangers of the region—military as well as climatic.

So that whatever idea we form about the desirability of the Antilles campaign there is no doubt whatever as to the conduct of that campaign and its inevitable result. However sound the conception—and whether it was really sound or not is no affair of ours—the execution was bound to be so costly as to fetter all other efforts on any serious scale. There was certain to be required an effort formidable in every sphere—military, naval, financial. How formidable the effort was in any given department it is very difficult to establish.

The English Ministers were always reluctant to make definite statements of the cost in money of the war in the West Indies. The full expenditure never came to light. About four millions sterling was admitted—£300,000 in 1794, £800,000 in 1795, two millions in 1796, and £700,000 early in 1797. The rising figures, of course, correspond with the increasing number of troops in the earlier table. And the sacrifices were largely in vain; the French islands won in 1794 were lost later, and negro slave revolts were organised in the English islands with ruinous effect. As regards the general result—military as distinct from commercial—we cannot do better than quote Fortescue at length:

“After long and careful thought and study I have come to the conclusion that the West Indian campaigns both to Windward and Leeward which were the essence of Pitt’s military policy cost England in Army and Navy little fewer than 100,000 men, about one-half dead, the remainder permanently unfitted for service. And in return for this frightful cost of life there could be shown only the British islands Grenada and St. Vincent utterly devastated and ruined, and the French islands of Tobago intact but of small value, of Martinique much damaged and with difficulty held, and of St. Lucia so devastated as to be no more than a naval station. For this England’s soldiers had been sacrificed, her treasure squandered, her influence in Europe weakened, her arm for six fateful years fettered, numbed and paralysed.”

It may help to form an accurate estimate of the effort sustained by England in the Antilles if it is remembered that Wellington’s permanent losses in the peninsula for seven years—counting dead, discharged, deserters—was only 40,000, *i.e.* considerably less than half. And the naval effort was, of course, inevitably commensurate with the military—and, moreover, was by no means unanimously approved of by the best brains at the Admiralty. Barham wrote: “It is this system of unlimited conquest that cripples us everywhere and diverts the fleet from its natural use . . . and but for this system, half the number of ships now employed in the West Indies and in Army convoys would have been sufficient and the French been prevented from sending a single ship to sea.”

COURSE OF THE WAR IN THE ANTILLES.

Having formed a general idea of the Antilles campaigns as an important aspect of English military policy, it is now necessary to review briefly the course of the war in the islands. This is in order to make clear how it came to pass that Hoche's Irish expedition corresponded exactly in point of time to the maximum English effort beyond the ocean—and consequently to their maximum exhaustion at home.

The war in the Antilles began early :—The first English expedition—seven ships of the line under Admiral Gardner—sailed in March, 1793. But, like all their early efforts at this time, it proved of inadequate strength, and was merely enough to set the ball rolling. Nor was it possible to achieve anything serious by getting reinforcements in dribs and drabs from remote stations. It was realised fairly soon that something quite different was necessary, and in November a second squadron was sent out with Jervis, bringing 7,000 troops, which reduced the Lesser Antilles inside a few months and then detached a large portion of the soldiers to occupy San Domingo—1,000 miles away.

But no sooner were their backs turned in the Lesser Antilles than the representative of the Terrorists—Victor Hugues—landed with a small expedition on June 2nd, 1794, and by dint of blood, fire, and iron, reconquered the French islands and organised a Slave Revolt in the English ones. This fighting occupied the rest of 1794 and the first half of the following year. The English had no immediate resources to counter-attack Hugues except odds and ends at various times—a few battalions from Gibraltar, a few from off the ships, and so on. By the end of July, 1795, the English General Irving bluntly wrote to the War Minister, Dundas : “ If you want full possession of these islands, and order restored in St. Vincent and Grenada twenty thousand men will be necessary. By the end of the campaign there will not be above ten thousand left.”

This, be it noted, concerned only the Lesser Antilles : it took no account of San Domingo and Jamaica where Slave Revolts were also in full blast. So that eventually by the middle of 1795—after two years and a half of fighting, in other words—the position of the English was very definitely worse than when the fighting started first. It was, in fact, a question of either abandoning altogether the struggle in the West Indies or organising an expedition or overwhelming strength for the conquest of the entire region. There could be no real choice, of course, in such a matter at this time. The great expedition was decided on.

Sixteen battalions had in May, 1795, returned to England from Germany, whither they had been driven out of Flanders. These were hastily brought up to strength by large drafts of recruits and utilised as the main strength of the new expeditionary army. Additional units were collected from here and there and the command of the force was given to Sir Ralph Abercomby who had commanded creditably in the earlier operations. The expedition sailed from Portsmouth on November 16th, 1795, and experienced in the matter of weather an ill fortune of an unexampled description.

On November 18th, the fleet encountered a most terrible westerly gale. The ships dispersed, some were wrecked, and the remainder ran for shelter to various ports ; a week later the majority again assembled at Portsmouth. On December 5th, the

expedition sailed again and encountered a second storm, which again dispersed it. Several ships were lost, more were missing for weeks, most put back, a few held on to Barbadoes, affording a meagre but welcome reinforcement for the early months of 1796. The main force did not finally sail until the second half of March, reaching Barbadoes on April 21st. Abercromby himself on a fast sailing cruiser had arrived a month earlier. Abercromby's expedition, fighting—and losing heavily—all through the tropical Summer of 1796 restored the situation in the West Indies to some extent, but not to the extent of securing the principal French islands. Operations continued during the first part of 1797. On June of that year the home government gave instructions "that the general should stand strictly on the defensive, save every penny that could be saved, and above all look to the good management of his hospitals."

EFFECT OF ANTILLES CAMPAIGN ON HOCHÉ'S EXPEDITION.

A reference to the table of British Establishments given earlier in the present chapter will make abundantly clear the influence of the trans-Atlantic war on campaigning in Ireland. For the purpose of greater exactness we make the following extract dealing with the Force details more particularly involved :

Year.	Home.	Plantations.
1793	17,344	18,194
1794	60,244	41,490
1795	119,380	40,261
1796	49,219	82,182
1797	60,765	64,227

From this will be seen the steadily-increasing drain on the English military resources since the beginning of the war. There will be seen, further, how the period of maximum commitment in the West Indies corresponded exactly in point of time to Hoche's Irish expedition. It is in order to demonstrate this fact beyond a doubt that it has been thought necessary to dwell somewhat in detail on the West Indian fighting. It will now be evident that—in view of England's main military effort having been exerted, and that in a really spendthrift fashion—in a very distant theatre Hoche's expedition possessed all the characteristics of a "coup de grace." Hoche delivered his stroke when the enemy had already practically put forth his utmost effort and had no serious reserve of force available. Hoche's expedition was *not* a diversion ; its whole significance is lost if it is so regarded. It was the throwing in at the critical moment of a "masse de manœuvre" with a view of gaining a decisive victory.

RECRUITING SITUATION IN ENGLAND.

Finally as regards England's general military situation we must examine into her man-power reserve at this time, as shown by the figures for recruiting.

Recruiting for the Regular Army at the time of Hoche's expedition was in a bad way. In 1793—not covering more than half that year—17,033 men had joined, in 1794 the numbers had swelled to 38,564, and in 1795 to 40,463. But in 1796 the number of recruits fell to 16,336, and in 1797 as low as 16,096. What was the

reason for the decline? Defeat in the field, frost and snow in Flanders, sunstroke and fever in the West Indies: such were the powerful arguments against recruiting in these years.

Altogether the recruiting situation was from the English standpoint unsatisfactory, and the measures adopted in the emergency of 1796—following the Spanish declaration of war in November—were not very convincing. The first scheme was to levy 15,000 men for the army and navy from parish to parish. The local authorities were to give a bounty. This system had always existed for the navy, but was a new departure for the army which was allotted inland parishes for its quota.

The second measure was for a gradual ballot of 60,000 supplementary Militia, volunteering being encouraged.

The third was to raise 15,000 Provisional Cavalry. The owners of riding and carriage horses were to provide one horse and man for every ten such horses; smaller owners were to club together and provide horses and men.

These measures, as a whole, were not very successful as we have seen from the 1797 figures. "In April, 1798, when Camden at Dublin was crying for reinforcements, Portland could only answer that none could be sent from Great Britain, owing to great disappointments in the recruiting service."

REACTIONS OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN IRELAND.

Dealing with the military situation in Ireland at a slightly later period Fortescue says*: "Ireland in 1797 and 1798 might be regarded as a City besieged by the British land-forces, and the British fleet as a covering army which kept the French at a distance while the siege progressed." In 1796, on the other hand the City had not yet been besieged. It was possible for it to be manned and garrisoned by the French and the army destined to beleaguer it would be forestalled.

The following table of Army Estimates for the Irish Establishment shows clearly the trend of affairs during the successive years of the Revolutionary War:

Year.	Regulars and Fencibles.	Militia.	Yeomanry	Total.
1793	12,000	17,500		29,500
1794	12,000	17,500		29,500
1795	20,246	21,369		41,615
1796	19,012	22,698		41,710
1797	37,667	22,698		60,365
1798	39,620	26,634	37,539	103,793

Leaving aside for the moment any attempt to assess the military value of these troops, the point to be emphasised is that it was only *after* Hoche's expedition that the English Government was sufficiently roused to make any notable increase in the Irish garrison—the jump from 1796 to 1797 being almost fifty per cent. while for a year previously there had been no increase at all.

* *Op. cit.* IV., 599.

FRENCH PRISONERS OF WAR IN IRELAND.

A little-remembered but at the time sufficiently serious cause of embarrassment to the English Government in Ireland was the presence in the country of numerous French Prisoners of War—military and naval—who were there up to the end of 1796.

The principal prison camp was Kinsale, where some 1,160 prisoners were housed in some houses in different parts of the town under the none too dependable guard of the Leitrim Militia. The houses in question had only mud walls which could easily be cut through—as for instance early in September when ten of the prisoners escaped and were never retaken. Incidentally, great sickness prevailed in the prison camp to the natural exasperation of the prisoners.

On August 22nd Lieut. Governor Browne made representations to the Commander-in Chief to the effect that “The lower orders of people in this country are not altogether to be depended on. Kinsale is the most improper place in the Kingdom for French prisoners, the Dockyard, Ordnance and Store houses and the great ease in procuring boats and small vessels to make their escape would militate against it”—which, as we have seen, was proved within the week.

Even more important was the presence of no fewer than 200 *Officer Prisoners* on parole in the neighbourhood of Dunmanway and Bandon. These gentlemen, of course, had abundant facilities for shooting, walking and riding excursions, meeting everybody, etc., in that region. They constituted, indeed, a fully-developed Intelligence Service actually in position and carrying out the preliminary work for Hoche—who was in at least some kind of loose touch with them.

In November of this year, on learning that the English authorities were taking steps to treat them as common prisoners, twenty three of these Officers disappeared. They were not recaptured—any more than those who had escaped from Kinsale some time earlier.

Now, in view of what has preceded, it is not an exaggerated summing-up to say that Hoche in 1796 was likely to find England as unready to meet a serious offensive effort as a Great Power can ever be reasonably expected to be—and not merely was this a momentary, a passing, unpreparedness: it had, on the contrary, every appearance of conferring such an initial advantage as might easily admit of securing a decision before an English recovery was possible. Such—without analysing details—were the broad, general conditions underlying the opening of Hoche's campaign.



UNITED STATES INFANTRY SCHOOL, FORT BENNING, GEORGIA

By MAJOR J. DUNNE, General Staff.

THE need for more suitable provision for the training of the United States Infantry officers became apparent as a result of the European War, and an Infantry School was established in 1919 at Fort Benning, about 9 miles from Columbus, Georgia. Columbus is a progressive southern town with a population of about 40,000, a large proportion of which is coloured. It boasts of some very large cotton factories—power being derived from the River Chattahoochee, on which the town is built. For the school an area of about 97,000 acres was acquired as a federal reservation; this, as can well be seen, leaves plenty of terrain available for tactical exercises of all descriptions, for pistol, rifle, and machine-gun ranges, for grenade, gas, and bayonet courts, etc. All buildings were in the first instance of a temporary nature and constructed of wood. These are now being replaced gradually by permanent structures of brick and concrete—the rate of replacement being dependent on the annual appropriation by Congress for this purpose. One of the big factors in determining the selection of this location for the Camp was the climate. It is oppressively hot during the summer months, but for the rest of the year a moderate temperature prevails. As an illustration of the reliable weather, I might mention that during the 1926-27 course there was but one day on which the outdoor programme of our class had to be cancelled owing to inclemency of the weather. In September and May the temperature is fairly high, but these are the only two months of the course in which a northerner might be caused discomfort by the excessive heat. The surrounding terrain is varied and rolling, with plenty of wooded areas—dry red soil being the most predominant feature. It is suitable for growing Indian corn, cotton, and sweet potato—where irrigated.

Officers coming on a course—80-90 per cent. of whom are married—receive their orders about March, and begin to arrive about September 1st. This allows them time—before the actual opening of the course in the middle of September—to get their families settled up in Columbus. There is no accommodation in Camp for them—the regular garrison personnel taking up all the accommodation.

The following approximate summary of the Student Officers who passed through the School in the year 1926-27 may give some idea of the extent of the School's activities:—

Advanced Class of 80 Officers, lasting September to June.

Company Officers' Class of 160 Officers, lasting September to June.

Company Officers, National Guard and Reserve Class of 125 Officers, lasting March to June.

Senior Officers, National Guard and Reserve Class of 16 Officers, lasting 6 weeks.

In addition there was a 3 months' course for National Guard N.C.O.'s and a 6 weeks' refresher course for some very senior Colonels of the Regular Army. These courses are designed to train the Infantry Officer in the tactics and technique of

his branch. One or more representatives of the artillery, cavalry, air force, signal and medical branches attended the two first-mentioned courses. There were, in addition, representatives of the Marine Corps, a Japanese, a Mexican, two Cubans, a Phillipine Scout as well as the Irish contingent.

The 29th Infantry, a white regiment, the 83rd Field Artillery, a Gas Company, an Engineer Company, and a Tank Battalion, supply the necessary demonstration troops for the exercises throughout the year. Air Service, when required, is obtained from an adjacent post at Maxwell Field, Alabama. The 24th Infantry, a coloured regiment, is also stationed at Fort Benning and supplies most of the labour details of the Camp, including orderlies, janitors, Infantry School stable personnel, etc. The Infantry School Stables accommodate a large number of horses which are maintained exclusively for the use of the Academic Staff and



A Regimental Command Post Exercise, in Doughboy Memorial Stadium.

Students. These horses are used for the various equitation courses, for the tactical rides which figure so largely on the advanced class schedule, and for the Command Post Terrain Exercises. Every encouragement is given to horse riding; there are many pleasant rides through the Reservation, and a Student Officer can always have the use of a horse on application to the orderly room of the Infantry School Stables.

The formal opening ceremony of the School year takes place about the middle of September. The Commandant presides and the Mayor of Columbus, with some other prominent citizens, is usually to be found on the platform. There is a full muster of Student Officers in their best service uniform, and after some welcoming and explanatory speeches the proceedings terminate with the introduction of the individual Officers to the Commanding General and his staff. This

to the Irish contingent was merely a repetition, as on our reporting to Headquarters a few days previously, Brigadier General Collins had sent for us to be brought to his office where he expressed their pleasure at having us on the course. The first day finished with class photographs and the drawing of items of equipment.

On Wednesdays and Saturdays working hours were from 08.00 hours to 12.00 hours, and on the other week-days from 08.00 hours to 16.00 hours, with a lunch interval of $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours, one hour, or none at all according to the day's programme. As long as the Student Officer was punctual in his attendance at all formations there were no restrictions placed on his movements out of Camp.

The two main Courses at the Infantry School are the Basic or Company Officers Course and the Advanced Course. These two Courses for the regular Army Officers are designed to complete the education and training of the Infantry Officer. The instruction given in the Company Officers' Class is of a grade comparable to that given in our general, Musketry, and Machine Gun Courses at the A.S.I. The subjects for this Course included Military History, Army of the United States, Close Order Drill, Mechanics and Marksmanship of the Rifle, Machine Gun, Automatic Rifle, Pistol, Grenades, 37 mm. Gun, and 3 in. T.M., Bayonet Training, Field Fortifications, Map Reading and Military Sketching, Equitation, Animals and Transportation, Physical Training, Combat Intelligence, Administration, Organization and Equipment, Mass Athletics, Instructional Methods, Training Principles, Musketry, Combat Practice, Communications and Command Posts, Field Messages and Orders, Staff and Logistics to include the Regiment, Tactics to include the Company. At the present time a large proportion of this Class consists of junior captains; it is ultimately intended to cater for Lieutenants and 2nd Lieutenants. It is designed to render an Officer competent to lead Infantry Platoons or Companies in peace and war, or to perform the requisite staff work of higher units such as Battalions or Regiments.

The Advanced Course is designed to train Officers for Command of Infantry Battalions, Regiments or Brigades, or to fill senior staff appointments of these units in peace or war. (The 1926-27 Class was about equally divided between Majors and Senior Captains—it is ultimately intended to include only senior Captains). The following is by no means a complete list of the subjects covered during the months September-December :—

Map Reading,	}	Refresher.
Field Fortification,		
Methods of Training,		
Methods of Instruction,		
Military History,		
Combat Orders, Technique,		
Combat Intelligence,		
Supply of Infantry Units in Campaign,		
Care of Animals and Transportation,		
Equitation,		
Communications and Command Posts,		
Command and Staff.		

According as the instruction terminated in each of the above subjects, there were one or more tests or marked map problems. From January to May the time was completely devoted to tactics, principally Infantry tactics (from the squad to the reinforced brigade). As a large proportion of this work was outdoor—terrain exercises, tactical rides, command post exercises, etc.—this portion was well enjoyed by all the Class. During this period also a number of lectures, conferences, map problems, and demonstrations which dealt with tactics and technique of the Artillery, Air Service, Tanks, and Cavalry, were included. Examinations were progressive, i.e., as you finished with each unit you were tested by means of marked terrain exercises or marked map problems. One complete week in May was devoted to problems of decision. As each problem was marked it was returned to the student—through School Headquarters, where a record was kept. The student was informed at the time as to whether his award was satisfactory or unsatisfactory, and at the end of the Course he was permitted to obtain from School Headquarters a list showing his grade in each problem.



Company Officers' Class during a Terrain Exercise.

In both the above Courses special attention is devoted to making the Student Officer qualified to instruct in the subjects he is being taught. It is recognised that an Army Officer in peace-time is drifting more and more into the role of instructor—the Company and Platoon Officers conducting the instruction of the enlisted personnel. In all garrisons, troop and post schools for Officers and enlisted personnel are in regular session; increasing numbers of Regular Army Officers are being detailed as instructors with the National Guard and Organised Reserves; and the Officers Training Corps at various Universities and Citizens' Military Training Camps require a considerable number of regular Officers as instructors and controlling personnel.

On the Terrain Exercises and Tactical Rides some very enjoyable days were spent outdoors—very often such were whole-day programmes, and rations had to be brought. When occasionally we were near a good road, and the Class could reasonably be assembled the Officers' Club sent out a truck which supplied drinks, sweets, cigarettes and sandwiches for a consideration. The drinks, of


course, were milk, non-alcoholic beers, or the local coca-cola, and were consumed in large quantities. When not mounted, the class travelled by the Q.M. Corps' narrow-gauge train to a suitable location in the area over which the Terrain Exercise was scheduled to take place.

The concluding phase of the Course was an elaborate ten-day Command Post Terrain Exercise—in which the Students were assigned appointments as various unit Commanders and Staffs. The Umpires impersonated the imaginary enemy. On being presented with a situation the Students functioned as if they were on active service, reconnaissance was carried out, orders given, Command Posts set up and operated—the non-commissioned personnel for these being obtained from the National Guard Class for N.C.O.'s, and the Communication Officers from a special Signal Class. The Command Post functioned as if in an actual war situation—the progress of the action was regulated by the Umpires who supplied information either to the higher Commander or to the Platoon leaders, indicating the supposed actual happenings or developments of the situation. All the Student Classes present took part—the Advanced Class personnel furnished the Brigade, Regimental and Battalion Commanders as well as the senior Staff Officers of these Units. The Company Officers' Class furnished Company Commanders and Staff Officers of the higher units. The National Guard and Reserve Class furnished platoon and company leaders, and Staff Officers of the Battalions. In this way the Commanders and Staffs of four Brigades and their subordinate units down to the Platoon were formed, and each Brigade handled a different problem. Some of the problems last two days and continued over-night. At the conclusion of each problem every Student was given a different appointment. To provide terrain for these problems the Students were divided into two groups in two different Camps, Camp Egbert and Camp Liscum, about six miles apart, and 8 miles from Fort Benning, but still on the federal reservation. Every Student spent six days in each Camp. As far as the sandy nature of the soil, the poor water supply (which was well chlorinated for drinking purposes), the presence of numerous biting insects native to the soil, and the problem of getting your mosquito net fixed properly would permit, life in these Camps was pretty comfortable. With an 05.30 hours breakfast, a considerable amount of tramping or riding under a glaring sun during the day, everyone was naturally tired at night—cold shower and "chow" (dinner) just put one in further form for sleep.

For the movement to Camp a very excellent Quartermaster department took charge of our kits, and when we arrived in the Camp we found them in our respective tents. They were similarly transported without hitch on the return journey.

Among the outstanding events of the year were demonstrations by a battalion in attack, by a battalion in defence, and by Air Corps detachments. The first two were given by a battalion of the 29th Infantry at full war strength, and with complete war-time equipment. A platoon of tanks from the Tank Battalion was attached, and Air Service and Artillery co-operated. The spectators were enabled to observe all phases of the action from a suitably located elevated vantage point; and at this point was erected an ediphone with a number of amplifiers which en-


abled the instructor in charge to explain the progress of the action as it was observed. The Air Corps demonstration, which was given by a detachment, including observation, attack, pursuit, bombardment, and cargo planes, lasted several days, and some gave very interesting displays, not the least thrilling of which were acrobatics and a simulated attack by the fast pursuit planes on the heavier bombardment type, and another simulated attack by attack planes on a battalion of Infantry marching in column of route along the road. This latter attack with a similar one against a battery of Field Artillery illustrated very clearly what could be accomplished in the way of harassing and delaying an enemy. It also emphasised the necessity for having Infantry fully trained in the art of speedily dispersing off the road into cover when the signal is given that the attack planes are at hand; with this training very little material damage could be done to the troops unless caught in a defile or between two high walls. The accompanying transportation and artillery present much more vulnerable targets. These demonstrations were spectacular events and always attracted a big muster of officers' wives and families as well as of civilians.



View of Camp Liscum.

It would probably seem superfluous to state in this article that our official reception and treatment during the School Year left nothing to be desired, but it may not be entirely inappropriate to record our appreciation of the uniform courtesy and consideration shown us by the individual members of our Classes, and by the instructors. The personal friendships later referred to by Major-General Summerall certainly were formed, and proffers of assistance to help us out of difficulties in our studies, etc., were numerous. Everybody was keenly interested in the progress of the Irish. People of Irish descent are practically non-existent in Columbus, so there were none of the elaborate St. Patrick's Day celebrations that are to be met with in other cities throughout the United States. In the Camp the regimental band of the 29th Infantry discoursed a selection of Irish airs during the lunch hour, opposite the Officers' Club. Lt. Sean Collins Powell, who was

taking the Company Officers' Course, was made honorary Commander of his Student Company for the day. Capt. P. J. Berry and myself, who were taking the Advanced Course, were assigned to command the imaginary battalions which we were engaged in handling on a terrain exercise that day. A number of the Officers at Fort Benning are of Irish descent, and it is interesting to note that one of the parents of Colonel Jas. B. Gowen, who commanded the 29th Infantry, hailed from East Cork, while the father of Lt. Col. James Higgins, senior student in the Advanced Class, hailed from Galway. Major Louis T. Byrne was a Student of the Advanced Class whose father emigrated from Wicklow, was an Officer in Meagher's Brigade during the Civil War, and was later a member of the '67 Fenian organisation in the U.S.A.; while Capt. Hunter Maguire, of the Company Officers' Class, who was much impressed by a review of Oglagh na h-Eireann on St. Patrick's Day, 1926, boasts of a Tipperary father.



Pontoon bridge, with foot-bridge in background, across the River Chattahoochee, erected during a demonstration by Engineers, Fort Benning.

No account of Fort Benning would be complete without at least some reference to the social side. There were the usual golf, tennis, polo and hunt Clubs. The swimming pool was a very popular resort during the warmer weather. Throughout the year the Officers' Club sponsored regular fortnightly "hops" (Cinderellas) open to all members of the Club and their guests. Dinner dances marked the more festive occasions, such as Hallowe'en, Thanksgiving, New Year's Eve, etc. The Dramatic Club and the Choral Society provided full scope for people of dramatic or vocal ability. In Columbus there were two civilian Clubs—the County Club and the Muscogee—and Army Officers were usually members of one or both.

The two outstanding social events of the year were the reception by the Commanding General at the opening of the Courses, and the graduation dance at the

conclusion—which latter included a reception for the Chief of Staff. Service uniform is worn at these functions.

A good standard of pictures is maintained at the garrison cinema. During the year there are many baseball, football, basket ball, polo matches, etc. During Holy Week we had the pleasure of making the acquaintance of several members of the baseball team from the celebrated Notre Dame University. They were engaged in a three-days' tussle with the representatives of the Camp. This team, while not so exclusively composed of students of Irish descent, and with Irish names, as at one time, is still chronicled in the newspapers as the "fighting Irish." The Infantry School Horse Show is held in April, and Students not competing attend the morning portion as a formation. The competitions are entirely inter-unit—the only visitors being Cavalry Officers from a neighbouring post.

In October, 1926, Major-General J. L. Hinds, then Chief of Staff, visited the School and addressed the assembled Officers. Major-General Charles P. Summerall was appointed Chief of Staff early in 1927, and in the course of a tour of Army Posts visited the School in April, and he also addressed the assembled Officers. He returned in May to preside at the concluding Graduation Ceremony, and personally presented the diplomas to the successful Students. I cannot do better than conclude by quoting from his address on this occasion:—

"It has been an especial pleasure to include in the members of the Classes Officers of a Sister Service, the Marine Corps, and of other countries with whom we are on terms of peculiar amity. Their presence and the personal friendships that have been formed will be helpful in promoting understanding and goodwill between our armed forces and our peoples. A welcome will wait those who, we hope, will be your successors."



PROCUREMENT—MEN AND MATERIAL.

By MAJOR L. ARCHER, A.S.C.

THE title of this article must not be taken as meaning that I propose to deal with the subject in all its aspects as applicable to the whole Army. Such a task would be beyond the capacity of one individual. I merely put forward some views on the matter in so far as it affects the Army Signal Corps.

The problem of man-power and material is always a difficult one for the technical branches of the Army. In highly organised industrial countries the problem of man-power is serious enough because of the opportunities open to technicians in civil life. In times of industrial depression, however, the acuteness of the problem is considerably diminished. In times of war the problem becomes increasingly difficult due to the demands of industrial organisations converted to war purposes and to the increased demands of the military machine. Countries industrially organised are obviously in a much better position to meet these demands than those whose organisation is of an agricultural character. The Saorstát comes into this latter category. With agriculture as our main industry, and few if any factories adaptable to war-time needs, we are poorly situated to meet the requirements of a modern army.

With regard to man-power our present position is that the average recruit is not the type from which can be made a technical soldier. In my opinion the main reason is that the average standard of primary education is lamentably low. This is possibly due to the fact that the average school-leaving age is about fourteen years. Then follows a period of about four years during which the average recruit is engaged in employment in which he is not called on to make any use of the education he received in the primary school, and wherein he seldom if ever receives any manual training. He has then reached the minimum age at which he is eligible for enlistment in the army. It is more than probable that the average age for enlistment is nearer twenty than eighteen years. During the interim period of from four to six years he has received no technical education, and he has probably discarded the primary training he received up to the age of fourteen years. A second reason why the average recruit fails to make a good technical soldier is the total lack of a continuation system of compulsory technical training for youths on leaving primary schools. This question has been the subject of an exhaustive government enquiry recently and there is little purpose in discussing it here. I think it will be conceded that what I have stated is a very fair general appreciation of the situation.

The question then arises how best may we meet our requirements with the resources at our disposal? There are, I conceive, three possible methods which are neither revolutionary nor original.

The first is to enlist youths at the school-leaving age, following upon a Civil Service Examination held to determine their educational fitness for technical training. Such youths would be drafted to the School of Signals and there trained in the higher branches of Signalling until they reach the regulation enlistment

age. On reaching the enlistment age they would serve with the field units for a period of about three years, passing to the reserve at the age of twenty to twenty-one years. Reserve service would be for a further period of twelve years.

The question of absorbing such personnel into civil life would require the co-operation of other government departments, principally the Department of Posts and Telegraphs. If during the period of colour service such personnel served in the Department of Posts and Telegraphs for a period of six to twelve months, they could be trained in post office methods and routine, and this, coupled with their army training, would fit them to take up duty in that Department on passing to the reserve. It would be essential that during the period of colour service such men would pass suitable tests agreed upon by the Department of Posts and Telegraphs and the Department of Defence, and that the passing of these tests would entitle them to be placed upon the establishment roll of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs. This would ensure that the big majority of Signal Reservists would automatically be absorbed into civil life on leaving the army. In addition such of them as are qualified should be allowed to sit for the examination for Wireless Operator's Certificates, held under the auspices of the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs. The possession of this certificate would render them eligible for employment as marine wireless operators, or in any shore or land station operated by the Department of Posts and Telegraphs.

The second method would be to encourage established Post Office personnel to enlist in the army for a short period of colour service—possibly three years, with nine years' reserve service. Such personnel would retain their Post Office appointments during army service but would otherwise be treated as enlisted personnel.

The third method would be to recruit established Post Office personnel for the Class " B " Reserve.

These three methods would go far to meet the requirements of the Army Signal Corps during peace and for a limited period during war.

It would also ensure that should an emergency arise, of such a magnitude as to make it desirable that the entire inter-communication system of the Saorstát to be placed under the control of the Department of Defence, it could be effected with a minimum of delay and dislocation.

It must be realised that there are no factories in the Saorstát engaged in the manufacture or assembly of apparatus such as is used in the Department of Posts and Telegraphs or in the Army Signal Corps. There will, therefore, be a great dearth of trained technicians in an emergency. The two departments most concerned in the procurement of technicians must therefore pool their resources for each other's benefit.

It may be asked: If this is so how did we meet the emergency of 1922-23 when conditions from the standpoint of training, organisation and experience were much worse than they are now, or than they can be in the future? The answer is that in that period we made use of one means of communication and one only, to wit, radio. At that time there was a world-wide depression in radio circles and a large number of radio operators were unemployed, or facing proposed drastic changes in the conditions of their employment. The consequence was that we had no diffi-

culty in securing the necessary quota. There was also the added inducement of a very high rate of pay and possibilities of rapid promotion. These conditions are hardly likely to be repeated, nor are the conditions of the emergency likely to recur. When next the Army takes the field it will do so under very different circumstances, and will probably have to make use of a more elaborate and complex system of intercommunication.

We now come to the question of the procurement of material. It may be taken for granted that should the army be called out for active service it will be under conditions which will render it extremely difficult to continue securing our supplies of warlike stores from their present source. We will be thrown largely on our own resources, and our situation will be an unenviable one.

Let us take the question of the supply of raw material. The following is a list of some of the materials commonly used in the manufacture of radio, telegraph, and telephone apparatus and of field-cable and wire:—Iron, Steel, Copper, Zinc, Lead, Silver, Tin, Nickel, Carbon, Aluminium, Tungsten, Silk, Cotton, Rubber, Porcelain, Glass, Mica.

This raw material will have to be procured in the face of competition by other countries, who require such material for their own needs and who, moreover, are in a better position to pay enhanced wartime prices. Assuming it is procured, how is it to be fashioned into the finished article, whether it be a mile of field cable a field 'phone or a radio valve? As has already been stated, we have no factories in the Saorstat engaged in turning out such apparatus at present. Much may be done by the incentive of national danger, but we cannot produce factories or technicians by a wave of the hand. Money may buy raw material, but if the skilled hand is not available to fashion it into the required article the raw material is just so much junk.

It may be said: "We will buy the finished article." But can we? If our position at the start of the European War was what it is to-day, and if we desired whilst maintaining our territorial integrity to keep clear of the maelstrom, we would have been forced to keep our army on a war basis as did other neutral European countries. Under these conditions from whom could we buy the "finished article?" Not certainly from any combatant power, and the powers who were not combatants could hardly have supplied our requirements.

It may also be suggested that a suitable alternative is to create immense stocks of warlike stores. This is obviously impossible. No country can afford to tie up a large portion of its wealth during peace in such a manner. In addition armament and equipment is for ever changing, and it would obviously be uneconomic to stock large stores.

The only solution therefore to the problem is to begin during peace to create the machinery which will meet all our peace-time requirements, and be capable of expansion to meet our war-time needs.

It will be of interest to recount some of the difficulties met by the Signal Corps of the U.S.A. Army on the entry of the United States into the World War, and the machinery created to cope with these difficulties. From this may be gauged the problem confronting the Saorstat, in view of its poverty in material, money, and skilled workers.

In April, 1917, the United States had in the Signal Units of the army a total of 13 officers and 1,570 men. There were at the same time 42 officers of other branches temporarily detailed for duty with the Signal Corps. In the units of the National Guard there were 160 officers and 3,500 enlisted Signal personnel. The standard of efficiency and training of these latter varied in every State. The Signal Corps Reserve created under the National Defence Act did not at this time exist. It should be understood that the Signal units of the army were distributed over a vast territory—from Alaska to the Mexican border and the Phillipines.

The task of providing personnel for a Signal Corps to serve an army of close on a million men was a big one. The methods adopted to secure suitable men were mainly advertisement and publicity. Articles outlining the peculiar needs of the unit were regularly published in newspapers, technical journals and periodicals. The machinery of Chambers of Commerce, schools, technical institutes and business men's associations co-operated wholeheartedly with the Army authorities. Selected speakers addressed audiences in theatres, cinemas, etc. during the regular entertainments for periods of a few minutes, explaining succinctly the needs of the corps, and the "four minute men," as they were called were to be found on the stage of every theatre in the United States. Telegrams explaining the requirements of the unit were sent to every telegraph office in the States for publication on the official bulletin board. Its needs even appeared on the "tickers" of the stock-brokers' offices. Use was made of the facilities afforded by the various telegraph, telephone, and electrical supply companies. Even after the period of voluntary enlistment had passed these companies kept the Chief Signal Officer advised of the qualifications of employees about to be called up on the "draft" system, so that they could be placed to the best advantage to the unit. Officers were recruited from men holding responsible posts in these companies.

It soon became apparent that the difficulties in the way of securing suitable men were increasing and were enhanced by the competition of the other branches of the army. A civilian committee on Classification of Personnel was then set up to try and remedy the conditions existing. Each branch of the army submitted requisitions to this committee for the men required. The Signal Corps requisitioned over 20,000 men—of which number it only received half.

To handle the training of this personnel four training camps were opened, but subsequently an effort was made to concentrate all training in one camp by the creation of Franklin Cantonment, at Camp Meade, Maryland, with a capacity for 11,000 men. In addition schools were opened at the University of Vermont, Maryland State Agricultural College, the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, and the College of the City of New York. Later, on the initiative of the Chief Signal Officer, the training of engineering students in Signal work was undertaken at thirty-two colleges.

The problem of training for all branches of the army became so complicated that the War Department consolidated all activity in the "Committee on Education and Special Training." The purpose of this body was to study the needs of

all branches for skilled men and technicians and to secure the co-operation of all educational establishments in meeting these needs. A plan was adopted to train and provide for the Signal Corps a monthly supply of the following:—

Radio electricians	1,600
Radio operators	1,000
Telephone electricians	400
Radio officers (commissioned)	110
Telegraph operators	80

In addition to above it was estimated that 1,000 men would be required monthly from the general draft.

This Committee had co-operating with it twenty-six Universities and Colleges with a total capacity for training close on ten thousand men in the above categories. These schools, however, did not commence operation until August, 1918, and students therefrom saw no active service. The foregoing gives an idea of the magnitude of the task with which the United States were confronted, and the means they took to meet it. Time did not permit the fruits of the effort to be seen, but the lesson to be learned is that the entire resources of the country must be co-ordinated to achieve the desired result.

We now come to the question of the supply of Signal apparatus and material. The equipment of the Signal Corps was far behind that of the Allied forces. Valve radio apparatus was non-existent, their field 'phone was of a poor pattern, and they were forced to adopt an instrument used by the U.S. Forestry Service. It was not until just prior to the Armistice that the "buzzerphone" (similar to the British Army Fullerphone) was developed. In the all important matter of field cable, the U.S. Army was only possessed of single conductor cable which, in the close warfare in France, was useless, owing to the ease of interception of messages by the enemy.

To deal in detail with the steps taken to provide suitable types of each class of material would take me beyond reasonable limits in this article. I will, therefore, merely treat of the problem of the production of field wire or cable.


In 1917 the Signal Corps possessed two types of cable—field wire and buzzer wire—both single conductors. These types were useless as they necessitated the use of the "earth return," and therefore facilitated the enemy in intercepting signals. A "two-way" or "twisted pair cable" became essential. A trial was made of field wire made up as "twisted pair cable," but this was discarded as too heavy and bulky. Eventually, after great trouble, a suitable wire called "outpost" wire was produced. Then difficulties arose. Manufacturers of this class of wire were not used to Army methods, or quantity production. Suitable machinery to produce it in large quantities had to be designed and built. The question of insulating the wire strands with rubber had to be overcome. Then the greatest difficulty arose in braiding the cable. There were only two makers of braiding machinery in the United States and the both of them were engaged to 85 per cent. of their capacity on other war work. It therefore became neces-

sary to start at the bottom and build machinery to manufacture braiding machines. The difficulty of securing raw material also arose. Six miles of steel wire and eight miles of bronze wire were required to produce one mile of outpost wire. This, with the inexorable demand for both steel and bronze for other war purposes!

In the meantime the demand from France for this wire jumped from 1,000 to 68,000 miles a month. On the top of this the Allies asked to be supplied with a like amount monthly. It therefore took the United States, with her immense resources and her vast industrial organisation, over eighteen months to produce three weeks supply of cable for her Armies. In actual fact, a total of 40,000 miles had only been produced up to November, 1918, and the output of 68,000 miles per month would hardly have been reached for another twelve months.

We can form from this a picture of the difficulties she experienced in producing the more delicate and complicated equipment, such as Radio sets, telephone switchboards, telegraph apparatus, telephones, photographic material, meteorological apparatus, field glasses, batteries, wire carts, etc., all of which was equipment used by or furnished through the Signal Corps.

The foregoing is a very brief survey of this subject, but enough has been written to enable my readers to realise the problem which confronted the United States between April, 1917, and November, 1918. I trust it will induce some of them to consider carefully the problems of a like nature with which possibly this State may one day be faced.



MILITARY ORGANISATION.

By COLONEL M. COSTELLO, General Staff.

IN view of the announcement by the Minister for Defence on the 16th November, 1927, that it is the intention of the Government to change radically the military system heretofore followed in An Saorstát, it is of interest to examine the military systems presently adopted by other countries. In the following notes, which are based on lectures delivered at the Hibernian Schools, Dublin, during the month of February, 1928, that aspect of Military Organisation which is concerned with the raising and maintenance of armies, is dealt with briefly. The organisation and maintenance in the field of tactical units which is of equal interest to the soldier and is the object of all organisation, is not considered. It is proposed to follow this rather general examination of Military Systems with a number of other articles giving an account of the following militias in some detail:

The Swiss Militia,
The Canadian Militia,
The United States' National Guard,
The British Territorials.

Organisation is the act of disposing, arranging and combining constituent or interdependent parts into an organic whole. Military organisation is the systematic arrangement of the manpower and economic resources of a nation for national defence. Organisation for national defence affects the whole population. The demands of modern war on the economic life of the state are very great. All its resources must be utilised with a view to the maximum degree of force being put forth in its defence. Therefore, the citizens who serve by producing food, those who maintain the transport services, and all others who assist in the maintenance of the national life, must be considered in the organisation of the state for its defence. And this organisation should produce a fusion of the military and the social and industrial life of the people so that the former may impede the latter as little as possible, and the latter contribute most effectively to the health of the former.

We know how great are the personal sacrifices demanded in war, and with a lively realisation of its horrors it is to be hoped that our people will strive to avoid needless conflict. But when war is unavoidable, defeat is more bitter and more costly than success. The history of our race leads us to hope that however pacific our intentions, we will not brook defeat and subjugation without a struggle.

Success in war is to be assured by sound preparation more than anything else. The most important form of preparation in time of peace is thorough provision for a war organisation. Such preparation tends to prevent war. A nation is slow to attack another known to be prepared for defence, and will not do so unless the results to be obtained outbalance the cost and effort demanded.

Colonel du Picq, a notable French officer, who is described by Foch as "the exponent of moral force," has this to say about organisation:

"It is not difficult for us to see that people animated by passion—even people who know how to die without flinching—strong in the face of death, but without

discipline and solid organisation, are conquered by others individually less valiant, but firmly organised all together and one for all."

The many difficulties and failures of the British in the Boer War have been attributed in great measure to the poor state of organisation of their forces. Our own difficulties in 1922-'23 should be a lasting example of the difficulties one works under when there is not uniform and complete organisation.

In studying an organisation as in any critical study, we must take nothing for granted. Every feature of it must be questioned and called upon to explain its purpose—the means by which it accomplishes that purpose, its reason for accomplishing it in that manner and no other, and the degree of success it attains. If the system is good it need not fear such investigation; if it is bad the sooner it is found out the better. When similarities are found between two systems we must know why. Did the two originate independently from needs felt in both places simultaneously? Was one imitated from the other? If so, was it pure imitation to save thinking, or was the imitation the result of constructive thought? Where differences are noted we should also find out why. Are the two independent, or did one system have knowledge of the other and deliberately reject or alter some point? If any feature is found in a system, after finding out how it came there, we should know whether it remains because it is fitted to remain, or merely from force of habit.

While we will go to the organisations which exist to-day, and are considered the best for information and data for our subject, we must not forget that they were not created as a result of any plenary inspiration. They are, in fact, the result of the evolution of the military art through the centuries. To understand them fully and to appreciate the needs which they were evolved to meet, we should properly make our approach to the subject through the pages of history. Lack of space prevents this. However, it should be remembered that the art of war is a very ancient one—that its development has a certain continuity, and that anything we do now is merely a further development in so far as it may be new to all. In the varying historical development of armies may be found the reason for many of the differences in organisation which cannot otherwise be explained, and the strength of tradition as affecting organisation will also be apparent. In this connection the following words of the German General, Von der Goltz, are apt: "Every good military system bears a clearly defined national character." In other words, a good military system is one that fits the peculiar needs and circumstances of the state in which it exists.

The ultimate object of all organisation is success in war. It is, therefore, the tactical organisation for battle that is the first step in the organisation of an Army. We will proceed here with a discussion of how that organisation can best be maintained in readiness for war, which is the question of peace-time organisation and Military Systems. All these matters are of little or no moment until there is a tactical organisation determined, and the answers to the questions they raise are invariably dependent on the form which the tactical organisation takes.

It is obvious that the maintenance in peace-time of the army needed for war on its war-time basis would be enormously costly. Few, if any, states could afford

to so maintain it, and it is in fact unnecessary. If it is intended to put 100,000 men in the field there is no necessity to keep those men always with the colours, provided one can arrange otherwise for their being available and in fit condition to take the field when they are needed. That applies to the men needed. We said before that war demands the production of every available ounce of energy which the nation possesses, and the organisation of material means is as vital as the organisation of men. It would be obviously impossible to have the nation always on a war footing. If we are to have a healthy state the production of wealth, the development of the national culture, etc., must absorb the greater part of the energy and money of the people in peace. It is to leave them free for these pursuits that we protect them against war and conquest.

A state cannot be always on a war footing. It must, however, in the words of Von der Goltz, "prepare all available resources in peace with a view to the whole being in readiness for war when the occasion arises." There is a variety of systems we should remember that no matter what the system, there is a need for decentralisation, of recruiting, training, etc., and there is the need for organisation that will be the basis or framework upon which the nation will be mobilised, i.e., Territorial Organisation.

Any good system fits the national character and situation of the country. National character is the main factor in determining the suitability or otherwise of conscription. Good military training will give discipline, physical development, courage and self-respect to an average man. It can be a powerful aid to the development of patriotism. The development of these qualities is of prime importance for increasing the value of any military force, and the capacity of the nation for defending itself. It is, therefore, necessary that the military system of a country should as far as possible develop and foster such national and individual attributes. If compulsory service is not popular and inflicts seeming hardships on the populace, it will not help in this respect. If we have only a standing army we won't reach all the people. How best to achieve the results of training mentioned is one of the factors that will determine the choice of a military system.

Military systems are generally of three kinds:—

- (1) The Professional Standing Army. The British Regular Army is an example.
- (2) The Short Service National Army (The "Nation in Arms"). The Continental conscript armies are mainly of this kind. The French Army, and those of the Little Entente nations are the best examples.
- (3) Militia Armies. The Swiss, Canadian, Australian and South African militias are examples.

There are, of course, combinations of two or more systems, and the degree to which each system or combination is developed varies greatly.

Now, with any system it will be the case that all the troops will not be placed on the field of battle in the first stages of the campaign. The Field Army proceeds to the theatre of war. The lines of communications, fortresses, coast defences, depots, etc., must also be manned. Replacements for the Field Army must be found. Men coming of military age during the conflict must be trained. For all of these troops and cadres and instructors will be needed.

The Field Army must be the best fighting men available—young, and the most recently trained. It will accordingly be found that most Military Systems provide a first line Army or Field Army, and a second line Army as a kind of reserve for the first, and for the duties at home or on Lines of Communication. Some have three, notably the pre-war German so largely copied. Apart from the different nature of the tasks in the Field of Battle and at home, there is another factor which influences the formation of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd line armies, to wit: the capacity of the state to put all in the field in the opening stages, even if such a course were desirable. The availability of trained men is not usually the governing factor; it is the supply and equipment of the whole man-power of the state which is impossible of achievement until industrial mobilisation for war has taken place, and the munition factories and other sources of supply are turning out material to their fullest capacity.

We will now consider briefly the characteristics of the three principal systems.
THE PROFESSIONAL STANDING ARMY.

- (1) It is a voluntary service army.
- (2) It is therefore a mercenary army to a great degree.
- (3) It follows that it is costly as regards pay and allowances.
- (4) Due to the cost the limit to its size is reached early.
- (5) Comparatively speaking, it is an army of long service men.
- (6) The difficulty of resettling the ex-soldier in civil life with fair chances of earning a livelihood, becoming a productive and useful citizen, and with equal justice to himself and the man who does not join, is great. (Vocational training is resorted to in England while the men are with the colours).
- (7) A higher standard of training can be reached than is the case with other systems.
- (8) It is suitable for overseas garrisons, e.g., British Garrisons in India and the Colonies, and American garrisons in the Phillipines, Hawaii, Panama, etc.
- (9) It produces a high-class and experienced instructor, both commissioned and non-commissioned, for the training of other forces, Reserves, Militia, etc., if such are maintained in conjunction with the Régular Army.
- (10) It will form the spearhead of national mobilisation, and take the field while the remainder of the national strength is being prepared for war.
- (11) It provides a ready-for-service expeditionary force for small wars, and can be used in this manner without an appeal to the nation for an unusual military effort, e.g., use by British and American governments in China, Nicaragua, etc.
- (12) It cannot furnish the fighting force needed for a major national effort, and even to put it in the field initially specialists and replacements are necessary. In England the supplementary reserve of specialists is found necessary for this purpose, and in the United States they have the organised reserve with the same mission. Additional officers must normally be available in the shape of a reserve of officers. It is important to remember, therefore, that even for the permanent professional army a supplementary organisation is essential.

(13) Standing alone, it is not the army of the people in the sense that every citizen will have an active interest in its welfare. It tends to become a foreign body in the state. The existence side by side with the Regular Army of a militia overcomes these drawbacks.

It is interesting to note that the post-war treaties impose this type of army on Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria as a means of limiting the military power of these countries.

THE NATIONAL ARMY OR THE NATION IN ARMS.

(1) Compulsory service is the outstanding feature of the Nation in Arms.

(2) The colour service is short (one, two, or three years).

(3) The maximum military strength is developed or capable of rapid development.

(4) The men with the colours and those who have most recently left, form the 1st Line Troops. The older men are incorporated in units (second line units) for lines of communication, or other duties demanding a lesser standard of fitness than those of the Field Army.

(5) Officers, the bulk of the non-commissioned officers, and other professionals are enlisted by voluntary recruitment.

(6) A large reserve of officers must be available.

(7) The system demands large forces with the colours each year, and involves considerable expenditure, but at a low cost per head, on pay, etc.

(8) The National Armies of Europe, of which we may take the French or Belgian as an example, are designed to take the field at very short notice, and relying on the national strength and resources to fight decisive battles within a few days or weeks of the declaration of war. This, for example, is the military system that France and Germany followed with a view to the conflict of 1871 and that of 1914-1918. The countries who can afford to do without this system are those who need not fear invasion without having some time for the mobilisation and organisation of their resources, e.g., England and the United States.

THE MILITIA.

The militia system exists in those countries which have no fear of invasion without time for defensive preparations, which look mainly or altogether to home defence, and endeavour to reinforce natural barriers or supplement external means of defence.

These countries are, in the main, unable because of lack of resources, to produce enough force to defend themselves against all likely aggressors. Switzerland maintains a militia so that her armed forces aided by the natural difficulties of her terrain, may make it too costly for any enemy to violate her neutrality. While, for instance, Germany could no doubt have overrun this small nation during the height of her power, the value of Swiss territory from any point of view would have to be weighed against the cost of conquest. Canada, Australia, and South Africa maintain militia armies which supplement the British Navy as home defence forces. They rely on the strength of Britain, but also on their own resources. It is the system of the small and weak nations.

In case of alliance or common action with another power, the stronger such a state is militarily the more its great ally will have to bow to its interests. This statement is commended especially to the consideration of our readers in view of the position of An Saorstat in international affairs. To digress still more from our topic it may be said that political permutations and combinations are endless, and the assistance of great allies is always an uncertain and shifting factor.

With these more or less general remarks we come to the principal characteristics of the militia system.

- (1) The system develops military strength at a less cost than any other.
- (2) While there are voluntary militias such as the British Territorials and the American National Guard, the system, if depended on absolutely for defence, embodies conscription or contemplates it. A militia depending on voluntary enlistments is difficult to maintain and comparatively costly.
- (3) The essence of the system is that the bulk of the army are citizen soldiers who follow their normal vocations throughout their service in the Militia and are called up for training during short periods for a number of years.
- (4) It is essentially democratic, more so than any other system.
- (5) A strong central government is necessary. With a weak government and an undisciplined nation the citizen-soldier is an obvious menace.
- (6) A Territorial form of organisation involving great decentralisation is required. Units must be organised by parishes, counties, cantons, towns, states, etc.
- (7) Very highly trained and capable professional instructors are essential in view of the very short time the militia soldier is in training.
- (8) Complete material means for training at the periodical encampments are necessary.
- (9) As about one month per annum is the usual period of training in the field (i.e., the period for which men are called out for training) some additional training is essential. There must be training all the year round in local drill halls for, say, an hour per evening each week. These local drill halls (armouries in the United States) are an absolute essential.
- (10) An actively sympathetic public is necessary to success. (The county associations in England provide the needful in this respect). Measures must be taken to ensure that men will be released for annual training without prejudice to their civil employment.
- (11) An adequate permanent establishment of officers, non-commissioned officers, specialists, administrators, etc., must be provided.
- (12) It is obvious that Militia armies cannot reach a high standard of training, and that the men can never be the match of those of a professional army. It is frankly recognised everywhere that before militia units, no matter how good, can take the field, they must have further intensive training.

Leaving the fuller examination of each system to other articles, we will conclude with some general observations which apply alike to all. British Field Service Regulations lay down the principle that military force must be economised by using to the greatest extent possible the ordinary machinery of civil life to assist the forces in the field. It is emphasised that the task of the army is the highly

specialised business of military operations. The less the likelihood of contact with the enemy, the less the degree of discipline and training required. The more the work of man or unit approximates to the civil employment or avocation of the men the less the training necessary. These principles are of universal application. There are many classes of specialists needed by an army in the field whose peace-time duties and experience in civil life fit them for their place in the war machine. Personnel to man hospitals, railways, motor transport repair parks, some classes of signal troops, are examples. Any military system should aim at making these men available for war without the necessity of spending time and money on them in peace-time by their inclusion in the standing army. The British Supplementary Reserve provides these people for the regular army.

All military systems have this in common—that they make special provision for the additional officers that will be needed in war. Officers, and to some extent non-commissioned officers, being the teachers, the leaders, and the custodians of discipline and tradition, cannot be improvised, and must be available in peace-time in adequate numbers.

With a militia or with the national army it is essential that the country be divided into territorial districts for purpose of decentralisation, for administration, organisation, recruiting and, above all, for speedy mobilisation. Even with a professional standing army such territorial sub-division is desirable. The process of local mobilisation is almost universally adopted for the purpose of making most use of local facilities, buildings, supplies, etc., thereby avoiding the expense and delay incident to new construction, and transportation of men and supplies. National Armies and Militia Armies having the bulk of their forces away from the colours in Reserve or Militia units, must have a means of having these units properly organised—men and units must be fitted into their appropriate places in the machine. Conscription and recruitment of men must be territorially carried out, and the placing of these men in units should be done where they are recruited for the purpose of avoiding expense in transportation as well as because of the need for decentralisation of the work and the keeping of men from the same place in the units that pertain to that place.


Units of reserves and Militia on a territorial basis can be recruited from a definite area, giving advantages in the matter of morale and *esprit-de-corps*, and they can be organised on the spot with saving in expense. Territorial organisation is necessary if the system of armoured training carried out with the British Territorials and United States National Guard is to be followed. For Annual Training it saves expense in transportation to have them trained on the spot. It adds to the interest of the people in such training.

That the army be closely united with the people and welded into the state as a whole is most important, being as it is the spinal column of national resistance in war. This close association is absolutely essential in National and Militia armies, as these systems depend on the good-will of the people for success, and on the fullest utilisation of machinery existing for other purposes. Close association between the people and their army can best be assured by territorial organisation. The example of the British Territorials, which are raised on a county basis by

county associations, and the British Regular Regiments which are mostly recruited from specific districts in which they have their Depot, are examples of the means taken to achieve this end.

There is no lesson which military history teaches with more clarity and force than this: that unorganised and untrained masses are a weakness rather than a strength. The history of the Civil War in the United States is only one example of the truth of this assertion even though it is the best. Armies cannot be produced in a day. Careful preparation, a sound organisation and training, training, and still more training are needed. No matter if one only boasted an infantry battalion it is far better to have one worth while battalion, at least one unit that can fight, than many such unable to cope with the conditions and demands of modern war.

What one has should be worth having, no matter how small, and for the future it may be said that progressive development should be the aim. There are two ways of making progress in any sphere of human activity—Revolution and Evolution. In the making of an army, revolution, whatever the intrinsic merit of the changes effected, produces disorganisation, confusion, lessened cohesion, and is apt to be disastrous to that most delicate but most vital quality—morale. By a process of evolution one can, if he goes carefully, acts with knowledge of his goal and his means, and uses good judgment, achieve all that might be effected by revolutionary changes without the disrupting effects. This is not evidence of conservatism. Without progress there is stagnation and death.



THE VIEWS OF THE 'OTHER RANKS'

By SGT.-MAJOR F. H. CHANDLER, No. 4 Brigade.

HAVING by good fortune been able to borrow the October and January issues of the Army Quarterly, I feel that I have some foundation for submitting an article under the present heading, because the two issues mentioned have not contained any expression of opinion so far as "Other Ranks" are concerned, and there are so many opinions and views held by the "Other Ranks" which call for expression. After all, in the absence of a deliberating body on which "Other Ranks" would be represented, there is no channel through which views may be passed other than the Army Quarterly. As an initial intrusion, I submit the following views, not in a carping spirit, but in the hope that they may help to a fuller appreciation of the difficulties, problems, aspirations and thoughts of the "Other Ranks."

THE ARMY JOURNAL.

I feel that "The Army Journal," or "Army Quarterly," is, up to the moment, a misnomer, because it has been out of the reach of and out of touch with Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. "Officers' Quarterly," by all means, but not "Army Quarterly," until it caters for "Other Ranks," because we are part of the Army. In the days when AN TÓGLACH was published as a monthly, or fortnightly journal the "Other Ranks" took every advantage of the Journal, and contributed to its columns as well as they were able. By these means they were made to feel that the Journal was accessible to them, and many discussions were developed through the medium of its pages. I suggest that the Journal should be made available to the "Other Ranks" again, by giving them some pages, in which, under Editorial supervision, they may present their thoughts. Circulation to the "Other Ranks" might be made by supplying to each Brigade or Battalion Library, two or three copies of the current number of the Quarterly, the cost to be defrayed from Brigade or Battalion Funds. Certain "Other Ranks" would be quite prepared to become subscribers to the Journal were they afforded an opportunity of doing so, and thus the Quarterly would be assured of increased circulation, and there would be potential increased advertisement revenue.

PERIODS OF SERVICE.

In Numbers 1 and 2 of the Quarterly, various Officers have commented on the matter of Enlistment for Short-Term periods, yet this matter is most peculiarly a problem to be reviewed and faced by the "Other Ranks." We, in our foolishness, may not be concerned with the pros and cons of the discussion as to respective values of Territorial, Militia, or Regular Forces, but we feel that our bread and butter is intimately concerned when we are faced with the option of extending our Service for a short period in the Army and a long period in the Reserve. The question occurs to us whether or not the average Irish employer has a mind so patriotically inclined as to permit members of his staff to be absent for one month per year while undergoing Army Training. In other words, can we find good employment where absence for one month per year will be permitted? We fear that the answer is, in far too many cases, in the negative, and thus we look upon the

Short Term of Service as a nightmare. The last few months of a current engagement are spent in questing for employment, so that we may not be faced with a period of Reserve Service. Personally, I am inclined to the view that the Territorial System of Drill Halls, with so many hours of Drill at night per week, and a fortnight's training per year, offers greater attractions to the "Other Ranks" than either "A" or "B" Reserve Service. Even with the Territorial System, the employer must be shown his national duty, and the Training period reconciled with his least busy period.

THE MATTER OF GRATUITIES AND PENSIONS.

I believe that the "Other Ranks" have a case for consideration in the matter of Gratuities and Pensions. Many of us have served faithfully and loyally, giving of our best, since the stormy days of 1922. We recall the fact that in 1922 and early 1923 men who left the Army, after as short a period of service as six months, received one month's leave on discharge, at the rate of 3s. 6d. per day pay and 4s. per day Ration Allowance, and it seems to us to be unfair that we should receive only three weeks' pay according to our rank, and 1s. 7d. per day in respect of rations for that period, after six years' service. We look forward to the time when the country may be able to consider some form of Pension Scheme for the "Other Ranks," and shall bless the sponsors of such a scheme.

THE MATTER OF PROMOTION.

I am sure that a careful analysis of the discharges from the Army would show that the percentage of junior N.C.O.'s leaving the Army is much greater than that of Senior N.C.O.'s. That is to say, of 100 Corporals 40 normally leave the Army on discharge as against 10 out of 100 Company Sergeants. I am open to correction, but I believe that these figures about strike the mark. The shortage of Junior N.C.O.'s is a constant thorn in the side of Unit Commanders, yet the shortage is the natural result of present conditions inasmuch as there is practically no promotion at the present time. Surely one of the reasons for the present state of affairs is that no Sergt.-Major or Battalion Quartermaster Sergeant cares to leave his position for civilian life. I state this as a reason because the Company Sergeants and C.Q.M.S.'s must perforce remain in their positions, pending vacancies in the ranks of Non-Coms. with Sam Browne Belts. As one of your Officer contributors has so ably put the matter, there must be a vacancy at the top before promotions can be effected. Why not, then, open the channel for Senior N.C.O.'s educationally and professionally qualified, to pass into the Commissioned ranks as vacancies occur? The Army Cadetship, as it stands at present, is not for the N.C.O., unless he should be possessed of private means and be unmarried. Some years ago I submitted an article to the Editor of AN T-OGLACH endeavouring to compare the position of a Sergeant-Major and a Lieutenant-General, claiming that neither could, in the ordinary way, hope for promotion. It is no unfair thing to say that promotion, to the Army man, is the spice of existence, and that, when ambition is killed, incentive and initiative must be dulled very considerably. The result, therefore, is that Sergeants and Corporals, despairing of promotion, leave the Army, and that the Senior N.C.O.'s fail to apply themselves to study, having practically no incentive to do so. As for the

remaining part of the " Other Ranks," I fear that theirs is veritably a desperate case, because even the attainment of Class I. Grade seems to constitute an impassable barrier. How then, may they look to scale the heights of promotion?

THE MISUSE OF THE WORDS " OTHER RANKS."

I believe that the words " Other Ranks " are not proper, and are to be resented. I have used the expression many times in this article in order to show how clearly it is wrong. As a Non-Commissioned Officer, I believe that I should be alluded to as such. The very comprehensive words, " Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Men " classify us very fully, and allot the dignity of rank to all entitled thereto. The term " Other Ranks " fails to give the Non-Commissioned Officer his proper status, and, I submit, should not be used.

MATTERS IN GENERAL.

Fearing that this article is already sufficiently egotistical, I hesitate to venture any further expressions of opinion, yet there are many other matters upon which the views of the Non-Commissioned Officers and Men could, with advantage, be heard. If the Editorial department is prepared to grant say six pages of the Quarterly to the Non-Commissioned Officers and Men, I am sure that many interesting matters could be brought to light for discussion and for the delectation of all concerned, and I, for my part, will glory in joining issue on any debatable or controversial matter which may be presented by (for the last time) "Other Ranks."

THE MILITARY SITUATION AND ITS MAIN INFLUENCES.

By CAPT. SEAN MacCARTHY, No. 4 Brigade.

THE intricate nature of our problem of national defence must be apparent to all interested in the subject, particularly to readers of the articles which appeared in recent issues of this Journal. The authors of these articles ably summarised the effects of the Anglo-Irish Treaty upon our political and military situation, and indicated aspects of the problem which invite study and discussion by all Officers.

That such study and discussion may be profitable and give results of any practical value, it is necessary to have a clear appreciation of the most probable circumstances under which the Military Forces of the State would be called upon to take the field.

In thus examining the subject, the most striking fact which proclaims itself is the influence of political programmes upon the Military situation and upon the preparations for war, which that situation may demand. Unless the political outlook on military matters is continuous and unaffected by change of Government, it is obvious that unity of purpose on the objects to be attained cannot be ensured, or the full military resources of the country employed; while Army organisation, equipment and establishment would be subject to constant interference with results disastrous to efficiency.

A stable military policy is, therefore, an essential condition to the solution of the defence problem, and it is hoped that patriotism will dictate the realisation of this fact to all political parties. Otherwise the work of those now, or in the future, responsible for the planning of military measures for the security of the State will be counteracted and nullified.

While the circumstances which would create situations demanding the intervention of the Defence Forces are numerous and varied, the most conceivable, and at the same time the most probable, are those arising from Great Britain entering upon either a defensive or offensive war. In such an event, and, notwithstanding the adoption of the most benevolent foreign policy by the Government then in existence in the Saorstát, a hostile landing on our coasts would become an imminent menace.

An attack of this nature would take the form of one or other of two main types of hostile action, namely:—

(1) An invasion, having for its objective the annexation of the country either as an end in itself, or as a means of threatening the security of Great Britain by direct or indirect methods based upon the military possession of this country.

(2) A raid or a seizure of one or more portions of our territory with the object of exercising a restricting influence upon the naval or military movements of Great Britain, by threatening its sea communications, and supplies, or of destroying points of military or economic importance.

While the former eventuality is one, the occurrence of which is possible in certain given circumstances; and cannot because of its possibility be disregarded in considering the adoption of defensive measures, the combination of circumstances which would render it feasible are of such a remote nature as to prevent it becoming the dominant factor in the military situation of the moment.

Accordingly, the latter contingency—a raid or an attempted seizure of a portion of our territory—is that which must exercise the determining influence upon our military policy. Such an attempt is feasible irrespective of the enemy possessing complete command of the sea, and is, as a result, much more probable than an effort to invade and subjugate the country. Furthermore, a policy aiming at the attainment of measures fitted to oppose hostile action of this second type means building up automatically the basis of an organisation capable of ultimately undertaking successful opposition to any effort to completely over-run and occupy the country.

The fact that the North-East portion of Ireland is not within the jurisdiction of the Saorstát has been mentioned in a recent issue of this Journal as the supreme factor effecting our military policy. That this fact, with the consequent existence of a land frontier is of a certain importance is undoubtedly true, but that a directing influence can be exercised thereby can hardly be upheld as completely accurate. All possible or conceivable contingencies must, of course, receive minute consideration in any complete survey of the military situation, but it is only the most probable of these contingencies which can dictate and supremely influence our immediate military policy. In an eventuality in which Northern Ireland participated as an enemy, or in which the defeat of the forces charged with the defence of Northern Ireland exposed the Saorstát to invasion by a common enemy, the land-frontier would most certainly be the predominant factor. The probability of any of these contingencies is, however, remote, and the importance of Northern Ireland as affecting our defensive schemes is small to a corresponding degree in comparison with other factors. The influence of the Saorstát-Northern Ireland frontier in present circumstances is one principally affecting the strategic concentration of our military forces, particularly in regard to the North Western Coastal Area.

The coast-line of the Saorstát governs strategically our military situation in the same manner as land-frontiers dominate the strategic position of Continental Powers. In this respect our insularity may be an advantage in many ways, but it necessarily bestows on an enemy strategic initiative and the great advantages resulting therefrom.

This initiative may be restricted only to a very limited extent by means of permanent coastal fortifications. Apart from the cost of such defensive works and the impossibility of fortifying all possible landing places, it is extremely doubtful if permanent fortifications can play any very important part in our measures of national defence. Modern experience suggests that the science of fortification can never regain its former importance in warfare. The most we can expect from existing coastal fortifications or from any likely to be erected in future, is that they would influence an enemy to seek an unfortified area for

disembarkation, or that they would delay disembarkation in the event of the enemy being in a position to select a fortified harbour, port or stretch of coast-line and to devote some time to the reduction of the fortifications. Permanent fortifications will not, therefore, of themselves provide a solution of our defence problem. They will not even provide a partial solution, because in the type of hostile action proposed in this article as the one which must principally influence our scheme of defence, an enemy would certainly select one of the many unfortified areas, which must of necessity, be at his choice.

Having regard to the comparatively short distances from any point on our coasts to military and political vital points, a successful disembarkation and immediate advance would permit an attacking force attaining its probable objectives in a minimum of time.

To illustrate this all-important fact, the Shannon Development Works, near Limerick, will serve as an excellent instance. These works will undoubtedly have created in a year or two a very vulnerable and vital area. An enemy successfully disembarking at some point on the Shannon estuary—many other parts of our coast line would be equally suitable for his purpose—could, unless immediately checked, bring under gunfire the area containing the Shannon Development Works within a few short hours of landing.

In view of these facts, it seems proper to conclude that the aim of our immediate military policy must be to evolve a military organisation, capable of coping with hostile action of the nature described, to such a degree at least as would prevent an enemy disembarkation developing in the enemy's favour to any appreciable extent.

Reliance on a guerilla type of military tactics to oppose successfully an attacking force is out of the question. Such a method of defence, while possibly inflicting severe losses on an enemy would, for all practical purposes, bestow on the latter a clear road to his objectives, and in addition would most probably tend to encourage an enemy to direct his efforts to a complete conquest of the country when his original limited objectives had been secured. The adoption of guerilla tactics can only be considered as a last resource.

The successful attainment of the mission which is imposed on our Army by the probabilities of the situation outlined here would seem to depend upon instant readiness, extreme mobility, suitable training and adequate armament. While these essentials lend themselves to exhaustive discussion, and must receive a detailed examination elsewhere, there are some outstanding points calling for particular mention.

The instant readiness of our Military forces is rendered necessary owing to the rapidity with which modern war may break out. It is dependent upon a good scheme of mobilisation developed in peace time. An efficient mobilisation system must of necessity be somewhat complicated, and it would seem desirable to avoid centralisation as much as possible, so as to prevent the possibility of a break-down under the strain of a sudden emergency. All the required stores and equipment should be present at the various mobilisation points, while the latter should be fixed in relation to the Railway and other transport services.

Another matter affecting the readiness of the Army and the speed of mobilisation is the method of forming the troops of the Reserve into Units on mobilisation. A system of cadres already formed and existing in peace-time, attached to Units of the Standing Army would seem better than a system requiring Units of the Standing Army to absorb reservists, or to detail cadres from their existing establishment on mobilisation.

Mobilisation and mobility are of extreme importance, as in the event of hostilities, circumstances might make it necessary for the Standing Army to engage the enemy and hold him in check before the completion of mobilisation. The smallness of our military forces also make it essential that they possess extreme mobility, so as to give a greater power of manoeuvre, and thereby counteract weakness in numbers. An increase in cyclist formations, either as separate units or otherwise, would greatly help towards securing such mobility, and in addition cyclist units would be ideal for coastal patrol and coast-watching services.

Training can also counteract our numerical weakness by educating and developing initiative in the commanders of the smaller tactical units, and giving special attention to providing a large reserve of suitably trained non-commissioned personnel.

While our training methods generally must be guided by the lessons taught by the Great War, the fact that an enemy landing on our coasts will be operating at a distance from his main basis of supply, and with his forces somewhat isolated, should permit our training system to take cognisance of tactical methods, which would otherwise be inapplicable.

In the matter of armament, we are extremely weak in artillery and machine guns—while the provision of anti-aircraft armament calls for particular attention. The steady decrease in the cost of the Standing Army should permit funds being devoted to making good these vital deficiencies. Of all the conditions essential to our success in a war of defence the provision of adequate armament is the one which demands earliest attention.

NATIONAL POLICY, MILITARY POLICY, AND THE GENERAL STAFF

By COMDT. D. BRYAN, General Staff.

I.—INTRODUCTION.

IN the Saorstát within recent years the Military Budget has been very effectively subordinated to the National Policy of reducing the burden of taxation to the greatest possible degree. If, however, only the question of financial economy was considered, the Defence Forces would not merely have been reduced—they would have been abolished. So also would the Departments of Education, Justice, and the other spending departments. Many considerations other than financial have to be taken into account when the size or cost of State departments are decided. These considerations deal mainly with the part played by the various departments in, and their necessity to the national life. In these notes reference will be made to some of the considerations usually weighed by the governments of other states when deciding what part the military forces may have to play in the national life and, accordingly, what their national military policy will be. In this article the importance of examining all matters from the position as it will be in time of war or crisis is stressed. This is necessary because in years of peace too many military questions are decided from the peace-time administrative point of view. If the fact that the Defence Forces are maintained solely for use in time of war or crisis is ignored, the next and logical step is to yield fully to the peace-time cry for financial economy and completely abolish them. Again, it is invariably the soldier's duty to do strictly what he is ordered. All states have now, however, provided themselves with an organisation composed of a picked body of officers of special military knowledge and experience and called the General Staff. In all states it is the particular duty of this organisation to think out and advise the Government through their chief on matters of military policy and on the measures necessary to provide for National Military Security. This organisation naturally must have much to say to the trend of National Military Policy, and in fact on it and its chief rests a great and more definite responsibility than on the individuals who happen to be the responsible advisers of the Minister in control of any of the other state departments. These facts are not as generally recognised as they should be by either the general body of officers or by any of the other persons who may influence questions of Military and Defence interest. It is, therefore, necessary that attention should be directed to the relation of Military to National Policy, and to the duties of the General Staff as the body charged with the responsibility for advice on military matters in connection with both.

II.—RELATION OF MILITARY POLICY TO NATIONAL POLICY.

The British Field Service Regulations open with the declaration that " War is the ultimate resort of policy whereby, when every peaceful means of settling an international dispute has failed, a nation seeks to impose its will on its enemies in defence of its honour, its interests or its existence." Military men are also

familiar with the statement of the German father of the theory of war, Clauswitz, that "War is only a continuation of state policy by other means," and with statements such as "Policy and strategy, go hand in hand," or "Policy dominates strategy and war organisation as from the nature of things it ever must." The intention in quoting these statements is to convey briefly the idea that in the conduct of its National or Diplomatic Policy a State may interfere with the interests of another state. If this interference is serious, and such as cannot be settled by normal diplomatic procedure, an aggrieved state may decide to protect its interests by force of arms. If under such circumstances the aggressor state is not able to maintain its policy, which it can only then do by defeating its opponents' forces and destroying its powers of resistance, it will find itself in a very difficult position. In 1920 Greece considered she had claims on certain areas in Asia Minor, and embarked on a policy the object of which was the seizure of these areas from the Turks. The Turks considered that Greek policy interfered with their honour and interests. Led by Mustapha Kemal, they decided to resist by force of arms, and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Greeks. That war, from the Greek point of view, certainly was a continuation of state policy by "other means." Its results, however, probably satisfied the Greeks that war must not be merely a continuation of state policy by other means, but that "policy and strategy must go hand in hand." Their military preparations were not equal to the needs of their national policy, or, in other words, National and Military policy were not properly co-ordinated or reconciled. Another and equally important consideration should not be lost sight of when considering the relation of war and policy. In the words of Major-Gen. Aston, Lecturer in Military History, University College, London, "It is essential to bear in mind that war is not always brought about by the policy of one's own country, but just as often by the policy of some other nation, unless it can be said that defending one's own vital interests when attacked may be called bringing about war by a continuation of policy." To refer again to the Greeks and Turks, it is obvious that if the Turks were legally entitled to the territories they held the Greeks interfered with their vital interests and forced a war on them. It is desirable that this consideration should be particularly borne in mind in the Saorstat. We are not likely to embark on an aggressive policy such as might interfere with the vital interests of other states. The policy of other states may, however, in time of war, interfere with the vital interests of the Saorstat and accordingly involve it in war. Possibly at no time in the world's history have such a series of issues existed in which National Policies and Military Policies are so inextricably interwoven as at the present day. Britain is concerned with problems affecting Russia, Egypt, Iraq, China, not to mention the greater naval problem. In all these cases she is wondering what military effects the adoption of certain lines of policy may have and what military forces may be needed ultimately to support these policies. France's post-war European policy would seem to have been largely directed to the creation of a series of military alliances and combinations. Similarly, Italy, Poland, and the various other European States are primarily influenced in their external policies by military considerations. It may be suggested that the same relation between National Policy and military considerations need not exist in the Saorstat. Any person

can judge for himself the amount of attention paid such considerations. There is, however, a number of ways in which military matters may affect Saorstát National Policy, and it may be of interest to cite one or two of them. The 1921 Treaty provided that Great Britain would undertake the defence by sea of Ireland for a given period. At the end of the period a conference to consider the matter further is to be held. No one will suggest that the defence by sea of the Saorstát is not a question of National importance into which military considerations will very largely enter. Furthermore, it is obvious that the other defence clauses of the Treaty, and considerations arising out of our membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations very materially affect our defence position and status. These considerations will undoubtedly have a far-reaching influence on our defence position when Britain is involved in a war the theatre of which may lie in Western Europe. No one will suggest that these matters are not of considerable importance in the consideration of Saorstát National Policy. Nor will anyone suggest that military considerations will not enter largely into or in fact primarily influence the consideration of these problems. *It can, therefore, be accepted that all states when formulating their National Policy, must consider the Military implications of such a Policy; and the Saorstát is no exception to the general rule.* Before leaving this question, it may be well to point out that a very good index of the trend of any state's military policy can be obtained by examining the memoranda issued and the statements made during the discussion of its Defence Budget or Estimates. These discussions, statements, and memoranda are invariably principally concerned with the sufficiency of the funds voted to provide for the state's security and for the maintaining of its policy, giving, of course, due consideration to questions of economy and the national financial resources. No other considerations are allowed to influence defence estimates and policy. Readers can judge for themselves the extent to which the capacity of the Saorstát's Defence Estimates to provide forces sufficient to secure the State's interests and maintain its policy in time of war or crisis enters into the discussion of our Defence Budget. As it has been suggested that General Staffs are concerned with questions of national security and military policy, they should be equally concerned with the Defence Estimates on which the National Security and the National Military Policy are based. It will also be suggested in a further paragraph that these matters should be considered, not when war has actually broken out or is imminent, but in time of peace. Spenser Wilkinson* says: "The origin of wars lies in the conflict of policies, in the incompatibility of the purposes of two states. The time to weigh the possibilities of conflict is when the national policy is taking shape." There is no doubt that a position of independence from external interference figures in the programmes of the three important political parties in the Saorstát as a feature of our National Policy. One Party maintains we are free from all such interference. Another states we are not but must become so. Publicly, at any rate, no discussion is heard on the part of either party as to the means to be taken to maintain this policy when war in adjoining states and waters may

*Late Professor Military History, Oxford University.

seriously interfere with it. The third party has been mainly concerned with the possibility of securing Saorstát neutrality in time of war. In a previous issue it was, however, indicated that in the light of historical experience neutrality can only be secured by the existence of armed forces adequate to maintain it and not, as many people in this State seem to think, by putting up some kind of a national boundary fence notice warning off foreign trespassers.

III.—NEED FOR MILITARY ADVICE WHEN DETERMINING MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONAL POLICY.

It should be apparent, although at times it does not seem to be, that a Government cannot consider the Military implications of any given policy without advice from persons of military knowledge and experience. As stated, all governments have now a definite and properly recognised body from whom they obtain military advice. One of the last governments to establish such a body were the British, and they were forced to establish it as a result of their unfortunate experiences in the Boer War. It is notorious that Britain expected to conquer the Boers with little difficulty and in a comparatively short time. If the military resources of the Boers and the situation likely to arise had been properly estimated and compared with the available British Forces, Britain would have either made better preparations for the war or modified her attitude to the Boers. In either case, she would have been conducting her National and Military Policy on Military Advice. Again, countries need military advice when making treaties of alliance and friendship which may have military results. Recently, Italy concluded a Treaty with Albania which did not at all please Yugo-Slavia. Other states who are in close friendship with Yugo-Slavia regarded the Treaty in much the same light. Before concluding the Treaty, the Italian Government undoubtedly consulted the Italian military authorities as to the possible military results of the Treaty under various circumstances. Existing Treaties may also involve obligations which are not generally understood or which may change with the international position. The Saorstát has entered into definite military obligations with Great Britain. These obligations will hardly affect us in the event of Britain being engaged in a war in Asia or the East. Let her, however, become engaged in conflict with a power capable of carrying the war into Western Europe or the waters round our coast and these obligations will immediately become factors of primary importance for us. Military obligations cannot be properly assessed or provided against without the assistance of military experts. *It would therefore appear that, not only must those who control the National Policy consider the military implications of such a policy, but they must obtain advice from persons of special military knowledge (their General Staff) when doing so.*

IV.—NEED FOR PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.

So far we have considered only the question of the relation of Military Policy to National Policy. The conflicting interests of state policy frequently lead to war. Once war ensues it is the ambition of the opposing nations to bring it to a successful termination quickly and with as little cost and loss as possible. Even

the most confirmed pacifist also knows that it is too late when on the verge of war to start making preparations for it. It is, however, when the precise meaning of the expression "preparations for war" is considered that confusion arises. Civilians and often even both soldiers and statesmen seem to believe that a nation is prepared for war if it maintains a number of men more or less drilled and supplied with certain arms and equipment. In other cases they are satisfied that the nation is prepared when they know that certain sums, great or small, are being expended for defence purposes. Experience proves that this attitude is wrong and, in fact when adopted by responsible statesmen or soldiers, amounts to criminal negligence of national interests. Prussia crushed Austria in 1866, and France in 1870; Japan defeated Russia in 1905. In each of these cases the vanquished maintained an army as well as the victor. Actually during the Russo-Japanese War, the Russians had not merely a larger army than the Japanese, but had concentrated in the theatre of operations a force superior in number to that of the Japanese. Yet the Japanese beat the Russians although even in the two most critical battles of the campaign they were inferior to them. It should also be stated that in each of these cases that the nation not expected to win actually secured victory. The most recent and outstanding example of this capacity of numerically inferior forces to inflict defeat is the wonderful series of operations in which Hindenburg and Ludendorf vanquished the invading Russian forces at Tannenberg and drove them back across Poland. Hindenburg and Ludendorf started this campaign with little more than a quarter million men. The Russian forces opposed (the famous "Steamroller") were five or six times as strong in numbers. These campaigns amply demonstrate the truth of the statement "that the relative value of armies is not to be arrived at merely by counting heads."* As armies are maintained solely to wage and win wars, it is essential for many reasons to remember the factors that give armies higher relative values. Space does not permit a detailed examination of these factors, but all students of military matters know them to be briefly as follows:—

(1) An army must be properly organised, equipped, trained and armed. The organisation, armament, and equipment must be elastic, so that it can be adapted to varying circumstances and enemies.

(2) Officers and men must be disciplined, virile, possessed of a warlike and confident spirit.

(3) The officers of all ranks must be properly educated and trained, possessed of vigour and initiative, and capable of leading their units in battle.

(4) Detailed and effective plans must exist, not only for the instant and proper use of the army in all contingencies, but also for the organisation of the nation in its support.

(5) The army must be assured of the moral support of the nation, or, as it has been described, "The nation must realise its responsibility individually and collectively for its own preservation."

No nation can regard itself as prepared for war (or capable of defending itself) until these conditions have been assured. Four of them relate to the preparation

*Col. Henderson, "Science of War."

of the nation. They are all obviously duties of the state department entrusted with responsibility for National Defence. These conditions cannot be secured on the outbreak of war unless extensive preparations have been made in the years of peace. *It is also obvious that these preparations cannot be made without the assistance of trained and experienced Military Personnel.* It can, therefore, be accepted that, in addition to reconciling National and Military Policy, preparations for war must also be made in peace, and these preparations must be largely made by military experts of the type from which National General Staffs are usually drawn.

V.—DEFEAT CERTAIN WITHOUT PEACE-TIME PREPARATION.

The immense importance of peace-time preparations for war is sometimes not recognised. For this reason the subject deserves further consideration. Everyone is familiar with the processes gone through in countries like France or pre-war Germany, and even small states such as Switzerland or Denmark when war threatens. In peace only a portion of even the first-line troops of these states is under arms. Men have to be taken from civil life, armed, clothed, and attached to their units. Transport, armament and supplies have to be collected. All are then formed into composite units, concentrated and moved to the theatre of operations. Germany, for example, had at most 850,000 men under arms in 1914. Yet in sixteen days from the start of mobilisation she had one-and-a-half million men concentrated on the Western Frontier and another 250,000 men on the Russian or Eastern Frontier. In addition, she had as many more reserve and second-line troops mobilised in the interior. The process of mobilisation is the same for a small country, and needs proportionately as much preparation. Again, to quote Major-Gen. Aston: "Every hour saved in this process (of mobilisation) is of importance, and this, like all questions of strategy, is a relative question. If the process takes five days, an advantage is gained over the enemy who takes six, but an enemy who can take four days seizes the initiative." There can be no slacking of effort in devising expedients to speed-up the process, *and work of this nature done in peace, makes all the difference to the plans of the strategist.* We must in any case know definitely to an hour the time that we must allow before we can expect to move the units of our force. We must also know the time required before the first reinforcements, depots of supplies, ammunition and equipment will be ready to perform their proper function of replenishment. Briefly, mobilisation is a race between two nations for the initiative. It is, however, a race in which numerous components of one whole take part along different routes, the speed of each unit and the time at which it will reach various points being fixed in advance. Germany, in 1914, wished to advance through Belgium and Northern France with all speed, on Paris. There was, however, no use and in fact much danger in her advanced armies getting near Paris unless reinforcements, ammunition and supplies were available immediately behind as needed. Obviously, plans for practically simultaneous mobilisation, concentration and movement to the frontier or theatre of operations require long, laborious and detailed preparation. A statement of the younger Moltke, who was German Chief of Staff in 1914, confirms this. Certain incidents which it is not necessary to detail led the Kaiser to believe, on an occasion while war was pending, that Germany would

only have to fight Russia. The Kaiser, as a result, stated to Moltke: "Now we need only wage war against Russia. Then we simply deploy the whole army in the East." Moltke's reply was: "That is impossible. It means a whole year's laborious work, and, once settled, cannot be changed. If your Majesty insists on leading the whole army East it will not be an army ready for battle but an agglomeration of dislocated, armed men, without supplies." Greater evidence of the importance of peace preparations for war can hardly be adduced.

France and Germany may be described as exceptional cases because of the size of their forces. The British position on the outbreak of the Boer War is an example of the evils of the lack of preparation in a comparatively small force. (Although possibly of much the same size as we will have to raise if or when we have seriously to defend ourselves). On the other hand the readiness of the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 is an example of the results of careful preparation. In 1899 the British had an army of units composed of good soldiers who were both well drilled and equipped according to peace-time standards. The junior officers and commanders were efficient when judged by the army standard of the day. There was, however, no war organisation. The higher commanders and staff officers had never studied either the question of organising and handling large formations or the work involved in fighting and administering them in war. Little information was available about the Boer country or its resources, military and otherwise. The information available was not properly used. The war was started without an examination of the possible developments and without any properly prepared plan or scheme of operations. As a result it lasted three years, cost Britain much loss of men, prestige, and money, and was not terminated until 300,000 men were put in the field. It is a reasonably fair assumption that if Britain within the first few months in pursuit of a definite plan, had been in a position to put in the field 100,000 men, probably the war would have ended in a very short time. What troops the British could have mobilised in a reasonable period at this time is unknown, as such questions were not then considered in the British Army. In 1906, after the formation of the British General Staff, it was estimated that it would take two months to put 80,000 men in France. The extent to which these men would be equipped and organised for a modern war is not stated, but it can be assumed they would not be much better off than during the Boer War. In 1914, 80,000 men, almost as many horses, with necessary supplies and transport, were transferred to France in ten days. 160,000 men could have been handled in the same time if the original plans had not been altered because certain statesmen feared German raids on England. The important feature of this great improvement in Britain's readiness for war was that there had been little or no change in the number of British troops between 1899 and 1914. The whole change was due to the fact that the British Army was organised, trained, and equipped for war. The officers were trained and qualified for their posts and, lastly but not least, important detailed plans for mobilisation had been prepared in advance. All this was due to the creation of a new Department in the British War Office the sole function of which was to prepare for war, and which was most explicitly freed from peace-time administrative work. This Department was the British General Staff. It may be difficult to visualise the difference between an army influenced solely by

peace-time considerations and one properly prepared for war. Field-Marshal Robertson, however, in describing the post-Boer British second line troops, states "they were a collection of units having no *systematic* proportion to each other, unconnected with the special needs of the localities in which they were raised, and in no sense an army." Lord Haldane and many other eminent authorities confirm Field-Marshal Robertson's views. A famous Commission (Esher) was appointed to inquire into the cause of the British unpreparedness for war and their actual reverses in its earlier period. The Commission's report briefly was: "If the recommendations of the Hartington Commission had been accepted the country would have been saved the loss of many thousands of lives, and of many millions of pounds subsequently sacrificed in the war." The Hartington Commission had been appointed some years before the Boer War to investigate and report on the British Military System. Its recommendations summarised were: "The creation of a new War Office Department under a Chief of Staff who was to devote himself entirely to collecting information, to thinking out great military problems and to advising the Secretary of State for War on matters of Military Policy." Recommendations similar to those of the Hartington Commission were made and enforced by the Esher Commission. The result was that history has decided that Britain never yet entered upon any war with anything approaching such forwardness and forethought in the preparation of the military resources at her disposal as she did upon the European War—1914-18.

VI. The examples quoted indicate that a government cannot hope either to conduct an effective military policy or make proper preparations for war without the assistance of a General Staff.

When dealing with the duties of the General Staff it should be borne in mind that it is their place to advise the War Minister or Executive on matters of military Policy, just as the permanent officials in the various civil departments advise their chiefs. In both cases the Minister or Executive can then accept or reject the advice as he thinks fit. In civil departments if the Minister rejects their advice it is his personal responsibility, and the public blame him and not his permanent advisers. In the case of the Military Department there is a difference. History proves that if a Minister does not accept advice on Military matters, and failure results, the public blame the officers in command and their staffs. The average man still thinks of the Dardanelles as an example of British Military inefficiency, while in fact all British military experts were opposed to the expedition. And who knows who were the War Ministers in France, or England, or Germany during the war? Yet everyone is familiar with the names of Haig, Foch, Hindenburg, etc. The position of a General Staff or even of individual military officers is, therefore, different from that of advisers in a civil department. Military advisers may give the best advice—but if this is rejected and failure ensues, the blame for such failure may attach to them in the public estimation. Their position is consequently one of great responsibility to the nation, and one in which their military reputation may be imperilled through no fault of their own.

Lecture on Liaison with Artillery during the Attack.

By COLONEL J. J. O'CONNELL, A.S.I.

(NOTE.—This lecture is intended to elaborate those paragraphs of "Tactical Drill," in which mention is made of collaboration between Infantry and Artillery).

ARTILLERY is a special arm organised with a view to helping Infantry by means of powerful fire-effect. It must be distinctly borne in mind that Artillery never acts on its own behalf but always on behalf of Infantry. The Artillery is so armed as to be able to do for Infantry what the latter cannot do for itself. Artillery can hit objects much further away than Infantry, and can destroy cover that is invulnerable by Infantry fire, so that every care must be taken to improve its accuracy and get maximum results from its employment.

INITIAL UNDERSTANDING WITH ARTILLERY.

In "Tactical Drill," para. 154, it is laid down that the Infantry Battalion Commander can facilitate his advance: "By indicating to the Higher Command what Artillery or other co-operation would be calculated to assist him." In para. 174 it is stated that the Offensive Combat Orders of the Battalion deal with "The action of the other arms for immediate support." In para. 197—the actual attack orders on the spot amongst the information given to each Company Commander is placed: "The latest information relative to adjacent units and Artillery." Finally, in para. 203, one of the main aims of liaison is laid down thus: "To ensure co-operation between all arms and units, especially *between the Artillery and Infantry.*"

Thus, the principle of co-operation of the two arms is clearly recognised and emphasised. A principle, however, is one thing; how to apply the principle is a different thing. The present lecture is intended to describe the application of the principle in question, *i.e.*, collaboration of Infantry and Artillery.

"Heaven helps those who help themselves."

This proverb is especially applicable to Infantry combat. Modern Infantry has a varied armament: every unit, even the smallest has rifles and bayonets, hand and rifle grenades, light automatic guns; in addition, the Battalions have light mortars and guns and heavy machine guns. Consequently even the smallest units can reduce unaided the majority of enemy points; *provided that they use the material in their possession with skill and resolution.* By calling on the Battalion for its more powerful material, a large proportion of the outstanding stronger points can be reduced. In this way *it will only be necessary to call on the Artillery for aid in the case of a small number of particularly strong points.*

This must be clearly understood and remembered, because all effective help from the Artillery turns on it. The Artillery has not an unlimited supply of ammunition—each gun has about as many rounds as an Infantry man. Again, once engaged, Artillery is by no means as mobile as Infantry. Consequently it cannot with impunity be switched on to all sorts, kinds, and sizes of targets. It is criminal waste of Artillery to call on it to remove an obstacle that can be stormed

with grenades and bayonets. The Artillery must be reserved for tasks worth while—tasks that cannot be properly accomplished without its aid. This is the first and most important point to be remembered when calling on the Artillery for assistance. The Artillery must be considered as an assistant of the Infantry—not as a slave tied to its hand and foot.

TURNING ARTILLERY FIRE TO ACCOUNT.

Before considering in detail how to get Artillery to do things for him, the Infantryman must *see whether it is not possible to profit by what the Artillery is already doing*. As we have seen, "Tactical Drill" lays down that certain combined action of the two arms is arranged at the start off. Clearly, then, it is the bounden duty of the Infantry to avail of this initial fire without delay. The Infantry must take advantage of the Artillery fire to advance—it is only a case of "covering fire" on a big scale. In short, Infantry must at all times be on the look-out for chances of turning Artillery fire to account—whether the Artillery fire in question has been asked for or not.

Whenever in this way Infantry has occupied a position at which Artillery has been firing, *the Artillery must at once be notified of the fact*. The Artillery will then be free to open up against a fresh target, to move forward, or to do whatever the Battery Commander finds most important for the next move. It is vital to notify the Battery Commander *at once*, so that he will lose no time in making his own next move.

GETTING HELP FROM ARTILLERY.

This is simply a step further than turning the Artillery's fire to advantage—in this case the Infantry *tells the Artillery what would be the most helpful thing for it (the Artillery) to do*. The Infantry themselves must do this—no Artillery Observation Officer can do it for them. It is the Infantry that has to advance and is fired at while doing so. When it is necessary to call on the Artillery it is necessary to be *dead exact*. It is no use saying: "Can't you do something for us." If you are held up you must tell the Artillery all about it. You must state clearly:—

1. What precise enemy element is holding up your advance.
2. Where exactly that element is located—to the yard if possible.
3. Where the element can be seen from—so that the Artillery can observe their own fire for themselves, being more familiar with the job.

To secure exactness in locating enemy elements, a *sketch*—accurate, however rough—is of enormous help to the Artillery. Another useful method was employed by the French in Morocco—Infantry N.C.O.'s were issued with a certain number of *tracer bullets* which they fired at the exact points occupied by the enemy.

HELPING THE ARTILLERY.

But Infantry must not be communicating with the Artillery simply when asking for its help. Infantry can also facilitate the Artillery, and must take every possible care to do so. There are many things very useful for the Battery Commander to know that may not seem so to the Infantryman—and which cost no trouble to communicate. Such are:—

1. *Exact location of front line of Infantry.* The Artillery can adjust its fire to the Infantry advance only when it knows what points have already been reached. This can easily be signalled by flares, flags, etc., which give the fronts exactly and instantaneously.

2. Plan of operations for local part of the combat, *i.e.*, idea of setting about reduction of a strong point located, etc. It is much better to tell the Battery Commander *why* you want him to do something than to say: "S.O.S., for God's sake do so-and-so."

3. Certain particulars as to the ground; for example, certain ground may be gravelly, giving good bursts; or boggy, giving none at all; a stream may be fordable where it was expected to be deep—or deep where a ford was expected. As regards these points it would be well for the Battery Commander to indicate beforehand points the Infantry should be on the look out for, and which, if considered purely from an Infantry point of view, might not seem very urgent.

PROTECTING THE ARTILLERY.

During the combat, Artillery must be protected by the Infantry against enemy attack—except from the air. This is a most urgent duty, because the loss of the guns is a two-fold loss. In the first place, a serious weakening of our strength, and in the second place it gives the enemy trophies to exhibit to our disgrace.

The abandonment of Artillery by adjoining Infantry is an act of dishonour.

An Artillery Officer is authorised to ask for support from the nearest Infantry; this support must never be refused. The Infantry must automatically provide information and security; and furthermore material support may be provided if the situation calls for it.

In principle, the Infantry must interpose so as to keep hostile Infantry out of range of the batteries, and in case of an exposed flank the Artillery must be covered on this side also.

URGENT NEED FOR SPEED.

Speed is the vital factor of all collaboration of Infantry and Artillery. The sooner the Battery Commander knows what is needed—exactly what is needed—the sooner he can supply the required help. The more information he gets about the general situation, ground, etc., the quicker he will be able to develop his own action.

This speed, which is so necessary, can only be acquired by close co-operation in peace-time exercises, so that each of the two arms has sound notions as to the strong and weak points of the other.

*By kind permission of the United States' "Field
Artillery Journal, May-June, 1925."*

A FABLE.

By LIEUTENANT J. L. CHAMBERLAIN, Jr., F.A.

Now this is just as fabulous as fabulous can be,
But perhaps the thought's occurred to you as it has to me,
So I'm putting down the idea in a sort of fairy tale
Bringing out a general moral on a very minor scale.

There once were two lieutenants just as raw as raw could be,
One of infantry, the other field artillery,
And continually they argued with disdainful, sneering voice,
On the total impotence of the other fellow's choice.

The infantry-man's name was Day, or maybe it was Knight,
But let us call him Day because it's easier to write,
The artilleryman possessed a name of very great renown,
For its most surprising frequency—the fellow's name was Brown.

First, Day would say, "Dear fellow, any yokel on a farm
Would say without a moment's thought that we're the basic arm."
Then Brown would say, "Dear, laddie, any cowboy on a ranch
Would say sans hesitation that *We're* the basic branch."

So through their peace-time soldiering, they carried on, each man,
Believing that the other's branch was just an "also ran,"
And both of them got generalcies, and then—war was declared,
But neither was afraid because they both were well prepared.

Now finally they happened through sheer coincidence,
To be in the same division to take up the offense,
And they still retained their theories of the proper way to fight,
They didn't *think* they were correct—they *knew* that they were right.

The enemy, the orders said, was stretched along the line
Of C.R. 10 (dash) Fiddlesburg (dash) R.J. Umpty-nine.
The orders said to go ahead until Clam Creek was crossed,
And hold the ground which had been gained—to hold at any cost.

The major-general telephoned to every brigadier,
And bade him come without delay the general plan to hear.
So Day and Brown came rushing with the others of their kind
To hear the plans for battle that the general had in mind.

Now at this point I'll interrupt with just a word or two.
Remember it's a fable—not a word of it is true.
So if in view of logic it seems slightly out of joint,
Don't criticize my ignorance, just try to see the point.

So there they were, the brigadiers; each had a different view
Of what would be the best and most effective thing to do.
And Day and Brown were still, of course, in absolute dissent.
The general listened calmly to every argument.

Said Brown, "Just let me take my guns and load them up and fire,
And I'll guarantee that I can make the enemy retire."
While Day with equal confidence, said: "Use the bayonet.
Artillery isn't worth a damn; I've never used it yet."

The general smiled a knowing smile and pondered on the case.
While the others talked and shouted, he sat quiet for a space.
At last he spoke, "The both of you," he said, "are right, no doubt,"
So I'll let you fight the way you want and see how you come out."

The push began at daybreak and caught the foeman sleeping,
And Brown tried every kind of fire; concentrations, sweeping,
H.E., gas, and shrapnel; barrages, box and rolling,
And the fire situation he was certainly controlling.

Now in another sector was a different situation,
For Day had started his advance without a preparation,
And the enemy's machine guns were a source of much distress.
In fact, the situation was a pretty awful mess.

The enemy was holding firm as well indeed he might,
He had no fear of H.E. that would blow him out of sight.
So inevitably Day's infantry was driven back in rout,
He'd fought just as he wanted to, and seen how he'd come out.

He grasped the situation and he grabbed the telephone,
He called the major-general—his voice was like a groan,
"For Gawd's sake send artillery, send all of it you can,
And wipe out these machine-gun nests—we're losing every man."


Now in the meantime Brown had also called the general,
And said to him, "Er, General, we're doing mighty well.
We've smashed the foe to smithereens, they haven't got a dug-out,
Nor even got a can of oil we haven't knocked the plug out."

"Now, where are you located? Just where is your position?
You've sent no message, do you think we work on intuition?
How many miles ahead are you? The time when you departed?"
And Browns' voice came most awfully meek, "We're now just where we
started."

It is not necessary to carry on this tale,
For already I have told it in considerable detail,
But let me quote in closing what the general said to each,
For it really was a very interesting little speech.

He spoke in words as follows: " You thought you knew your stuff,
But now I've let you try it and you've both had quite enough.
And I think you've learned that you can save yourselves a lot of harm,
By a slight consideration of the other fellow's arm.

I think you've learned, in short, the value of co-ordination,
But you've learned, too late—you'll have to find some other occupation.



THE MEN OF THE FUTURE.

A PLEA FOR ACTION.

By MAJOR-GENERAL H. MACNEILL, General Staff.

(Note.—The report of the proceedings at the inaugural meeting of the Civil Service Debating Society, which appear in this number of AN t-ÓGLACH, following the very pertinent remarks in the October issue on the training of our youth, under the heading of "Save the Children," have prompted the preparation of the following notes in the hope that they may help to clear the air and enable some definite steps to be taken to face this vital problem).

IT will, it is thought, be admitted that national morale in this country is at present at a very low ebb. Patriotism is invariably confused with party politics; no more is it regarded by the mass of the people as over and above all parties, creeds, and classes. The ideal—"My country, right or wrong"—is dormant, if not dead. National self-respect appears to be non-existent; foreign ideals and customs appear to be matters for admiration and emulation; native culture and native ideals are slowly fading out of existence. Good citizenship, as understood in other countries, apparently does not exist, service to the community or the nation seems to be subordinated to selfish personal or at most party interests. Various explanations can be advanced but the immediate problem is to find a remedy for this deplorable state of affairs.

This decline in national morale is not of course confined to any class, creed, or party; all suffer from it to a greater or lesser degree. Neither is it confined to any age; it is just as apparent in the juvenile as in the adult. However, as these notes are concerned with the problem as it affects the youth of the country the adult section of the community can be left out of consideration at the moment, although it is believed that if the proposals broadly outlined in the following pages should be put into effect the indirect effects on our adult population would in themselves provide ample justification for the experiment.

The two principal boys' organisations in Ireland to-day, although totally opposed to each other in ideals and outlook, are somewhat akin by reason of the fact that the programmes of both, in spite of their essential differences, are such as are calculated to appeal to the enthusiasm and love of excitement and adventure in boys and to turn this youthful enthusiasm and energy into channels not likely to prove of service to this nation as a whole.

One of these bodies seeks to organise and train the youth of Ireland, not for service to the nation as such, but to utilise it in the interests of a hypothetical political entity. It is not desired to enter into anything in the nature of a political discussion, but it will be admitted that such an organisation has resulted in instilling into a percentage of the present younger generation the idea that an Irish Government, elected by the Irish people, served by an Irish Army, Judiciary, Civil Service and Police is an enemy to freedom, and must be treated as such. Obviously this is not the view of the bulk of our people, and so the objects and training of this organisation are, to say the least of it, purely factional, and if persisted in can only destroy all hopes of healing old wounds, and of arousing a decent spirit of national self-respect, of pride of country and of national institutions in the rising generation.

The other leading boys' movement in the country is probably even more dangerous to the continued existence and progress of this nation. It is particularly so by reason of the fact that, while it openly professes loyalty to this country, its organisation is directed from a foreign capital. It seeks to instil into its members the ideals of a foreign civilization. It teaches them to honour and respect the flag and the institutions of an alien land. Its traditions are naturally not the traditions of Ireland, but are absolutely foreign and hateful as a whole to the ideals of this country. The continued existence of this body constitutes in itself an impertinent challenge to the facts of our situation to-day. As in the case of the first organisation, these teachings, as they become more widespread, will help to destroy all hopes of building up a strong, united self-reliant nation in this island.

There is one other body which may be mentioned which professes to be organised on national grounds and provides another example of the prevalent confusion between patriotism and politics. This organisation takes care to couple with the term "national" the label of "non-political," which in this particular case seems to be another description of "non-national" and may eventually become even anti-national. Moreover, its membership is confined to members of one denomination only, and although this happens to be the religion of the majority the organisation must be classified as sectarian.

In addition to these three organisations there are various other bodies, most of which are attached to different religious denominations. At least one of these is definitely foreign in outlook and ideals. Most of these organisations are too limited in scope and influence (except in their own localities) to be regarded as assets or the reverse.

It should be clearly understood that while all existing organisations are criticised it is realised that all of them have their good points, and many elements of their various programmes could be adopted with advantage for any really national movement of this type. For example, one of them emphasises that the first essential in the qualifications of the boy who wishes to serve its cause is self-sacrifice, and naturally this principle of submerging Self for Service must underlie the training of all future citizens. This particular body has also adopted a moral code, based on the old code of honour of the Fianna of Fionn, which is a model of its type. Another, by insisting on the development of character, recognises the essential qualifications of good citizenship. Even the denominational bodies by teaching the boys reverence for their various religions recognise that the fundamental principle in the training of future citizens is recognition of their obligation to God.

To sum-up, the position with regard to what may be described as the supplemental education of boys in Ireland, is as follows:—

- (a) The two chief organisations, while fulfilling a certain amount of good in the abstract by means of the training imparted to their members, more than nullify this by seeking to utilise the results obtained either for partisan interests, or in the interests of a foreign country.
- (b) In addition to these two there are various other bodies, mostly of a sectarian nature, which, if they do little harm, achieve little good, and cannot be regarded as exercising mass influence.

In view of the above, none of these movements can be classified as National assets; there can be no place for them in the Ireland of to-day.

They must, however, be replaced by something akin to themselves, for it is now universally recognised by all progressive nations that the teachings of the home and the school are not, as a rule, sufficient in themselves to develop the ideal citizen. These teachings must be supplemented by something further. It is almost equally recognised that the most satisfactory complementary training can be achieved through the medium of Boy Scouting or Scoutcraft, which has been described by the noted Englishman who founded it as "A school of citizenship through woodcraft."

If we recognise this principle of the necessity for supplementary education for our boys through the medium of Scoutcraft we must next consider the fundamental principles which must underlie the organisation of any such movement in Ireland upon a national basis. It would appear that these could be summed up as follows:

1. It must be truly national in every sense of the word, that is to say, it must be broad enough to appeal to all creeds, classes, and parties provided that they recognise definitely that this is an ancient sovereign Nation, subordinate to no other, with its own traditions, history, and culture, which must be upheld and respected above all others. In a word, the ideals of Irish-Ireland, of the true Gaelic State, must be fostered and developed, to the exclusion of all others.

2. Its training must ensure that these ideals will be maintained in the future by instilling into its members the principles of patriotism, citizenship, discipline, courage, chivalry, resourcefulness, and self-reliance. It must develop character and physique. It must aim at building up individual efficiency, while emphasising that this efficiency must invariably be utilised in the service of the nation and the community, rather than in that of the individual.

An attempt is made to show in outline in the following paragraphs the lines on which these objects might be attained.

PROPOSED NATIONAL ORGANISATION.

In such a movement as this it is felt that the details of organisation are important only in so far as they have a bearing on the scheme of training. Therefore the actual type of organisation necessary does not arise at the moment. However, it might be well to consider at this stage two cardinal principles which are vital to the success of any such movement, viz.:—

- (a) It must be non-sectarian and non-political.

- (b) It must be non-military.

It has been already stated, with regard to the first of these principles, that the movement must be broad enough to appeal to all creeds, classes, and parties. How this principle can be put into practice must now be considered, for it is of course not sufficient that such a movement should merely appeal to the sympathies of people. We must seek to obtain their active support and assistance where this is likely to be of value.

As was mentioned earlier there are two principal boys' organisations in Ireland, one distinctly foreign in outlook and ideals, and one based on semi-political prin-

ciples. There does not appear to be any reason why we should not get the co-operation of these bodies (or at least of individual members) in the preliminary stages.

Similarly some of the smaller organisations, sectarian or otherwise, would probably be willing to help. A meeting between the representatives of these various bodies could be arranged at which views would be exchanged and an attempt made to hammer out the outlines of a programme acceptable to all. If successful in this a Provisional Committee could be appointed, comprising all shades of opinion, to complete the details of the scheme.

The preliminary meeting should not be confined to representatives of existing organisations. People interested in such matters as education, the language and literary revival, social work, etc., should all be invited to attend. It would be very desirable at some future date to have introduced into the Dail an Act giving such an organisation national recognition by granting a Charter or equivalent, and in view of this it might be necessary to discuss the preliminary programme not alone with the Ministers of State affected, such as Local Government and Public Health, Education, and Defence, but probably also with representatives of the various political parties. If such an Act could be passed—and there is no reason why it should not—as an unanimous non-party measure, the moral effect on the country would be of considerable importance.

It is realised that in dealing with existing denominational bodies the religious aspect might be a source of difficulty. It must be insisted, however, that while the movement would be non-sectarian it would not by any means be anti-religious. In fact the religious aspect should be stressed in any such movement, and it should be insisted upon, as far as possible, that all boys attend to the duties of their own faith. Clergymen of all denominations represented should be encouraged to take an active part in the movement. Sluaighte or Troops of one faith could be attached to various schools and churches. In a word, everything must be done to train the boys to practice their religions openly and proudly, but without bigotry.

Finally, the movement should be non-military. At the moment the Army could doubtless launch such a movement, but immediately the charge of militarism would be raised against it. This danger is always exaggerated in a democratic country, but it must be admitted that there is always an element of risk attached to it, however small. Apart from this the actual value of such an organisation run on military lines is negligible. The ultimate aim must be not to turn out "toy soldiers," but good citizens. If the country is in danger the good citizen will always be first to answer her call. The same cannot be said for the "toy soldier" type. That in fact is one of the outstanding lessons to be learned from the history of our boys' movements during the recent past. We trained our boys and young men to fight all right, but we often neglected to make it clear that they were fighting for a principle, with the inevitable result that some of them continued to fight, apparently "for love of it," when the official sword was sheathed. The military training of boys should be left to other bodies, such as Cadet Corps, which would cater for the older boys, the finished product of our Scout Movement, the trained embryo citizen.

The military side of a Scout movement should be limited to the very minimum of drill necessary to make the boys smart, disciplined, and physically fit. If they wish to, the older boys may be encouraged to learn to shoot. This would emphasise the fundamental right of every citizen to befit himself to assist in the defence of his country, and provides good moral as well as physical training.

Apart from these two factors, however, the military training proper should be left to other agencies better qualified to deal with it.

This, of course, should not prevent the Army playing its rightful part in the development of such a movement. It would not appear that there is anything to be gained by the Army participating officially as such, but it should certainly encourage and assist any such movement. It should provide it with all possible and reasonable facilities, and all individual officers with an interest in the training of boys should be encouraged to take an active part in the running of Sluaighte or Troops.

The October issue of AN T-ÓGLACH not alone touched upon the necessity for a really National Boys' Movement, but it also published an article by Major Cotter making a plea for the usefulness of hobbies. Why not consider both these pleas in conjunction? Anyone with the slightest experience of the training and development of young boys will admit that it is the finest of all hobbies, and more far-reaching in its results than any ordinary hobby can hope to be.

OUTLINES OF A TRAINING PROGRAMME.

The aim of Boy Scout training is to turn out good citizens. This involves the preparation of a programme which will be calculated to train the boy morally and physically, to train his mind, to develop his character, to help him to make his way in life if possible by giving him preliminary training in the rudiments of the vocation or craft he is destined to follow, by means of handicrafts, etc., to develop his physique by teaching him how to take care of his body, and to develop his sense of citizenship by instilling into him respect and reverence first for God, and secondly for his country and its traditions, history, culture, and national institutions. This may appear at first sight a pretty formidable programme, but it must be remembered that it has been successfully carried through by similar Boys' Movements all over the world. The main point to keep before us is that it is practicable. Too often have we failed in the past because we have put high-soaring ideals on our programmes and left it at that. Little or no attempt was made to live up to these ideals in our training schemes. Idealism must be the basis of our organisation, but let it be practical idealism.

It would therefore appear that our training could be summed up as follows:—

- (a) Development of Character,
- (b) Development of Physique,
- (c) Development of Citizenship.

These three main elements of training will be dealt with separately below.

DEVELOPMENT OF CHARACTER.

In developing the boy's character we have got to set out primarily to teach him to be honourable and reliable—to be brave, morally and physically—to be clean in body and mind—to be obedient to his parents and superiors—to be chivalrous

to those weaker or poorer than he is—to be thrifty, temperate, and diligent, and above all to be reverent to his God and loyal to his country and community. These points cover the fundamental principles of training in citizenship. They could be embodied in a Code of Honour or Scout Law, but this alone is not sufficient. The boy must be taught to uphold them in his everyday life. For example, he learns that when he gets an order from his parents, his teacher, his employer, his Scoutmaster, or anyone else in authority over him he obeys it without question, and if he has any objection to it he keeps this to himself *until he has carried it out*. Thus he learns discipline as distinct from servility.

His courage, moral and physical, is developed by gradually training and exhorting him by example and otherwise to stand up for the right at all costs, to be prepared to face any danger in the service of his country, his community, or his comrades.

He can be taught to be chivalrous by putting him under “geasa” or a Scout promise to do a “good turn,” no matter how trivial, to someone every day. By teaching and demonstrating to him the habits and lives of dumb creatures he learns that they are not to be wantonly injured or destroyed. He learns that politeness and courtesy particularly to the old and infirm and to women are essential qualities of chivalry. He is trained to live up to these few principles for the honour of his Troop and his Organisation, and thus automatically the principles of honour, and loyalty, service and discipline are acquired.

The necessity for practical rather than theoretical character-training must be kept always in mind. The boy must be kept out in the open air, taught to use his eyes and ears and hands, got interested in the habits of birds and animals, trained to “rough it” and fend for himself. All this, if properly directed, must tend to develop his resourcefulness, energy, chivalry, sense of duty, love for the beauties of his native land, reverence for the God Who made them. Incidentally it develops his physique, teaches him self-reliance, and trains him to submerge self for Service—and the result is the good citizen.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHYSIQUE.

Here again the practical nature of the training must be kept in mind. We are too much inclined in Ireland to think that Physique Culture is confined to a few aimless “jerks,” spasmodic “arms-bending and stretching,” often in a stuffy dark hall. This may be all right in its own way, but in itself it is *not* Physical Culture.

The boy must be taught a few fundamental laws of hygiene and sanitation, and be trained to live up to them. We must start with personal cleanliness, teach him to keep his hair clipped and brushed, his teeth clean and sound, his nails trim, his body and mind clean. If we succeed in these small things the bigger ones will follow automatically. Again get the boy into the open air, out into the country away from city streets, teach him endurance, avoiding overstrain of course, get him to use his legs, and we will have done more for the physical development of our youth than all the ill-directed Physical Jerks ever invented. Give Physical Training Exercises their proper place by all means, but don't let them overshadow everything else.

DEVELOPMENT OF CITIZENSHIP.

The first essential in the development of the good citizen is to make him a *useful* citizen, useful to himself and to the community at large. We can do this by helping the boy to pursue some hobby, by issuing badges or some such mark of proficiency to encourage him. By insisting on thoroughness in the qualifications for such badges character is further developed. He learns to be really efficient, to be resourceful, patient, and energetic.

A hobby room or workshop, no matter how primitive, should be an essential feature of every Club Room or Meeting Hall. Efforts must be made to get outside Instructors whenever necessary. Periodical shows or displays could be held to encourage progress. Articles might be sold at such functions, the proceeds or a percentage of them at least going to the Sluaghte or Troop. Thus the boy is trained as a wage-earner and as a citizen, he learns to work for his community as signified by his Sluagh. Arrangements could also be easily made for tours of museums, factories, workshops, etc., to develop further the interest of the boy in the work of the world around him.

Having trained the boy in the fundamentals of *useful* citizenship we must go further, we must teach him that all his efficiency and his usefulness must be used for the service of the community rather than of himself. We must train him to respect the laws of his community, get him interested in these laws, teach him the essentials of municipal government by enlisting the help of Local Authorities, show him how these authorities work, and why.

Finally, we must develop that broader patriotism, which may be summed up in the description "Loyalty to Country." We must teach him to respect its flag, its institutions, and its laws. Teach him its history, encourage him to use its language, to support its industries. Here again, at the risk of emphasising the obvious, let it be repeated that the training must be practical. For instance, we set out to foster the Irish Language. What practical proof can we give of this in a Training Programme? To begin with, let the Organisation, its Committees, Unit, Officers, etc. be referred to or described in Gaelic only, all drill commands be given in Gaelic, the initiation Promise or Pledge administered in the National Language.

Similarly for History. It is a very simple thing to say we will teach the boy the history of his country, and proceed to attempt to fill his head with a mass of dates and similar uninspiring detail. What does that achieve? Nothing. Cannot we hope to do better by appealing to his imagination rather than his memory? For example, let every Sluagh be called after some famous leader, Patriot, or Chieftain of the past. His picture should be displayed in the place of honour in the Sluagh Hall, his name inscribed on the Sluagh Flag; one day a year set aside as his Memorial Day, which the boys of his Sluagh would commemorate annually as their day; the salient features of his life taught to every recruit. All this will give the boy a good detailed knowledge of one phase of his country's history, and will almost inevitably whet his natural appetite for more.

We can tackle the question of practical support of Irish industries in the same way. Commence by ensuring that nothing of foreign manufacture is included

in the official uniform or equipment of the organisation. There is little use in asking boys to support Irish industries while you give them felt hats made in France, or leather belts made in England. Make the boys proud of their Irish uniforms and equipment. Make it a point of honour with them to support the industries of their own country.

These few notes do not lay any claim to originality; they do not purport to lay down any new doctrines. The principles outlined are those on which every successful National Boys' Movement all the world over is based. There does not appear to be any sound reason why they should not be quite as applicable to our boys, if properly directed, as they are to the boys of, say, England or America. As was pointed out earlier, an organisation founded on such a basis could be made broad enough to enable all Irishmen, irrespective of class, or creed, or party to meet on a common platform, to join hands in a common cause of vital concern to the future of our country.

It was pointed out in the October issue of AN T-ÓGLACH referred to before, that there is something akin to the "Children's Crusade" of 1211 in progress in Ireland to-day. Let us do our part to launch a rival Crusade, a cleaner, nobler Crusade, a crusade to save the youth of Ireland—not to destroy it.



HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHEMICALS IN WAR.

By COMDT. D. STAPLETON.

THE employment of chemicals in military operations is, without doubt, a particular development of the European War. Nevertheless, the attempts to use incendiaries and gases in a crude way go back to the wars of the Athenians and Spartans in the fifth century before Christ. Pitch, charcoal and sulphur were melted together in cauldrons and the fumes blown over the enemy's lines by means of bellows. This is the first recorded use of true gas fumes, as the smoke clouds described earlier by Plutarch in reality consisted of a cloud of fine dust dispersed by horses galloping over a mound of dust and ashes, and carried over the enemy's lines by the wind. Later on, incendiary arrows came into use, being shot from a distance against the wooden structures of the opponent. These were subsequently enlarged and were even shot from catapults.

About the sixth or seventh century after Christ, "Greek Fire," one of the most famous weapons of ancient chemical attack, was used by the Byzantine Greeks.



Fig. 1.—75 m.m. White Phosphorus Shell, 2 seconds after bursting.

This fire gave off dense clouds of blinding smoke of an asphyxiating nature. It was very difficult to extinguish, as water poured upon it only served to increase its activity and spread the flames. Greek Fire was in use during the Crusades, when it was employed by the Saracens against the Christians. Subsequently the secret of its composition was lost.

To the ancient Greeks is also credited the flame projectors, which they used against the Saracens. They consisted of large syringes, shaped like dragons and other monsters, with wide open jaws, from which burning liquids were squirted towards the enemy, who usually fled, terrified more by the appearance of the supposed monsters than from any physical infliction.

From these early days down to the European war, very little has been recorded in connection with the use of poison gases. In modern times, however, instances of the use of chemicals for attack are not wanting.

During the Crimean War, the British Admiral, Lord Dundonald, submitted a plan for the reduction of Sebastopol by the use of a cloud of gas which he proposed to generate from 400 tons of sulphur and 2,000 tons of Coke. The British, although admitting that the plan was feasible, refused to allow it to be put into execution "as the effects would be so horrible that no honourable combatant would employ such means."



Fig. 2.—Early Gas Protection.

During the American Civil War, at the Siege of Charleston, wood saturated with sulphur was burnt under the parapets in the hope of suffocating and choking the defenders. At other times shells were filled with an incendiary composition which included white phosphorous. The latter substance has now become invaluable for the production of smoke clouds (Fig. 1), and was used extensively in the European War.

The first use of poison gas is supposed to have occurred in the Spring of 1915, when during the month of April the Germans discharged at Ypres about 6,000

cylinders of chlorine. It is a fact, however, that some months previous to this three Germans were found gassed in a German dug-out. The positions and attitudes of the men showed all the indications of prussic acid poisoning. One was in a standing posture grasping his rifle, the bayonet of which was buried in the wall of the dug-out; another in a slightly leaning position was standing rigid in a corner, whilst the third was sitting upright on the floor, against the wall. By no possible chance could carbon monoxide have accomplished this feat, as the men would have collapsed under the influence of the gas. The action of prussic acid in an enclosed area such as the dug-out would produce the maximum paralyzant effect which this gas is capable of exercising. The result would be the establishment of the rigid postures in which the men were found. It is significant that the French Police were accustomed to use prussic acid gas against a section of the Apache element in Paris for a few years before the war. Prussic acid was also used by the French subsequently to April, 1915, until its utility in the field was absolutely disproved by Professor Barcroft, head of the British Research Department.




Fig. 3.—(CL2) Chlorine Plant.

At the Ypres gas attack over 5,000 casualties and 500 prisoners were lost in the front line, and gas was felt even by the reserves who were brought up to fill the gaps. Immediately after this attack an appeal was made to the women of France and England for pads of cotton for protection (see Fig. 2). Within 2 days, 200,000 masks were sent to the front. These pads were dipped in "Hypo" solution, just prior to use, and were very efficient against chlorine (Fig. 3).

During the Summer of 1915, the Allies learned that the Germans were preparing to launch a very virulent gas—"Phosgene"—and a mask was quickly produced which protected against it. From this period, it may be safely said, dates the commencement of the competition between the production of a mask to keep out poisonous gases, and the development of new gases to penetrate the mask. Down to the present day, in all research work carried out by the different countries interested in this new branch of military science, the same competition continues. You have the "Offensive side" developed by the discovery of new gases, smokes, etc., whilst the "Defensive side" is looked after by the development of the respirator and container.

During our recent courses at Porton C.W. School, my colleague and I found that this competitive idea was thoroughly exploited, and at the Research Department the Camp had been divided into the Offensive and Defensive Sections. It is an undeniable fact that the degree of perfection to which the respirator has been brought is entirely due to the excellent initiative which this form of rivalry encourages.

During the European War all the gases used were not delivered by the cloud method. By far the greater quantity was discharged by the Artillery. The most important of the early shells were of two kinds—lachrymatory and sensory—and were principally used for forming gas-barriers to prevent the bringing up of reserves. In January, 1916, the Germans began to use lethal gas shells against the French, and, during the Summer of the same year, against the British. At this period, owing to the physical disabilities which the early type of mask inflicted, many of the soldiers were using only goggles to protect the eyes, and a large number of casualties was the result. The next important development came when, on July 12th, 1917, the Germans significantly celebrated the "Orange Anniversary" by firing "Yellow Cross" shells. The gas dispersed from these shells was entirely new, and was none other than the now celebrated "Mustard Gas." It was used with disastrous results against the British in the Ypres Salient. From this time on "Mustard Gas" developed into one of the greatest problems of the war, and the energies of Allies were chiefly directed to the production of protective appliances. At the same time experiments were begun with a view to manufacturing mustard gas. It was not, however, until 11 months later that the Allies fired their first mustard gas shell. The Germans now further devoted their attention to the production of a powerful sensory irritant gas. This was intended to render the wearing of the mask difficult, through the sneezing properties of the gas, or even to penetrate the container and thus render masked men casualties.

The gas (Diphenylchlorarsine) or "Blue Cross," was dispersed in the form of an intensely irritant smoke, i.e., particulate cloud, and in this form remained suspended in the air for a lengthy period. A concentration of 1 in 50 millions formed the limit of tolerance, and 1 in 10 millions incapacitated a man in one minute. The advent of these gases was responsible for the complete re-designing of the respirator and container, as they penetrated the latter with the utmost ease. It is satisfactory to know that the latest design of respirator will resist for a considerable time the highest concentrations of these gases.

MARCHING.

BY COMDT. M. H. O'CONNOR, A.M.S.

TO anyone who wishes to study at a glance the changes in warfare as century succeeds century—a few hours with “Creasy’s Battles” will prove of interest. It is to be regretted for this purpose that the book ends at Waterloo, and that the period probably of greatest change—1815 to the present day—is not dealt with. The data given by the previous centuries, however, is not inadequate. Warfare during twenty-five centuries is treated, and is seen to be constantly changing. So numerous and so rapid are the changes that it is quite difficult to perceive and pick out the constant factors present throughout the whole period. One can, however, easily recognise at least one constant feature—the part played throughout the ages by the foot-soldier. Men still move to the attack on foot—even as they did thousands of years ago.

One may, therefore, be excused for hesitating to believe that the future is going to change things very much for the infantry man. He may be constrained—temporarily—as in static warfare to live underground, but as long as tactics and generalship persist, and as long as objectives remain to be gained, and wars to be won, so long will he be compelled to emerge some day and take on movement, and movement it is suggested for which only his legs can avail him. One doubts if even a perfected mechanicalisation will ever permit him to discard completely the use of his legs. It may certainly transport him more rapidly, even more deeply into the firing zone, but once there the occasions calling for the use of his legs will be as numerous and important as heretofore. So long as tactics require the use of advances and retreats of deployments and flankings, so long, one imagines, will men be required to march. In warfare these occasions will always remain, in which march route is the speediest method of accomplishing a movement. Napoleon’s dictum in the matter cannot as yet be discarded: “More battles are won by strength of leg than by force of arms.”

History abounds with instances of remarkable marching performances, but they all partake of the nature of forced marches. Regarding these, marches of over 20 miles a day can be said to be “forced.” Greater distances can readily be covered by small bodies of men or by picked troops, but as a general rule, men are fit for very little at the end of 25 or 30 miles marching. Certainly marching on consecutive days should not exceed 15 miles per day, with a rest of one day in seven. There is, however, considerable value in the suggestion that in the training career of each soldier there should be at least one forced march—say 30 miles a day—to give him the assurance that he is capable of such a performance should he ever subsequently be called upon to do it.

It is proposed to deal with the subject of marching under the following headings:—

- I. Fatigue and the Physiology of the March.
- II. Preparation for the March.
- III. The March itself.
- IV. The End of the March.

Fatigue and the Pysiology of the March. This is best explained as follows.

If fatigue is the chief factor operating against marching men—what forces can we put against it? We have

- (a) The muscular system.
- (b) The respiratory system.
- (c) The circulatory system.
- (d) The nutritive system.
- (e) The eliminating system.
- (f) The cerebral system.

(a) *The muscular system.* All the muscles in the body take part in marching. Hence the necessity for good "tone" in the body muscles generally, and games, physical exercises and the general training that the soldier undergoes are helpful in producing this "tone." Weakness of muscles in one place will throw an undue strain elsewhere. Good leg muscles are a particular asset. In this regard, nature has done her best. The size of the leg muscles in man indicate to what extent man was intended to use his legs. Flat feet, deformities of toes, corns, blisters, ill-fitting boots, ill-fitting equipment, all add to the strain on the muscular system, and so require careful attention in the soldier.

The muscles of the "untrained" man work against difficulties—they are loaded with fat between their fibres, and they do not work with that educated co-ordination of trained muscles that saves so much effort. Untrained muscles also produce too much waste products which, as will be seen later, embarrass the circulatory system.

(b) *The respiratory system.* The breathing system is very intimately connected with the other systems. By its means the blood in the circulatory system receives its oxygen. Impaired functioning of the respiratory system will hamper in a vital manner the functioning of the circulatory system, and *vice versa*.

Here again the education of the lungs and breathing muscles by the various training exercises is the soldier's safeguard. The gasping respirations and purple face of the untrained man are familiar to everyone. It is not generally realised however, that the respiratory system has a very important eliminating function. Poisonous products—the result of exercise—are freely excreted in the breath, while the lungs also play an important part in keeping the body cool. In doing this—it is of interest to note that as much as three pints of moisture may be given off by the lungs in 24 hours. This point will be dealt with again.

(c) *The Circulatory system*—consisting of the heart and blood vessels. The part played by this system is of course manifest. It is the most important system in the fight against fatigue. For our present purpose, the circulatory system can be described as acting in the following ways:—

- (1) It acts as a nourishing agent, inasmuch as the circulating blood carries food and oxygen to the working muscles and to the tissues.
- (2) It acts as a purifier, because the circulating blood sluices away from the muscles and tissues the waste products accumulated by exercise—removes, as it were, the "clinker" from the machine. In this manner it aids the eliminating system.
- (3) It regulates the heat of the body and controls the energy expended.

(d) *The nutritive or degestive system.* This is concerned with the intake of food and drink, and its subsequent distribution as nourishment to the tissues, the nourishment being the fuel that supplies the energy used up in the exercise of marching. In this connection the human machine acts almost precisely like the petrol or any other fuel driven engine—the more work done—the more fuel required. There is a material difference, unfortunately, in the method of stoking the two machines. Neither can be started for a journey on an empty tank, but only the petrol engine can travel on a fuel tank. A man stoked full with food immediately before a march would be impeded by it, as it would not be available in time for use by him. The fuel expended by man is the nourishment previously stored in his tissues—it cannot be supplied direct from the tank while, on the journey.

(e) *The eliminating system.* A most important element in the struggle against fatigue—it is the exhaust of the human machine. Unless this system is functioning well, the engine will be choked up with its own waste products. One of the symptoms of this is overheating, for example. On a warm day the temperature of marching men may rise a degree and a half. The eliminating system helps to keep men cool. The skin sweats freely—moisture and waste products being got rid of—the lungs exhale moisture as well as vitiated gases, and the kidneys and intestines are also engaged in the collection and disposal of waste products. One can now well imagine the advantage of the well washed skin that functions freely, and the value of suitable clothing to help it. One can further see the necessity of selecting as recruits only men with healthy organs.

With regard to the cerebral system, this is closely associated with such familiar terms as “esprit de Corps,” “Morale,” and “the will to win.” In no way is man’s superiority more clearly demonstrated than in this conquest of his will over his own body. We are all aware of, and never cease to admire the final effort that lies at the end of any physical performance—be it a game—an athletic contest or combat. It is the element above everything else that an officer desires to cultivate in his own men. The cerebral system has, however, another aspect. We are up against the very definite fact that in each man there exists a nervous system of most intricate character, controlling every single movement and emotion, doing its work with a complexity that has no parallel elsewhere, and liable, extremely liable, to fatigue. It is well said that the morale of a marching unit is proportional to its state of fatigue. A tired brain is fatal to morale.

One may now proceed to define fatigue itself—it is a diminution of functioning power caused by work and accompanied by characteristic sensations. Fatigue may be local, as in certain muscles after exercises. This is readily remedied by rest. It may be general. In this case every system that has just been described may be said to be feeling the effects of the efforts it has made. The extent to which the systems are affected by fatigue is proportional to the fitness or rather the previous “training” of the individual. Pushed beyond a certain limit this fatigue can now readily be understood to be dangerous from the possibility of permanent ill-effects to vital parts.

Viewed from the point of view of the different systems, the earlier onset of

fatigue in the unfit man can now also be readily appreciated. The utterly tired man is of so little use for fighting purposes, that one must be excused for labouring this question. Incidentally he is more likely to catch any disease that is going.

Against fatigue we have as remedies—firstly, training, that is games, exercises, etc., all of which educate the different systems to function healthily. Secondly, Rest. This, as regards marching, is supplied by the halts, and by not calling for undue efforts. Thirdly, food.

As regards the development of fatigue on the march, it is of interest to note that if it be traced as a curve—one can see a small rise immediately after the start of the march—due, it is probable, to ill adjusted equipment or, perhaps, to the process of establishment of that compensatory mechanism the second wind. Subsequently the fatigue curve rises quite gradually until the latter third or quarter of the journey, when it takes a startling rise. It is, therefore, precisely at this stage of the journey that the long halt and the serving of the dinner meal are indicated.

The instructions for the conduct of the march may now be better understood in the light of this rough preliminary examination of the physiology connected with the march. The majority of the points are to be found in the different manuals sanctioned for use.

PREPARATION FOR THE MARCH.

Preparation for the March. The Company Commander should carefully inspect his men, both in full marching order and after the manner laid down for the personal cleanliness inspection. He should examine the tunic to see if it is too large or too small, or too tight around the neck or arm-pits, and if it contains the field dressing. The tightness or pressure of the web equipment should be tested. When the tunic is too large the equipment is difficult to adjust comfortably. The fitting of the breeches around the knees requires attention, if too tight, it will impede the circulation, and become painful when the leg swells. Leggings should fit well, and if too long, should be remedied by the shoemaker, not by the man himself. They should not pinch the top of the boot. As regards the boots, officers should always ensure that the men receive accurately fitting boots. They should be big enough to allow the man to wear two pairs of socks. If too big, the friction causes blisters. It is unwise to allow a man out on an important march with brand new boots. Socks should be clean, without holes, and a second pair should be carried. If shrunken and in ridges, they will certainly cause blisters. The feet inspection is most important.

At his weekly cleanliness inspection of his men the Officer should lose no opportunity of drawing the attention of the Medical Officer to any unusual condition of his men's feet. Advice should immediately be sought if corns, blisters, weals, bunions, ingrowing toe nails, undue sweating or any deformities are observed. All these troubles are amenable to treatment, but if neglected, cripple a man at the very outset of a march. The cleanliness of the feet is of course of paramount importance. The breeches braces should be tested.

When old or broken, it does not support the breeches evenly, and is frequently drawn far too tight.

A careful inspection of the water bottle is necessary. It should be perfectly clean, and contain only pure water or sweet weak tea. It must not subsequently be filled from any unauthorised source.

A light meal should be served before the start of the march. When possible, it is desirable that men should know beforehand the distance to be travelled. Delays, or a long period of standing-to, before the start, are irksome. To enable the halts to take place at the clock hours, the main body should march off at 20 minutes past a clock hour. The first halt thus occurs half an hour after the start, and enables men to rectify faults in the adjustment of their equipment.

It is of importance that unfit men be not allowed to start. In this regard the Medical Officer can give advice. A man who has been drunk the night before must be regarded as unfit.

Every Commander should have beforehand a very clear conception of the time it takes for a given body of men to march a given distance. This factor may have a vital bearing on the objective in hand. The ordinary quick time of 120 thirty inch paces a minute gives us a speed of 100 yards a minute or 3 miles 720 yards an hour—or with halts, about 3 miles an hour. The following factors, however, amongst many others have a bearing on this question of speed. They need little elaboration.

- (a) Atmosphere. Snow or wind retard speed, so does heat. So does rain, by soaking equipment and adding to the weight carried. So does darkness, though night marching may be cooler.
- (b) Character of Country. Gaps, defiles, traffic, disorganise the formation and cause delays.
- (c) Size and character of marching Unit. The larger the unit, the slower the pace, especially when accompanied by impedimenta. Breaking down wagons, etc., may block the road.
- (d) The physical state and morale of the men.
- (e) The total weight carried by the men. This has a manifest bearing.
- (f) The distance to be travelled—the greater the distance, the less the speed per hour.
- (g) The actual speed or pace the men travel at—the quicker the pace, the more rapidly will men tire. Doubling to make up time lost on delay is particularly undesirable.

THE MARCH ITSELF.

The formation adopted will, as a rule, be influenced by the nature of the route, and by military considerations, such as the presence of the enemy. The more open the formation, however, the better will be the ventilation of the ranks, and the freedom from dust. Men trained to breathe through their noses will be less troubled by dusty weather. Marching on either side of the road and leaving the middle free is also advisable. Loose clothing and tunics thrown open at the neck aid ventilation.

The question of marching rhythm is very difficult to decide. A uniform length of stride places at the one and same time both the tall and short man at a distinct disadvantage. It is stated, however, that the action of keeping step is automatic, being quite a subconscious effort of will, and that there is consequently an economy of mental effort. This is doubtful. Marching should certainly be automatic, and should be performed without any conscious effort of will in order to minimise mental strain, but both these objects would be better achieved by avoiding a regulated step and changes of formation—both of which call for a decided mental effort, except, perhaps, in the oldest of soldiers. The stimulating effect of marching to rhythm, however, especially to the music of bands, songs or whistling, and especially towards the end of a march, must not be lost sight of. In this connection, one understands that Headquarters have considered the question of giving each Battalion a March Song. Such an idea will develop a highly inspiring competitive element that would certainly make for better performances.

The best attitude for marching is also a very debatable point. Parade poses are out of the question. For marching purposes, the rigid, upright posture is not going to give the best results. Unfortunately when the pack is carried with full ammunition pouches, the point of balance of the total load is only best attained when a fairly upright attitude is adopted. The nearer to the head that the pack is carried, the more will the man lean forward. Nature herself seems to indicate that this forward attitude is the least exhausting. Anyone who has observed a body of tired men finishing a march will realise this. They are bent forward, compelled, it is suggested, by tired nature to adopt the attitude of least effort, and so of the best physiological advantage. The French "*Marche en flexion*" is of this type, and was, one believes, evolved by their Alpine Corps, the pack being carried high, the knees bent and body carried forward. The extraordinary speed of six miles an hour over considerable distances is said to have been achieved by this method. "*Go as you please*" is, perhaps, the soundest advice.

Officers should ensure that the maximum benefit is derived from the halts. They should take place ten minutes before each clock hour, so allowing ten minutes rest in each hour. The first halt occurring thirty minutes after the start can most conveniently be devoted to remedying minor faults of equipment, easing straps here, and loosening clothing there. At subsequent halts, men should immediately fall out on either side of the road, in warm weather preferably in the shade, and lie down. This is infinitely more restful than sitting. The equipment can be loosened or thrown off with a single movement, and the clothing opened freely. Our present type of legging has the advantage that it can be removed in two movements, thereby refreshing the legs, and enabling tight lacing of boots or breeches to be adjusted. During one halt, socks may be changed or the feet carefully wiped and dried. Apart from necessary adjustments, as much of the halt as possible should be spent in complete inactivity.

Halts in villages or by wayside shops should be avoided—to avoid the purchasing of unsuitable articles of food or drink by men. For this reason, hawkers should be forbidden to approach the line of march. For refilling the water bottle only authorised sources of supply should be recognised.

The long halt best takes place when two-thirds of the journey are over. It should last an hour, and whenever possible a hot meal should be served. The travelling kitchen allows of such a meal being ready for serving almost at once.

At this halt, in particular, sanitary precautions are necessary. Foot soreness or blisters can also receive attention. As blisters are frequently due to the rubbing up and down of a badly fitting boot, they can often be considerably eased en toute by tying a strap, or some twine, around the foot in such manner as to prevent this movement of the boot.

The question of the intake of fluid on the march is a vexed one. As much as four pints of fluid may be lost in warm weather from the body tissues through the lungs and the skin, on a fifteen mile march. It is probable that the loss of a further four pints would have serious or fatal consequences. The loss is greater in the untrained than in the trained man, and the former consequently suffers the greater thirst. He will consequently require more water to replace this loss than his trained comrade, so that a hard and fast rule about drinking cannot be laid down. It is certain that a water sodden man who constantly imbibes from his bottle will not march as well as a more abstemious comrade—if only because excessive drinking will cause excessive sweating, and this tends to exhaust a person. At the same time, fluid lost should be replaced, within certain limits, and water imbibed has a very salutary effect in diluting and helping to sluice away the waste products formed in the tissues as a result of exercise. In this regard it aids materially the function of the circulatory system referred to earlier. In the utterly fatigued man the blood has actually thickened, and become viscous from loss of fluid, and the accumulation of waste products. A Medical Officer's first treatment in such a case would probably be directed to renewing the volume of the body fluids by giving liquids in quantities. As a personal opinion, therefore, it is suggested that a soldier during a fifteen mile march on a warm day not alone can take with safety, but actually requires for the better performance of his work, three or four pints of fluid taken at judicious intervals. The use of pebbles in the mouth, and the other means suggested in the manuals for allaying thirst, merely indicate an outlook of those former days when windows were kept closed, and cold baths considered dangerous.

On resumption from a halt, each man should change position in his "four." This makes for variety and a fairer distribution of advantages, such as shade from the sun, evenness of the road, etc.

No man should be allowed to fall out on a march without the written permission of his Officer. It will be found advisable to have made all necessary arrangements regarding the disposal of stragglers before the march starts.

THE END OF THE MARCH.

Foresight and precision of arrangements at the end of the march are of particular value, otherwise irritating checks and delays occur, and are badly borne by tired men. A satisfactory meal should be ready for serving within an hour of arrival. This interval will allow the men to freshen up after the journey. Eating when in an exhausted condition is not advisable.

It is desirable that the men's feet be examined at the end of the march by the officers, and treatment recommended where considered necessary. Socks should be washed, dried, darned and rubbed until soft. The feet should be washed in cold water, rubbed with spirit or alum solution, or one per cent. formalin, blisters treated, and a powder applied. As a foot powder, the following is recommended :—

Salicylic Acid	...	3 Parts.	
Boric Acid	...	10 „	To be dusted on
Talc	...	87 „	

WHEN DUBLIN WAS NOT OF IRELAND.

AN OLD RECORD.

By J. J. WEBB, M.A., LL.D.

THE citizens of Dublin possess a wonderful treasure house of records in the Muniment Room of the Corporation. Many ancient charters are preserved, some of which have been produced in Court from time to time to vouch the citizens' right to property in dispute. The "Chain Book" of Dublin is still to be seen. It contains a record of the Laws and Usages enforced in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It was at one time chained to a pillar or wall of the Tholsel or Town Hall for the use of the citizens. Another important record is the "Liber Albus" or White Book of Dublin. In this article a brief reference is made to another valuable record—the Roll of the Guild Merchant.

About the year 1866 Sir John Gilbert discovered in the Muniment Room a bundle of documents which, upon investigation, was found to contain a number of membranes bearing the names of members of the Merchant Guild of Dublin. One of the membranes is dated A.D. 1226, and is headed: "The undermentioned entered the guild merchant during the Provostship of Robert Pollard and Peter of Ballimor in the tenth year of the reign of King Henry." Then follows a list of 224 names of which portion is here given:—

Matheus de Duni.
Stephanus Russel.
Walterus de Kerdif, frater Ricardi Brun.
Robertus de Daltune.
Ricardus de Glouernia.
Simon de Lichefeld.
Nicolaus de Kent.
Alanus de Forneis.
Willelmus de Trum.
Oliuerus de Nichol, aurifaber.
Walterus de Oxonia.
Philippus the ropere.
Ricardus Bakun.
Nicholaus de London.
Saggere, filius Game.
Ricardus de Excester.
Andreas de Hunteedune.
Willelmus Curteisie.
Laurentius de Leicestre.
Willelmus de Beletune.
Rogerus de la Hide.

Walterus de Lichefeld.
Johannes Miles.
Robertus Barun.
Henricus de Cestria.
Reginaldus the Ietherkersuere.
Ricardus Passauant.
Osbertus de Excestre.
Walterus Whittawem.
Nicolaus de Bristoll.
Willelmus de Srobeslurgia.
Gillefintan.
Thomas de Oxonia.
Robertus Nigel.
Robertus Halberd.
Dawe de Cestria.
Adam le custurer.
Willelmus Sailard.
Simon de Reuni.
Radulphus de Langeford.
Gilbertus de Nortune.
Johannes Gule.

Willelmus de Hereford, sellator.

Johannes de Winton, sellator.

Gilbertus tinctor.

Herebertus de Leicestria.

Math. de Leicestre.

Willelmus de Karlel.

Willelmus pistor archiepiscopi.

Rogerus de Lichefeld.

Under a charter dated A.D. 1192, granted by Prince John, brother of Richard Coeur de Lion, King of England, to the citizens of Dublin, the citizens were empowered to have all reasonable guilds as the burgesses of Bristol had. This right was early availed of as is evidenced by this Roll of Names. The Guild Merchant is the oldest Dublin Guild of which there exists a record. None but members of the Guild was allowed to carry on the art of merchandise in Dublin. Any person who infringed the guild's exclusive right of trading was liable to imprisonment.

It is not proposed to deal in this article with the working of the guild system in Dublin, but merely to call attention to some points of interest in connection with the Roll of Names.

The Guild Roll for the year 1226 contains 224 names of new entrants, an indication that the guild was in a flourishing state of health and that its membership was sought by a considerable body of citizens. A conspicuous feature of the Roll is the absence of Irish names. The only Irish name amongst the fifty above mentioned is "Gillefintan." "Willelmus de Trum" (Trim) is doubtless the name of a colonist who had settled in this town newly founded by de Lacy. On the other hand London, Bristol, Oxford, Leicester, Lichfield, Chester, Huntingdon, Shrewsbury and other English towns are represented. The guild was, in fact, a guild of colonists. Irishmen, with rare exceptions, were excluded from membership.


France and the Netherlands, Scotland and Wales were represented in the Guild Membership of this year. Amongst the names are "Ricardus Francigena," "Johannes de Brabant," "Reginaldus de Hugellevile," "David map Rob."

The Christian names are in nearly all cases followed by a descriptive term, indicating the place of origin, trade, or relationship to some other person, or some personal attribute of the members. Sometimes a double description occurs, as in the cases of Walter of Cardiff, brother of Richard Brown and William, the Archbishop's baker. Amongst the craftsmen mentioned in the above list are a goldsmith, a rope maker, two saddlers, a dyer, a "letherkersuere" who was probably a currier, a baker, and a "custurer." "Walterus Whittawem" concealed in his name the craft of white-tawyer or leather dresser. "Johannes Miles" is the only soldier in the above list. He was probably a mercenary. All the Citizens were trained to Arms.

From the names above quoted it appears that the Guild Merchant of Dublin included many craftsmen among its members. None of the members is in fact described as a merchant, although where no indication of the occupation is given, it is probable that the name is that of a merchant. In this respect the Guild Merchant of Dublin was like that of other towns of the same period. Craftsmen as well as merchants were freely admitted to membership. In a sense every craftsman was likewise a trader. The tanner bought raw hides and sold leather, the weaver bought yarn and sold cloth. By this dealing they were considered eligible for admission to the Guild of Merchants.

The Guild Merchant of Dublin was the parent guild from which the craft guilds ultimately sprang. Too few in numbers in the thirteenth and fourteenth century for a separate organisation, the members of the more important crafts became sufficiently numerous and powerful in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to obtain charters establishing distinct craft guilds. When that stage of development had been reached craftsmen were excluded from the Guild Merchant.

The fact that the name of only one soldier occurs in the above roll does not mean that medieval Dublin was lacking in military organisation. As a matter of fact there was a very comprehensive system of military service among these colonists for repelling attacks by, or carrying out raids on their neighbouring enemy—the "native Irish." But this is another story. Enough has been said to show how utterly anti-national medieval Dublin was—and to support the enormous effort required to produce the mentality and outlook which we are pleased to associate with the Dublin of to-day.



COGAÐ CROMUELL.

1 SCO. TIOBRAID ÁRANN.

leipt. séan ua maolcáta (Iaó cá) DO SCRIB.

RÉAM-RÁD.

Seasuiġeað dume lá šeal foġmair ar mullaċ beinne des na beannaib is doirde de Sléibte Cnoc Moal-Domnaig agus péacað sé ótuair. Cípró sé leacta os comair a súl ceann des na maċairib is áilne agus is doibinne dá bfuil ar elár leactan fóula .i. Máš feimín na sean-scéalaite. Deo radarc aige ar an šuio is mó de Conntae mór Tiobraio Árann agus ar na sléibtib atá in a seasam mór-timceall air ar šac áiró. Cípró sé na šaillte šo horb dána tíar agus Sliað na mġan šo mín mánta toir, agus tuair faio a radairc uair šreim an Diabail toir é agus léas aš bun na spéire. Tá an cuio is mó de'n maċaire úo ar an talam is foġanta i nċirinn agus is an-áluinn an radarc na šuirt agus na šarraite agus céao scáil de buideact agus de šlaiseact orta, agus iaó aš uol i luigead agus i luigead dar leis šo šcailleam sé radarc orta i bġaó i šcém ; ába doibinn na Siúire aš sníom a ótuair tríota mar beao ribín airšio agus ába Tearra aš šabailt aniar šo víreac 'na coimne šo mbuailtear ar a céile iaó aš šob Rinne.

šan don dearmad sin dúitce arb fiú troio a déanam cun a seilbe do baint amac, agus šo deimín péin is mó fuil a doirceao mar šeall uirce ó'n lá bris Brian Mac Ceimnéoe agus a úritáir maġmáan ar na Danarair aš Sulcoit šo otí an lá a caiteao an t-urċar deireannac le tiġearna talman éigín a bí aš cur a cuio tunóntaí cun páin. Cuir radarc na dúta sin samnt ciocrac ar don eaċtrannac a baim lán a súl riám aiste, lena fearannair šlaise, a šortamla agus a tánaib agus a treádaib líonmáa ; agus ba ró-mínic a creacaoar agus a loiteaoar agus a mílleaoar i agus do páġaoar in a pásac fóllam in a noiaio í.

Bí an scéal mar seo, cuir i šcás, taréis do sna šearaltaig a beit curta pá cois aš Eilís šasana. Cuir Seoirse Perrin, Ríoire, mar cúntas cúice nár páš sé adarc ná arġar ná teac šan oġaó i šCúige Múman ó ceann šo a céile ; agus deir na h-Annálaċa aš cur síos ar an léirscríos céatna ná raib šeim bó ná feao oireamán le cloisint ó Cáiseal šo farraige tíar.

Tá an scéal céatna le h-innsint i otaoib an cogaio a lean éirige amac na bliatna 1641. Deim Murcaó na o'tóiteán léir-scríos an Perrinig do sárúšaó nuair bí sé aš troio do Párlimint šasana agus cuir sé an oireao san o'anfaó agus o'uamán i šcroiútib na noaoime le treascairt claiúim agus le toiteán, šo ndeirtear fós i otaoib aoimne a bíonn taréis ciapaó agus cráo tar bárr o'pášail ó tubáiste agus ó mí-áo an t-saošail šur "connaic sé Murcaó," cé ná fuil eolas ar domán aš na daoimib a deireann na focail seo cé'rb é an Murcaó céatna ná ar cao a deim sé. Cuir sé bárr ar a o'roc-šníomarca nuair oóig sé eaglais agus mamistir Cáisil sa mbliatna 1647, an 13aó lá o' Meaoon foġmair, Marbuiġeao šac fear, bean agus páiste ar péatao teact suas leo, agus šac saġart agus brátair freisin.

Ac dá dhonaíocht é an millead a d'heim Murchaí ar Conntae Tobarach Árann bí níos measa i ndán dá muintir. B'é sin cogadh Cromuall agus an riuas a d'eimead ar Saebealaib agus ar Sean-Gallaib in a diad.

Searr-cúntas ar an gcogadh seo annso síos.

Táinig Cromuall i dtír i mBaile Áta Cliat i Lughnasa 1649 le 17,000 de sna saighiúirib, a b'fearr a bí in arm Sasana, roir dragúin agus troisctis. Ba iongantach uachtásach iad na fir a bí san arm úd. Puratánach dílis b'easach saé fear acu, agus síl sé gurab i obair an Tigearna Dia beasach sé déanamh nuair a beasach sé as marbhadh clann claon an áirseora, a tugadh géilleadh do'n diabol tar diallaib úd an pápa. Bí sé griosuithe cun na h-oibre seo le saé don saéas scéil péill agus pola mar gheall ar cad a bí Catoilicis na h-Éireann taréis a déanamh le sna Protastúnachib sa mbliadain 1641, agus creíod sé na scéalta so gan don asó; agus in a focair sin arís bí seanmónaite as imteacht le saé cat de'n arm cun gan leigint do don fuaradh teacht ar an ngorradh. Nuair d'eimtear mactnamh ar an méid seo ní h-aon iongantach an t-ár agus an t-éirleach a d'eimeadar súd in don áit ar leigeadh leo. Agus rud eile fós bíodar calma agus dána i dtóir agus níorb don leasaimh "Ironsides" a tabairt ortá. Bí an taoiseach a bí ortá .i. Cromuall, ar ceann de sna saighiúirib ab oile a bí ann lena linn. Ní raib taoiseach a d'iongbála i nÉirinn ac b'féidir eoghan Ruad Ó Néill amáin, ac tuit sé sin timm timceall an ama céana a táinig Cromuall i dtír agus d'éas sé ar an bád lá de Mí na Samna agus páasach Éire gan taoiseach ná stiúrtóir éipeactamail le linn an cruasachais ba mó dá raib sí riamh ann.

Níor d'heim Cromuall mórán moille sár a tionsuig sé ar an obair a bí leagaithe amach aige. Ó Baile Áta Cliat tug sé ruatar ó tuaird go Droichead Áta, longport leis an rí in a raib timceall dá míle go leit fear mar luét cosanta. Bris sé ar an tóin le neart faobair agus púdar agus cé gur gheall sé anacal do sna saighiúirib dá ndéanfais géilleadh, tug sé ordúasach ar iad go léir a cur cun báis comh luath agus do bí a gcuid arm leagaithe ar leat taobh aca. D'eimead treascairt ortá go dtí an bfeair deireannach roir íseal agus uasal agus ar mórán comh maith leo, ní amáin ar fearaib, ac ar mnáib agus ar páistib. Le méid an scannrair a cur an léir-scrios so ortá d'heim saé don áit ins an taobh tuaird de cúige Laigean in a raib saighiúirib an ríog géilleadh gan buille a bualach. Tug Cromuall anois a d'asach ó deas trí Baile Áta Cliat arís, agus as san go loc Farnham, agus glac sé seilb ar saé don baile mór a rangadh a beit ar a bótar.

Bí longport láidir i loc Farnham agus bí 2,000 saighiúir ann, agus cuireadar rompa ná páigeadh Cromuall seilb na h-áite gan duad. Ac buardéad ortá le peall. Bí méirleach in a measg a tug faillige dá bualgas ar breib. Fuair Cromuall seilb an baile agus d'heim sé an t-ár a d'eimead i nDroichead Áta a sárúasach. D'eimead tóin-marbhadh le faobar claidim ar saéartaib, ar bráctaraib, ar saighiúirib, ar mnáib agus ar páistib, gan truagach gan trócaire, d'éir mar táinig na "h-Ironsides" suas leo. Bí cúige Laigean go léir nac beasach fé cois anois aige ac amáin Catair Chill Coinnig, ac ní raib ceapaithe aige dul comh fada ó tuaird leis an mbaile sin go fóil.

Dein Ros Míe Treoin géillead do ar an Igaó lá de Meadon Fosgmar 1649. Duail timneas an-cúro dá cúro fear agus é féin freisin agus do fanadar ann ar mí nó mar sin, ac tug sé ordúgá do Cornéill Mac Ragnail agus do Major Ponsonby iarracht a déanamh ar seilb a tógaint ar Carrraig na Siuire mar teastuig bealac treasna na Siuire uair le h-agaíó Catair Portláirge o'ionnsurde. Bí cúig trúpaí déas de saigdiuirib capall as Mac Ragnail agus as Ponsonby. B'é méio luét-coimeáda na Carrraig don cat amháin troigsteac agus trí trúpaí saigdiuirí capall. Bí fallaí árdá láidre timceall an baile, ac cummuis Ponsonby ar sheit an-ghic. Dailis sé gasra mór de fearaib na tuaithe mor-timceall. Cuir sé ar monaib capall iad agus cuir sé o'fiacaib orta gluaiseact a déanamh amac romh a cúro féin saigdiuirí agus tug sé ordúgá dóib, nuair a tiocfarois gairio do fallaib an baile, glaoad a déanamh ar na gárdaib agus a ráo leo i n-geaóilg sur cúro de arm na h-Éireann iad féin a cur Tigearna Oir-Mhumán mar congnam cúta. O'éirig leis an bfeall-beirt. O'oscail na gárdaí an geata agus gab na Cromuellaig seilb na bpallaí agus na ngeataí gan duad ar domhan. Bí sé ró-déanac nuair tuigead an dearmad a bí déanta. Teit cúro de compluét an baile treasna an droicir go dtí Conntae Portláirge, agus marbuisead an cúro eile gan truaig gan taise ac amháin timceall céad fear a dainisig iad féin istig sa caisleán. Géilleadar so ar na máireac agus tugad cead dóib dul go dtí don camta eile le arm an ríog ar maic leo. Breatnaig b'eao ceitre pícró duine dóib agus taoadar so le muinntir Cromuell.

Nuair clos Cromuell féin an scéal so cuir sé árd lutháir air. Bí an t-sláinte casta arís ar a cúro fear agus air féin, agus ar an 23ad lá de mí na Samna shóis sé féin agus a arm ar fad Carrraig na Siuire agus é ar botar go dtí catair Portláirge. Mhol sé go mór Mac Ragnail agus Ponsonby i dtuad an cleas o'imrigeadar. O'fás sé Ponsonby sa Carrraig mar fear-ceannais ar an mbaile agus le h-agaíó gárdaí an droicir cun an bealac do coimead ar oscailt. Do fágad cat saigdiuirí capall aige agus o'a búrdean troigsteac.

B'é an céad ruid a dein Ponsonby ná an baile a cur i dtreo a cosanta. Agus níor míste do san mar dá lá in a diaró san tug an taoiseac Taape agus Tigearna Inse-Cuinn * iarracht nimneac ar an áit a tógaint tar nais ó muinntir

* Sin é murcad na dtóiteán a dóig Caiseal. Bí sé anois, agus é as troir ar taob an ríog. Cromuell. Cairig cat de saigdiuirib ó cúige Ularó pé Major Catal ó h-Eocáigam go dtobarfarois iarracht ar brisead a déanamh ar an Longport le lám-láidre.

Troideadar ar fead ceitre h-uair a clois go cróda, calma. Cuireadar na geataí trí teme agus pléascadar bum pé sna fallaib; ac le h-uirbeasa piocóirí le h-agaíó an falla do brisead pé, agus d'éimrí le h-agaíó dul anáirde air b'éigean dóib éirige as an obair taréis do 500 fear agus a dtaoiseac calma beit sinse ar lár gonta nó marb. Ní raib lón a ndaetm as an cúro eile cun iarracht a déanamh ar surde síos timceall an baile go gcuirfead an t-ocras o'fiacaib ar na Cromuellaig géillead. Do gluais an méio a bí fágta de arm Taape agus Tigearna Inse Cuinn go dtí Ciunmeala.

Ní raib a daeitin fear ná sunnaí mór as Cromuall cún brisead déanamh ar Cathair Portláirge. Cait sé éiríge as ionnsurde na cathaí san. O'pás sé an áit ar an dara lá de mí na n-óglas agus treorúis sé an t-arm go léir go dtí Dúngarbán, agus as san siar go dtí Coeáill. Tug sé sos dá mí dá curo fear san áit seo. Bí curo mór aca tinn agus teastúis uairt uain a tabairt dóib ar teacht cúca féin.

Sa mbliadain 1650 a bí an Ianuairí ba bréagta a comnaic doimne riamh romhe sin. Ar an 29ú lá de'n mí bí Cromuall ar bótar arís. Síod an cuntas a scríob sé féin go dtí cathairleac oireadtaí Sasana:

"Taréis o'ár gcuro fear a scit do leigint ar fearó tamail 1 sosaib geimreata, agus taréis an t-slánte a beit casta arís ortha, bratamar go rabamar 1 n-úmail ar tabairt pe'n gcogaí arís agus ar cibé iarraedtaí ba toil le Dia a tabairt ar an namaro. Ceapamar foza a tabairt pé ar dá bótar. O'orduigead do'n céad curo—15 no 16 de trúpaib saighdiuirí capall agus dragúin agus timceall 2,000 troigthead—dul suas trí Carrraig na Siúire go dtí Cill Coinnig pé treoruigad as Coirnéil Mac Ragnaill. Bí ar Major General Ireton é do leanamaint leis an bfuigeallac. Cuaró mé féin trí mhas eala, treasna na h-Abda móire 1 oreo Conntae Luimnige agus Conntae Tiobraid Árann le timceall dá trúp déas de saighdiuirí capall agus do nó trí céadta troigthead. Tosnuigeas mo turus ar an máirt an 29ú lá de Ianuairí ó Coeáill" (Litreada Cromuall—Carlyle).

Níor deim Cromuall morán moille, mar dá lá in a diaró san, o'réir a cuntais féin gab sé seilb ar caisleán Cillbeithne, ar teorainn Co. Corcaige agus Co. Tiobraid Árann. O'pás sé 30 saighdiuir mar gárdá ann. Cuaró sé as san go dtí Cloicín an Margaí agus gab sé seilb caisleáin an Ríoire Risteirí Eabráir, as an áit do ghlacotar an cúirt dóighe sa lá tá indú ann. Do deim Risteirí Eabaráró an-obair ar son na h-Éiréann san éiríge amac sa mbliadain 1641 agus bí sé ar ceann de'n dream ar bamead a gcuro talman díob nuair bí Éire curta pé cois as Cromuall. O'pás Cromuall trúp de saighdiuirí capall mar gárdá sa caisleán so. Ó'n s-Cloicín gluais sé go dtí an Rérdóill. Deim sé cimi de dhorn saighdiuirí a bí ann. Ultais do b'ead iad. Cuir sé compluét saighdiuirí as triall as san go dtí an Caisleán Nuad, áit comnuighe na bPiondaragásac atá surde ar port teas na Siúire timceall deic míle siar ódeas ó Cluainmeala. Tug an Piondaragásac suas an caisleán san troto san acram, ac tugad tar 'nais arís do é ac cibé úirlisí troda a bí ar na falláib a baint anuas díob. O'pásad cúpla saighdiuir ann cún go bfeicead siad an obair 'gá déanamh, agus cuir an curo eile cún bótar. Ní rabadar imighe 1 b'ad nuair cloiseadar árd rí-rá agus bacram sa caisleán taob tiar díob. Tar 'nais leo com mear agus do bí 1 gcosaib a gcuro capall, mar rit sé leo gur amlaíó bí muinntir an caisleáin as marbúgá a gcomrádaite. 'Sé an rud a fuaradar ann ac conairt as glamgáil agus as sceamgáil. Táinig a trugad intinne ortha 1 otaob an Piondaragásais mar rugadar é féin agus a curo con leo an bapta so, agus tugadar go dtí Cromuall sa Rérdóill é. Tós sé sin. Leis an conairt agus a maigistir agus é as dul ar bótar cún Cathair Cillcoinig o'ionnsurde, agus bíod sé féin agus a curo oifigeac as fiadac

leis na coin. Daineán sé le dealradh gur meall an Piondaragásac agus a conairt Cromuall, mar tá litir le feicsint fós a sríobh sé 'gá iarrad ar an Riasaltas gan an Piondaragásac so ná a muirear a cur as seilbh a gcoda. Ac níor deimeadh san mar éirí sé féin agus a muinntir imteacht, agus an áit in ar rugadh agus tógadh iad a tabairt suas do eacramnac éigin ó Sasana.

Ar an dara lá de feabha d'fás Cromuall agus a arm an Réircoill go dóic ar maidin. Gab sé tar abainn na Siuire ag áit Baile an Róistigh timcheall trí míle ar an taobh téas de Cáthair dhúin Iascaigh. Deirtear go raib tuile san abainn agus gur bádaigh roinnt dá chuid fear ann. Ac cibé rud a bain dó níor fás mórán fear fé n-a cosadh mar srois sé an Fiodáir an oirde sin agus glaothais sé ar luict cosanta an baile géilleadh do. A cúntas féin ar seo annso síos :

"As san (an Réircoill). Gluaiseamar go dtí an Fiodáir na bheag i gceart lár Tíobraid Árann, áit a raib compluict de'n namhaid. . . . Sroiseamar an baile insan oirde agus sinn corra, fluic, bárdte le saoi agus le fearcainn. Taréis ár dturais fada, ní raib fios againn cá gcuirfimis fúinn, ac bí sean-maoinistir agus roinnt bochtán taobh amuigh de sna fallaib agus cuadmar isteach ionnta, agus glaothmar annsan ar luict cosanta an baile géilleadh dom. Cáiteadar lem stocaire agus ní éistfóis linn ar fear uair a clois. Ac bí roinnt oirpigeac in ár mburdean go raib áithe acu orra agus cuireas cuca iad cun a cur i n-úmail dóib go rabas láitreach mé féin agus cuid maith de'n arm in focair. Níor lámamar leo ac bí árd buile orra agus cáiteadar san go nimneac linne agus dúbradar nárab sin an uair de'n oirde gur ceart glaothac orra géilleadh a déanam. Ac sa deire ba toil le fear ceannais an baile dá taca a cur, amac cugainn, agus is dóig liomsa surab amlaigh a bí uair fios d'fágail an raib cumacht fear ár ndaectin againn le h-agar a cur d'fiacaib air géilleadh. Taréis an oirde go léir beagnac do cáiteam i gcomluadar tugadh suas seilbh an baile dom ar maidin ar comthaib gur gnáthac cumtha onóraca do glaothac orra. Díos níos toilinnige na comtha so a tabairt dóib ná mar beinn, muna mbeadh ná raib mórán i bhfocair 200 fear againn, agus ní raib dréimhir ná gunnaí ná darda eile againn le h-agar briseadh a déanam ar an áit."

Díonn muinntir Fiodáir ag maortheam uaireanta gur troid luict cosanta an baile go cróthac agus go calma agus nár géilleadar go rabadar traocca, briste. Ac ní fuil don an-cuid de'n fírinne sa scéal so mar tá na cáipéisí ag cur síos ar an ngnó le feicsint fós agus ní réirctigir le scéalta na maorthe. I dtaobh an luigeadh troda a deimeadar, níor deimeadh darda le sagart ná le bráthair ná le doimne eile, agus lámalaigh dóib a gcuid do coméad agus níor iarradh orra imteacht go cúige Connacca nuair deimeadh an ruaig ar an cuid eile de sna daoimib roir Gaedelaib agus Sean-Gallaib a deim arm a lámseáil ar son Séarluis.

Nuair clos compluict de saighdiuirib an ríog a bí i gCaiseal Muman go raib Fiodáir tar éis géilleadh a déanam, teicteadar ó'n gcaithir agus cuir méara agus seanóirí na h-áite atcuinge go dtí Cromuall gá iarradh air iad féin agus a gcaithir do chosaint. Agus nuair fuairteadar amac na comtha maith do fuair muinntir Fiodáir uair, tugadar eocraca na catrac cúige agus d'iarradar air na cumtha céadna dóib féin. Seall sé dóib ná beadh sé de gá ar doimne acu

ná raib in arm an rí gó Cúige Connaceta ; ac brisead an geall so ceitra bliadhna in a dhiaid san agus cuiread an ruaig ar muinntir Chaisil comh maith le cad.

Taréis do seilb a tógaint ar fíoráirí cuir Cromuella cún bótair cún Callainn o'iomairde. Deirtear ar a gabail trí baile an Sarrda nó gur seasuis sé ar énoc agus gur dearc sé ar an dúite mór-timceall. Nuair brat sé áilneacht na tíre sin agus saibíreacht na talman ar gac taobh de, dubairt sé "Sin tír gurab fiú troid a déanamh ar a son."

Bí fear i mbaile an Sarrda agus ceap sé bob a bualad ar Cromuella. O páinín ab ainm do. Cuair sé ag triall ar Cromuella agus dubairt sé leis gur cara san cáim do párlimint Sasana é féin, agus go raib an gráim marb ag muinntir na dúta go léir air mar geall ar an gcaradas san, agus go rabadar ag déanamh gac don ruid a bí in a gcúmaect cún é do cráo agus do ciapad. Le linn na camnte seo a beirt dá déanamh aise le Cromuella connacad teime mór agus an-cúro deataig i bfaid uata agus o'fiarpuig Cromuella de fáct na teime sin. Dubairt an páinéac go truaigheileac gurab amlaíó bí na comarsaín teréis a caisleán do cur trí teime. Bí truaig ag Cromuella nó agus geall sé do ná déanfaid sé féin don bacaint leis agus go bfaigad sé i seilb a cúro talman é. Ac beagán aimsire in a dhiaid san fuair Cromuella amac gurab amlaíó cuir an páinéac daime éigin suas teime mór aicinn a déanamh le linn an ama bead sé féin ag camnt le Cromuella mar dúmas gurab é a caisleán a beirfí a dóig. Ac dá élisteact a bí an páinéac bí cleas tar a cleasaib ag Cromuella. Croc sé é.

Taréis brisead déanamh ar luict cosanta Callainne cuir Cromuella pé i gCaiseal Muhan agus deim sé a bhun-longport de. Annsan cuir sé amac buirdeanta saigheuirí trí sna dúitib mór-timceall cún brisead a déanamh ar cibé camtaib a bí ionnta o'arm an ríog, agus cuir sé o'fiacaib ar Contaetib tiobraio áran agus lumnige cáim míosamail a díol leis.

Bí caisleán Áiríofionáin ar ceann de na caisleánaib a tógad ar an am so. Stóe an cuntas a scríob sé ar an gníomh so :

"Bí an-ponn ar Major General Ireton bealac ag gabail treasna na Siuire o'fagail, mar go veimín ní raib don caoi agaimn ar dul treasna ac le bádaib, nó le siubal ár gcos nuair bead an t-uisce iseat go leor. . . . Um tráchnóna Dia Satairn rug sé leis buirdean de saigheuirib capall go dtí Áiríofionáin, áit in a raib droicéad ag bun caisleáin láir, agus tug sé pé ag an ceatair de clog ar maroin. Marb sé timceall trí dúme déas de'n tús-gárda agus níor cáilleamar-ne ac beirt marb agus ohtar nó veicneabar gonta. Féill an namhro dúinn agus táimíó i seilb an caisleáin. Ionad an-tabaectac isead é agus an bealac is giorra o'ár mbealac treasna na h-Abamóire ag Ceapac Cuinn. Is féidir gunnaí agus púdar do tabairt go dtí so ar an uisce agus annsan treasna an droicéad ag Áiríofionáin go dtí an arm" (Litireada Cromuella).

Mar dubairt Cromuella, áit an-tabaectac bead Áiríofionáin agus ba cúrsaí bróim gur tugad suas comh bogh san do í, mar b'annsan amáin gur bfeirir cose a cur le lón-cois ar teact go dtí Cromuella ó Eocail ar an t-slighe ba comhsaige. Dáibí Mac Giobúin a bí mar ceann-urraio ann a bí a daectin lóm agus fear aise, agus caisleán daingean láir nár bfeirir a brisead.

AR AN 19th LÁ DE MÁRTA táinig Cromuall féin go dtí Cluainmeala agus mar ba nós aige, glaoó sé ar complúct cosanta an baile seilleadó. Do fheadair doo Dub é go dána, agus dubairt sé leis go raib sé féin an-íada ó don fonn a beit air an baile. Do tabairt suas go dtí go mbeadó sé i bpat níos laige ná mar a bí sé ar an uair sin, agus go bfuigeadó sé (Cromuall) a lán-óiceall do déanamh.

Le linn Cromuall ní raib baile mór Cluainmeala i ngeor com mór agus tá sé sa lá tá indiu ann. Bí an baile go léir ar an taob tuaró de'n abainn, agus bí fallai toir tiar agus tuaró leis agus an abainn ar an taob téas. Bí na fallai timceall cúis troigste píceadó ar doirde agus cúis troigste artuigioct. Bí ceitre geataí as dul istead sa mbaile, ceann, insan áit go bfuil an Geata mór anois, ar an taob tiar; ceann as barr na sráide ar a nglaoctar Sráto Glavstone, agus geata eile toir timceall na h-áite go bfuil bann na h-Éireann, agus an ceatramadó geata as cionn an tSean-óroicéto. Geata an loca a bí ar an ngeata tuaró an uair úd, agus Sráto na loca ar an tsráto a bí san ionad go bfuil Sráto Glavstone anois. Ní raib ac an t-aon óroiceadó amám—san áit go bfuil an Sean-óroiceadó anois—treasna na h-abainn. Bí an baile taob istig de na fallai timceall 500 slat ar fadó soir a's siar, agus 400 slat ar leiteadó.

Tug Cromuall tuairm cruinn ar connus a bí an scéal istig i mbaile Cluainmeala. Bí a fios aige ná raib púdar ná biaó ró-fairsing as na niallac agus bí a fios aige leis go raib mórán daome ann tinn leis an bfiabras. Ceap sé dá calmaect a bí doo Dub agus a cúro fear go scaitpeadó siad seilleadó go luac agus ná beadó ionnta don troio ro-mór a déanamh. Dá son san ní raib an t-arm as déanamh daóda go dtí so ac iad in a surde timceall an baile taob tuaró d'abainn.

AR AN 27th LÁ D'ÁBRÁN cuir doo Ó Néill an cuntas deireannac go dtí Tigearna Oirmhúman 'gá ráó leis go ndéanfaó sé an baile do cosaint go deire na scribe. Bí Tigearna Oirmhúman as déanamh a óicill ar an uair céatona d'iarradó arm do cur le céile cun fuascail do déanamh ar Cluainmeala ac bí sé ró-mall. Da fairsio in a diaró so gur táinig Tigearna Brogill lena arm ar congnam do Cromuall. Bí sé taréis briseadó a déanamh ar arm an Róistig as Mađeróma agus an t-easbog Mac dothágáin do crocáo. Bí a fios as doo Ó Néill nuair táinig an congnam so, ná raib don maic do a beit as tñút go ndéanfaí don fuascail air, agus go scaitpeadó sé a coimirce do cur ar Dia, ar neart agus calmaect a cúro fear agus ar a intinn féin.

Nuair do tug Cromuall ná raib don págail go ndéanfaó an t-ocras do cur d'fiacaib ar an niallac seilleadó, cuir sé a cúro gunnai móra ar inneall ar énoc na Croitche, árdán a bí ar an taob amuis de'n bfalla tuaró, agus tosnuig sé as caiteam leis an bfalla cliatánac le geata an loca. Bí sé as caiteam leis an bfalla so ó lár an Ábrám go dtí lár an bealtaine. Ní raib doo Dub d'iomáoin ac an oireadó leis. Da 'mó ruais a tug sé amac ar na Sasanaig 'san oróce nuair seibeadó sé an caoi. D'éirigeadó leis uaireanta agus marbuisgeadó sé cúro acu agus déineadó sé cimi de cúro eile acu. Uaireanta eile d'air féin a cuirtí an cluice. Leis an obair seo go léir bí an scéal as eirigé i

bpao níos leathránaíde ná mar do síl Cromuall a b'eao sé. agus cuig sé in a aigne nárb obair gan tuar an baile seo do tógaint le lámh láidir. ní raib gac don ruto comh socair as baile i Sasana agus ba maic leis iad do beit, agus dá son san bí veitneas abailé air, agus deim sé iarraict ar an lámh uachtarac o'páigil ar doo Ó Néill le ceilg agus le feall, o'reir mar o'éirig leis a véanam i loégarraim.

Bí Major Pennell, mar túbrao céana, mar oifigeac ar an dá céao saigoiuir capall ó Cuige Mumhan a bí i gCluainmeala. Méirleac claon b'eao é, agus o'reir deallrao ní raib a curo fear pioc ní ba fearr ná do bí sé féin. ní fuil fios agaimn connus a deimeao an gno ac geall Cromuall £600 do ac ceann de na geataib o'poscailt oróce airmíte ar uair airmíte agus 500 dá curo fear féin do leigint istea. Táinig an oróce ar ceapao an gno do véanam. Dam sé le deallrao ná raib don muingim ró-maic as saigoiuirib na Mumhan as doo Dubh mar bí óróugaó i bperom aige go scaitfeao trian de gárda gac geata do beit 'na saigoiuirib ó Cuige Ulaó. Níor cuir Major Pennell an oróce seo, domne ar ceann de na geataib ac a curo féin fear. Ar fábaratdeact Dé cuaró doo Ó Néill féin as péacaint gárdaí na ngeataí an oróce sin. Connaic sé ná raib an oireao le h-aon saigoiuir Ulaac amáin ar ceann de na geataib. Duail troc-amras é láitreaó agus tug sé óróugaó an Pennelleac do gabail, agus ar a gealleamam do ná véanfaí é do cur cun báis sceit sé an cealg go léir. Níor deim doo ac burdean mór fear do bailiugaó timceall an geata agus nuair táinig an uair do bí ceapaite an geata o'scailt, o'scail sé é. Táinig 500 fear o'arm Cromuall istea ac níor cuaró tuime beo tar ais amac aris.

Uair éigin le linn an ama so fuair gasra de saigoiuirib capall le Cromuall, a bí amac an tuat as cuaroact, greim ar Nioclás Ó Maolcata sagart paróiste Airo Fionáin. Tá sé as na daoimib pós gur sa ngrámsis do rugaó air. Tug na saigoiuirib leo istea go Cluainmeala é agus túbairt Cromuall leis go ttabarfaó sé a pártuín do ac comhairle tabairt do luict cosanta an baile géilleao do féin. O'preatsair an sagart é ná véanfaó sé don ruto dá sórt. Díceannao é os comhair gárdaí na bpalláí.

Cé go raib eolas a gcéirde as na saoir a tóg falláí Cluainmeala, ruto gur fuiris a feicsin sa roinnt deas díob atá in a seasam pós, níor taróbrig domne nuair bíodar 'gá otógaint go véanfaí gunnaí móra go deo a caitfeao piléar go mbeao trí cloca meadóaint ann. Bí na gunnaí seo as Cromuall agus ní ar an saoir gur ceart an milleán do beit go raib beárna mór i rioct tuitite le cliatán geata an loca. Tuit sí sa deire. Ar an Ibaó lá de mí na Bealtaine bí lámac na ngunnaí mór go h-uachtásac. Bí gac gunna mór a bí as Cromuall as caiteam leis an mbeárnaim comh mear agus o'feao do líonaó. o'iarrao leibéalaó níos fearr a véanam uirte cun go mbeao bealaó as na saigoiuirib ar tuit istea. Ní raib as doo Ó Néill ac pot-urcar do caiteam tar ais. Ní raib an púar aige.

Gan aon tabat saigoiuir oirte b'eao Cromuall. B'e seo an cúis gur as geata an loca do deim sé iarraict ar an falla do briseao. Daimen sé le deallrao go raib curo mór lánáí cúmhanga agus srátoeanna caola timceall na

ngataí eile agus ná beaó sé ró fúiris dá cuir fear don sórt troda órouighe do déanam taob istig díob, ac ní raib don lánaí éola taob istig de seata an locha.

Ac fear glie b'eaó an miallaó leis agus tuig sé é seo com maí le Cromuell péim. Dá réir sin nuair do connaic sé go raib an beárna i rioct a tuitite, bailig sé sac fear, bean agus páiste sa mbaile go raib ionnta a gcosa do cur púta agus cuir sé o'fiacaib orda sac don ruo mar cré, doileac, agus cloca do tarraó go dtí an mbeárna; agus dá claoe do déanam de'n mbrustar go léir isteaó ceitre pícro slat ó sac taob de'n mbeárnaim. Cuir sé a dá gunna mór pé ceilt as an gcionn istig de'n lána so, agus ar sac taob de cur sé saigiuiri le píciú agus le claoimtib taob tiar de na claoacaib; agus cuir sé na saigiuiri go raib muscaevi acu i bpuinneosaib sac tige mór-éimceall a bí i bpuisceact urcair do'n mbeárnaim.

Go moó ar an 17aó de bealtaine tosnuig na gunnaí móra as buitreaó arís as síor-caiteam leis an mbeárnaim o'iarrad i déanam ní ba réirde. Leanad de lámac go dtí an trí de clog um éraóna. Stadaó de annsan agus gluais na "h-Ironsides" pé déim na beárnaim in a gcipib cogaró agus iad as canaó salm o'n Scrioptúir, agus a gcuro arm as oritle le solus na gréime. Isteaó leo trí an mbeárnaim agus com luac agus do sroiseadar an taob istig cuir an dream a bí ar scát na sclaoaca páilte puitleaó rompa, agus tosnuig luac na ngunnaí as caiteam leo com mear agus do feadadar a ngunnaí do líonaó. Bí na Sasanaig as tuitim go tuig agus san don pagail acu ar teaót ar an namaro a bí sa treascairt, agus sa deire sé an ruo a démeadar ná cur díob amac arís com mear agus do bí an a gcosaib, se sin an méto go raib ionnta san do déanam, mar o'páadar móran sínte in a noiaó gonta agus maró.

Támig scannraó ar arm Cromuell an briseaó so do démeaó orda, ruo nár bam díob riam romhe seo. Ac ní raib don staonaó ar Cromuell péim. Bí fonn air seilb an baile do bam amac cibé méto fear do cailleaó sé san obair. Do pioc sé amac na fir ab fearr do bí aige le h-agaó an dara h-iarracta agus cuir sé na h-oifigi do b'fearr do bí aige in a sceannas.

Isteaó leo arís agus níor cuireaó isteaó orda go raib an lána go léir lán o'fearaib agus iad brúighe ar a céile. Nuair do connaic an muimntir do bí i ocosac ná raib acu dul ní ba sia bíodar a glaoac com-árd a nguta "Háilt! Háilt!" go dtí an dream a bí as teaót isteaó in a noiaó. Ac nuair do cíos an luac a bí ar an taob ismuis na focail seo, agus san don pagail acu radarc do pagail ar cad do bí ar siúbal, rit sé leo gur amlaó bí na h-éireannaig as teiceaó agus go raib a gcomrádaite as glaoac orda staó do déanam, agus dá son san sé an ruo do démeadar na brúgaó isteaó ní ba déime cún ná beaó an gleo go léir ar leac-taob orda sár a beoís péim istig agus éromadar as luirig "Ar agaó lib! Ar agaó lib!" Da gairio go raib an lána com lán san agus ná raib as doimne cos ná lám do corruighe. Tosnuig na h-Ultaig anois as lámac isteaó sa éarn fear úo com mear agus do bí acu a gcuro gunnaí roir beas as mór do líonaó. Agus níor díomaom do luac an faobair ac an oiread. Tus buídean foza pé'n mbeárnaim agus comáimeadar siar an méto eile a bí o'iarrad brúgaó isteaó. Da uatbásac

an coscairt a d'eimeadh ar an méid do bhí istigh sa púna sceimleach úr. Tháinig fear a tuic siubalaigh air agus marbhuigh é mar an rud é ná raib sé marbh céana. Tuic cuir de na h-oifigí ab' fearr a bhí i gceann as na "h-Ironsides" agus d'fuir isteach, ar céann acu. Bhí Cromuall féin agus burdean saighdiúirí in a teannta agus fuireadh as an ngeata go ndéanfaí é d'oscailt do ó'n taob istigh agus san pioc feasa aige ar cad do bhí ar siubail istigh, mar níor rit sé leis ar don cur go ndéanfaí don baint siar ar a cúro "Ironsides" i dtóir fear le fear. Bhí don oifigeach amháin amuis dár d'amm Séarlas laingli agus d'eim sé iarracht ar d'ul an áirde ar an bfalla, in áit éigin go raib sé briste is docha, cun raibarc d'fágail ar an gleo ac d'eimeadh an lám de le h-iarracht de speil ó'n taob istigh. Deirtear gur d'eimeadh lám iarraimn do in a d'iaró san agus as san go lá a báis níor tugadh d'ada mar leas-amm air ac "laingli na láime iarraimn."

In don uair an clois amháin nó mar sin bhí 2,000 fear beagnac, sinse istigh agus tomáimeadh an cúro eile amac peil-mel trío an mbeárnain arís.

Ba mór i fearg Cromuall. Níor d'eimeadh a leitéir d'éirleach ar a cúro fear in don áit ó'n céad lá a lámseáil sé clárdeam cun troir a déanam i gcomne an rí. Ac ní raib d'ada le déanam aige. Bhí sé nac beag in a oróche agus bhí fios aige ná beadh ac d'icelle a tuile fear do cur isteach trío an mbeárnain uachtásach úr; 'sé sin dá dtéigois isteach do, rud ná raib sé ró d'eimneach de. Thug sé órdughad uiaó gairm do séirdeach as glaothac ar a cúro fear ón dtóir.

Bhí na h-Éirinnigh agus ba leo do bhí an buair, ac ba buair san tairbte i. Dá mbeadh a daetim fear as do d'Ó Néill an oróche úr agus a gceart armála acu bhí caoi as meon aige ar bhriseadh agus ruaig do cur ar na Sasanaigh taréis air agus éirliú an lae uachtásais úr; ní beadh le déanam ac poíga do tabairt amac futa, agus beadh sé an-dian go mbeois i ndán seasam in a comne. Ac mo leán! ní mar sin do bhí an scéal. Bhí cibé lón púdar agus piléar do bhí aige fote beagnac taréis an buailte fuilte úr, agus bhí a fios aige dá dtasadh na Sasanaigh arís ná beadh don fágail aige cosc do cur leo an bábta so. Deirtear go raib Cromuall féin ar intinn Cluaimmeala d'fágaint annsan, mar gheall ar an gcoscairt a d'eimeadh ar a cúro fear i mbualadh uachtásach an lae úr ac gur tug sé fé'n a aire piléar airgid ar an dtalam agus cuir san in iuil do go raib lón cogadh go ganncúiseach as do d'Úb. Ceap sé go ndéanfaí sé seipt ar an áit do dtógaint le ionnsuidhe ocrais mar ó ba rair é go raib na piléir com gann san acu ná faigead don flúirseacht bíó beir acu.

Ac fuair Cromuall seilb Cluaimmeala i slíge nár rit leis in don cor, agus san a tuile duair. Sur do d'Ó Néill agus a cúro oifigeach an oróche céadna úr i gcomhairle agus d'é do éinneadac ná raib d'ada le déanam ac an baile d'fágaint. D'éir deallraid ní raib ac burdean beag de saighdiúirí capall ar an taob deas d'abaimn as Cromuall, agus dá son san bhí bealach san cosc acu treasna an dtóir go dtí Conntae Portlárige. Glaothais do ar an méara, fear de na faoitig, treib gur mór le ráo iad i gcluaimmeala le fada de bliadantaib roime sin. D'innis sé do go raib sé féin agus a cúro fear cun an baile d'fágaint agus nuair do d'raitfeadh sé iad do beir an fad sin ó

baile agus ná féadfaí teacht suas leo go bfaigh sé an baile do tabairt suas do Cromuall ar na comtaib ab fearr do bheirfeá do.

Treorúis do Ó Néill an méro dá curo fear, go raib ionnta siubal do déanam, treasna na Siuire go dtí Conntae Portláirge san an namato 'sa bfeiscint ná 'sa gcloisint.

Nuair bíodar dá uair imtighthe cuir an Méara teachtairéacht go dtí Cromuall i san fíos do do Ó Néill, mar b'ead, 'sa iarrao air cad é an margaó déanfaí sé leis féin ac an baile do tabairt suas do. Cuir Cromuall oifigeac cun an Méara do tionnlaican ó'n bpalla go dtí a cában féin. Sil Cromuall go raib do Dub agus a curo fear sa mbailemór pós agus bí an-ádas air go rabhas cun an baile tabairt suas comh bog san do, mar san amhras bí a lán daeten troda aise taréis an lae. Demeaó an margaó eacorra agus sío iad na comta do réiróigeaó eacorra mar atá :

1. Tabarfar suas agus cuirfear isteaó i lámhaib * fíir ionaó an Riasaltais ar an h-oct de clog ar marom moiu baile mór agus luét cosanta Cluainmeala leis an mero arm agus pileár agus púdaí atá anois ann.
2. Mar cúiteam ar an méro seo tuas deanfar cosaint ar luét comnuigthe an baile seo roim-ráirde in a mbeata agus in a maom, ó ár agus éirleaó na saighiuirí, agus beir acu na cirt agus an díon céadna atá, nó ba ceart do beir as na daoine eile atá pé reacht párliminte Sasana.

O. Cromuall.

(* N.B.—“ Viceroy ” atá annso ac ní raib don rí i Sasana um an dtaca so.

Bí deire le ionnsurde Cluainmeala. Bí seilb an baile gabta as Cromuall taréis cúis seachtmame de dlút-ionnsurde, agus trí mí ó'n céad lá do tangadair na Sasanaib i nsaor an baile. Bí tuairm as Cromuall ná beaó sé ro-fuiris an baile tógaint ac bamean sé le deallraó nár rit sé leis amáin go ndéanfaí briseaó agus buaócaint ar na fearaib ab fearr do bí aise i gcomhrac com-tromac. Domuigeann Cromuall féin gur beas nár foill Cluainmeala air ; agus dá mbeaó cúpla míle eile fear as do Ó Néill ní ro-mór a raó go mbeaó innsint eile ar stair na h-Éireann.

Ac as casaó ar an scéal 7 Nuair bí a amm curta le na comtaib as Cromuall o'iarr sé ar an Méara an raib a fíos as do Ó Néill go raib sé as teacht dtí é féin. Dubairt an Méara ná raib mar go raib sé féin agus a curo fear imtighthe as an mbaile ó chuit an oíde. O'iarr Cromuall ar go feargaó cad 'na taob nár inns sé é sin do roime sin, agus o'freaigair an Méara é nár cuireaó don ceist cuige mar seall air.

Dubairt curo dá curo oifigeac le Cromuall gur dem ealoó uí Néill ó'n mbaile neam-nró de'n margaó a bí déanta. Ac dem Cromuall na comta do bí déanta do cómlionaó.

Deir scriobnóirí áirimte gur lean Cromuall do Dub le solus an lae ar marom, nó gur cuir sé roinnt saighiuirí capall ar a dtóir agus gur marbúigeaó na pánaí nár raib ionnta an siubal do cóimeaó suas. Ní cinnte ciocu fíor bréas an méro seo de'n scéal.

Do ghuais do Dub agus an méro dá curo fear do bí fágta as triall ar catair Portláirge ; ac ar shóisint na catraó do ní oscailleaó Preston, an

taoisead a bhí ann, na geataí cun é do leigint istead. Bhí pláig sa cátair agus tós cur do saighiúirib doo Uí Néill i agus tug sé orúgadh annsan dóib go léir ar dul abaille. Bhí ar gac fear a bealaí féin do baint amach com maic agus do féadadh sé san a déanamh. Cuar do Dub féin agus Major Pennell go dtí cátair luimniú.

Do fág Cromuall Cluaimmeala ar na laeteantais veireannaí de mí na bealtaine. Cuar sé go dtí Eocail agus as san go dtí Sasana. Dó fág sé in a diad fear dar b'amm Coirnéil Jerome Sankey mar fear ceannais ar Conntae Tobar do Áran. Ní raib an fear so ac 29 mbliadhna d'aois ac bhí sé ar ceann de na puratáin ba millte a bhí in arm Cromuall agus, nio nac ionga, bhí an gráim marb aige ar don ruid do baint leis an Eaglais Catoilicead. Ar na sagartais b'eas cur sé an cead coir agus cuireadh ceathrar acu cun báis i gCluaimmeala rit na bliadhna taréis tógaint an baile. Bhí sagart paróiste i gCluaimmeala, an cátair Tomás de faoit, rit na h-amsire sin, i gclod seirbhíis i dtig fir de'n mbaile mór dar b'amm Séamus Breannoc agus cé go raib a fíor as na ceartaib cérb'é nio scéitir doimne an rún air.

Cé go raib Cromuall mteighe as talamh na h-Éireann ní raib don siotcáin i gConntae Tobar do Áran. Leanadh de'n gcozadh go ceann trí bliadhna eile. Nuair ruagadh na h-Éireannaig as na bailtí móra agus beaga teicteadar go dtí na sléibte agus go dtí na coillte agus nuair seirbhíis an caoi air déimíis creadadh agus marbhadh ar na Sasanaig. B'é bhí mar ceann orta na Coirnéil Éamon Ó Duibhir, dritiár do "Sean Ó Duibhir an Gleanna" d'reir gac deallrad. Nuair seirbhíis Sankey greim ar doimne díob súo a bhí as troto in a coimne, díob carabad de cháib caol cruaid i ndán do. Bhí an bás ceadhna tuillte as doimne a raib don amhras air go mbíod sé as tabairt don congam do saighiúirib na h-Éireann.

Nuair táinig Cromuall istead i gConntae Tobar do Áran teic muinntir na tuaithe go léir mar do gluais a droc-cáil romis cibé áit do cuair sé. Veireadar leo gac don ruid a féadadar roir bia agus beatairig, agus do fágadh an tuait nac beag in a pásad. Nuair bhí seirbhíis na mbailtí mór gabta as na Sasanaig glaoadh ar ais go dtí a gcuir talman ar na daoine a díob in a gcomnuirde timcheall na mbailtí mór san agus tugadh cead dóib a gcuir gort do saortughadh agus a gcuir bó do crúo gan cur istead na amach do déanamh orta. Sean-focal isead é gur ar maite leis féin a déimean an cat crónán; d'air maite leo féin a tug na Crumallaig tar nais na daoine seo. Teastuig bia ó sha bailtí móra agus ní raib doimne eile cun é do solátar dóib. Ac duine air bit eile ac na daoine seo a béarfaí air taob istig de limistéiread don bailemóir air, bhí an croc do bhí i ndán do gan truaigh gan taise. Agus ba ró mímí do cur an tocras amseiseorta bocta sa gcontabairt agus dá deasadh san ba mó duine gur cuireadh an gac caol rigin fe'n muineál aige. Cuireadh 500 duine roir fearaib agus mnáib cun báis i gCluaimmeala, cuir i gcás, ná raib coir ná feall eile déanta acu ac iad beic ar lorg greim len ite.

Ruid eile fós, don áit gur marbuidtí saighiúir le Sankey, cuireadh sé cur de muinntir na h-áite sin cun báis, pioa iad beic cionntac nó gan beic, mar sásam, agus díol as an marbúgadh. Marbuidh arm na h-Éireann saighiúir

leis i bparóiste áirimte. Rug sé leis go fíodáir muintir an páróiste sin go léir. Cuir sé crann-cúir orda agus croc sé cúigear acu. Níor d'ém Coirnéil Éamonn Ó Duibir don ruid mar seo le na Sasanaigh. Don cúir acu sur d'ém sé cimí díob scaoil sé cún siubail arís iad san bacaint ar doimhne a d'éanam leo ac a gcúir arm a baint díob. Ac bí an namhar ró-láidir, ró-nimneac agus ró-fealltaic do agus sa deire caic an Duibíreac siotcáin do d'éanam le Sankey; agus an 23ad lá de Márta sa mbliadain 1652 cuireadar araon a n-ainmeada lena comta siotcána as caisleán na Castra. D'éir na



'An Seata Clár,' Cluan Meala.

comta so tugad cead do'n Duibíreac agus dá cúir fear out tar lear. Dá bliadain in a diad san cuair sé féin agus 3,500 eile de muintir tiobrad áram go dtí an ffrainc.

Bí na h-Éireannaigh i gcruaodás uatbásac anois. Ní raib don cosc le na Cromellaigh a dtail u'imir orda agus is deardta ná raib sé in a gcómaic ní ba mó donais do d'éanam ná mar do d'eimeadar ar muintir na h-Éireann. Cuireadar cíos agus cáin orda agus dá mba ruid é ná bead an t-airgead acu cún a ndíol tógadar uata sac a raib acu sur bpiu don ruid é. Tógadar na leapaica agus na cludai-leapan, na headaí cláir, na measa, agus sac don sahas

troscán; agus cuadar com fada san leis an scéal agus gur stracadar na h-éadaí anuas de na mnáib. Acé bí íde ní ba measa ná na rudaí seo i ndán do sna daoine. Ar an 26ú lá de September sa mbliadain 1653 cuireadh dlíge i bpeirín go scaitfeadh gac duine a bí i seilb don talman i gcúige Uladh, i gcúige Laigen nó i gcúige Mumhan a n-áit comnuigte o'págaint agus a bí tar Sionnam tiar roim an céad lá de mí na Bealtaine bí in a gceann, nó beadh an croc tuillte acu. Riaraó a gcuir talman ar saigdiuirib Cromuall agus ar daoine eile tug airgead do'n Riasaltas i Sasana le h-aghaid an éogaid i nÉirinn. Da deacair cur síos a déanam ar an dtubaiste agus ar an anfad agus ar an gcallsaot a bí leagta anuas ar muinntir na h-Éireann. Síto é mar déimean an piontaragásac tagart do'n scéal sa "Cromuallian Settlement":

"Bí Éire, mar deireann an Scriptiur, com pollam le pásac. Bí cúigear as gac seisear da cuir daoine cailte. Bí mná agus páistí ag págail báis leis an ocras cois na gcladaí. Bí na mactirí ag déanam áir ar corpaib na mbealaíte bocta gur marbuigeo nó gur deimead deoraite dá n-ataracaib, agus gur bfuair a mátraca bás leis an ngorta. Sa mbliadain 1652 agus arís sa mbliadain 1653 táinig pláig ar lorg creadaib na gcogad, agus scuabadh cun báis contaete ar fad, ionnus gur bpeirín le duine 20 nó 30 míle do siubal san criostarde beo o'peicsint. An duine, an beataideac, an t-éan, bíodar go léir éagta nó taréis teite ó'n uaigneas uatbásac. Bíod na saigdiuirí ag cur síos mar adair iongantais ar don áit go bpeicirís deatac ann, bíod sé com annam san acu deatac o'peicsint de ló, ná teime o'ofóce. Dá dtangaití ar dó nó trí de bótánaib ní bíod 'na gcomnuirde ionnta ac sean daoine agus mná agus páistí agus iad mar dtubairt an páig 'mar buidéal sa deatac' bí an croiceann com dub, com h-odár san orta leis an ngorta uatbásac."

Sin é an scéal croide-briste o'innistear ar Éire ar fad, gan amhras muna raib an scéal ní ba measa ag muinntir Éibrad Árann ní raib sé ní's fearr, mar dá beag áit go raib réim ní ba mó ag na Cromuellaig na bí acu ann.

Deimead cimi de na miltí roir fearaib agus mnáib óga agus de páistib féin agus díoladh iad mar díolpaí capail nó ba le luét siuicre do cur amuis in oileán Jamaica. Agus ba seacht bpearr dóib an bás féin dá sciobadh leis ná an daoirseacht damanta ut in a cuireadh iad na miltí míle tar páirre siar ó tír a ndútcas.

Craob scaoileadh le gáir trúmpa agus rúscadh druma ar gac baile margaid agus sráid-baile go scaitfeadh na Gaedil agus na Sean-Gail beir ar an taob tiar de'n tSionnam roim lá Bealtamte 1653. Níor dam an dlíge seo le sclábuigte na le céardaite mar teastócarois siúd ó na Sasanaig a fuair an talam. Agus bí daoine eile nard iad o'éaluis tar 'nais agus a fuair talam ar cíos ó na tigearnaí talman nuada mar níor bpeirín leo súd a ndactén cunóintí ó Sasana o'págail, cun an talam do saortúgadh agus is dóca gur bpearr leis na tigearnaí cíos o'págail ó Éireannac dá olcas é, ná gan don cíos o'págail. Da son mar do fán siol na nGaedeal sa tír. Agus rud iongantac, do measc na Gaedil agus na Cromuellaig, sin iad na h-fisil,—mar bí uasail na nGaedeal go leir díbearta,—com mear san agus go raib clann saigdiuirí Cromuall, o'réir mar deirtear, ag troit i gcomne rig Liam níos

luísa ná d'acáir bliadain in a dhiaidh san agus san focal de b'éarla na Sasanaí ar a dtéanam. Deirtear leis gur pós an-cúro acu mná Saedéalacha agus gur d'eascair ainmeacha Saedéalacha do glacadh. Cuir cúro mór de saighdiúiribh Cromuella fúta i gComntae Tobradh Árann, níos naé ionga mar bí an talamh go poiganta ann. Tá cúro maíe d'ainmeacha na gCromuellaí le pasail sa lá tá m'iu ann ar muinntir na tuaithe i gCo. Tobradh Árann. Deir daoine leis gur ó na "h-Ironsides" do fuair fíor Comntae Tobradh Árann an misneach agus an neart is dual dóibh. San aon d'abairt tá slíocht daoine ann do tug an craobh leo saé aon lá riamh ar páirc an buailte agus ar bán na gcleas ac cioca an ó na "h-Ironsides" a tugadhar leo an buairt so nó naé ead is doca gur deacair a rádh anois.

Cun an pán, do cuireadh ar uaislibh na h-Éireann um an dtaca so, do tuisint níos sóileire inneospar annso síos mar shamlaíocht eadtra na bhPionndarasasac ó'n gCaisteán Nuadh. Demeadh cur síos ceana ar connus mar tógadh an caisteán agus d'eascair cime de'n bhPionndarasasac féin agus connus mar do sheall Cromuella do ná cuirfí as a cúro talman é. D'riseadh an seall so cé nárb' é Cromuella féin ba comntae ac Riagaltas Sasana. Bí na Pionndarasasasac sa Caisteán-Nuadh naé beas ó'n gcéad lá do táinig na Normánaí go dtí Éire. Tá roinnt de foirne an tsean-caisteáin le feicsint fós ar bhuac na Siuire ar an taobh teas, d'iríeac san áit a iompuigean an abainn soir taréis a cuairt anuair, timcheall deic míle siar ó dheas ó Chúammeala.

Cait na Pionndarasasasac dul tar Sionnain siar com maíe le cáé roimh lá Dealtaine sa mbliadain 1653. Cuireadh atchuinge cun an Riagaltasais iad do leigint tar nais cun an foimhar do gearradh agus do sábháil. Ní leigfí tar 'nais iad féin ac tugadh ceat dóibh cúro dá ngiollaibh do cur tar nais le h-aghaidh an obair do déanamh. Ní ró-fada in a dhiaidh san gur díoladhar ar beagán cibé talamh do fuairéadhar i gCúige Connachta agus teiceadh ó'n miad agus ó'n donus go dtí an Spáinn.

Nuair glaothadh tar nais go dtí rígeacht Sasana ar an dara Séarlus táinig oigre na bhPionndarasasac abailte go dtí Éire arís. Bí sé taréis deit as troit fé d'atad an rí sin ar roimh na h-Euróipe agus is doca gur síl sé go bhfuigeadh sé tar nais arís cúro a atad. Nuair táinig sé go dtí an Caisteán-Nuadh connaic sé an t-eactrannac do fuair talamh a simnsear agus léirscrios dá déanamh aise ar coillicibh agus ar crannnaibh na h-áite. Daineann sé le deallradh go raib eagra ar siúro go mbainfí an talamh de arís agus bí sé d'iarraidh an méto do féad sé a sciobadh an fadó agus bí an caoi aise. Cuir an Pionndarasasac a gearradh ar an obair seo go dtí riagaltas Sasana; agus d'éir deallradh ní sa Caisteán-Nuadh amáin do bí an scrios so ar bun mar cuir an riagaltas gairm amac as cur cosca le saé domne adomud do gearradh in aon do taisbeáin an Pionndarasasac an gairm seo do'n eactrannac a bí as gearradh an adomud d'é an méto sásamh do fuair sé uairt ná a rádh leis ná raib meas gearradh ac aon crann amáin ac go bhféad sé é sin in a sheasam cun an Pionndarasasac féin do croadh air muna n-iomchroadh sé é féin.

Ní bfuair na Pionnóragásaigh a gcuro talmhan tar nais go deo ; ac o'fan curo maic dá shioc san áit agus luigeadar isteach in a dtunóintí pén tigearna talmhan nuad go raib seilb na h-áite aige do bí ag a seacht sinnsir rompa le na céadta bliadain.

b'é an scéal céadna é nac beag ag uaisil Conntae Cobrao Árann ar fad. Demeaó scaipeaó gan bailiugaó ortá ar fuair tíorta na h-Euróipe agus págaó na h-eacetrannaigh i seilb a gcaisteán agus a dtalmhan, mar bí an dara Séarlas com fallsa agus com claon agus do bí a ácair agus ba ró-beag i a suim ionnta súo a cáill a gcuro de'n t-saogal ar a son agus ar son a ácar ; agus o'fás sé saighiuirí Cromuall agus na daoine eile a fuair talamh muinntire na h-Éireann, in a seilb gan cur isteach ná amac ortá ac amain pot-tuine annso agus annsúo.

AGUISÍN.

AO DUB Ó NÉILL.

Rugaó Aoó Dub Ua Néill ins an gcuro de Tír fá Tuinn a bí i seilb na Spáinne. Mac do Art Óg oritáir do Eogan Ruad b'ead é. Táinig sé go dtí Éire i bpoáir Eogain Ruad sa mbliadain 1642. Demeaó príosúnac de ag bualao Cluain Eois sa mbliadain 1643 agus níor leigead cun siubail é gur demeaó malairt príosúnac tar éis bualao Dinn Boirde sa mbliadain 1646.

Dein Tigearna Oirímhán taoiseac de ar ácair lunnige taréis briseóa Cluainmeala. Demeaó príosúnac de nuair tugaó suas lunnneac agus cuireaó go dtí Túr Lonnuin é. Taréis do a beic dá bliadain nó mar sin in a príosúnac leigead tar nais go dtí an Spáinn é. b'ann do fuair sé bás.

Deir luic eile staire gur coméadaó i dtúr Lonnuin é go bfuair sé bás.

SÉAMUS Ó RAĞALLAIGH, SAĞART.

Bí sağart i gCluainmeala le linn ionnsuróte an baile darab ainm Séamus Ó Rağallaigh agus nuair bí Aoó Ó Néill ag págaic an baile o'mitig sé sin com maic mar bí a fios aige na tabarfaí don écart ná cóir do ná o'don sağart eile. Cuao sé amuğa sa doirceadhas agus casaó roinnt de saighiuirib Cromuall air gan cúinne. Demeadar é ceistuğaó féacaint de'n sağas tuine é, agus o'admuig sé go calma gur sağart é.

Marbhuigeadar láitreach é.

MAOLMUIRE MAC CRAIC, SAĞART.

Rugaó ar an ácair Maolmuire Mac Craic i gCluainmeala ag cur na h-ola véanaigh ar fear a bí ar leaba a báis. Tugaó i látair Cromuall é agus tug sé sin óróugaó uair é do crocaó látraic bonn.

MAJOR PENNELL.

Deirtear gur croc Iretón Major Pennell taréis seilb luimise o'fágail. Is dóca gur raib míleán aise air i ttaob an cúis céad fear do marbuiséad trí a feall-beirt i sCluammeala.

AN CAISLEÁN NUÁ.

O'airiginn fao ó as na sean-ghaebalgóirib timceall an Caisleáin Nuá go raib sunnaí móra caithe istead i bpoll an caisleáin san abainn díreac as bun fallaí an caisleáin. Réitígeann so leis an scéal gur órouis saigdiuirí Cromuella do'n bPionndarasásac fad gléas cogair a bí ar na fallaí do caiteamh anuas. Ac 'na coimne san arís deiread na sean daoine gur cait Cromuella urcár as sunna mór leis an scaisleán ó Crosaire na Sraige, timceall oet scéad slat ó'n scaisleán ar an taob thuair o'abainn agus gur scoilt sé ó bun go bárr é. Ní réitígeann so leis an stair i ttaob Crosaire na Sraige beit ar an taob thuair de'n t-Siuir mar ní raib arm Cromuella ar an taob san de'n abainn nuair tós sé an caisleán so.

Fuairead piléar sunna móir i nGarraróe in aice an caisleáin ar an taob teas timceall daicad bliadain ó son. O'reir deallraio ní i sCogaio Cromuella ac i sCogaio éigin eile do lámáio an piléar úo.

LAINSLÍ NA LÁIME IARRAINN.

Seo tíos annso uadact do dem faol éigin do lainslí na láime iarrainn, é siúo a bí i mbualao Cluammeala. Taisbeáimeann sí 'de'n sórt croitíe bí as na ropairib úo.

"Mise Seán Lainslí, do rugao i Wincanton i Somersetshire agus do socruigead i nÉirinn sa mbliadain 1651. Táim anois im lán meadair agus céille agus déimim im lám-scriob móireact péin mo uadact mar atá;

"Fágaim mo teac mo earraí agus mo gabaltas 253 acra as 'Black Kettle' as mo mac ar do nglaoitir Seán Dána; aise sin agus as a oigrib go deo is coitíe; ac é beit de ceangal air Procastúnac do pósao, doimne ac amáin Eilis Nic Eannraic do glaoúis 'Coileán Oilibéir' ormsa. Dronnam mo briste nuad croiceann-fiaro agus mo brúgtóir tobac airgo go bfuil J agus L ar a bárr, do Risteard Mac Risteird mo compánac do ioncur mé as an sContabairt i mbualao Cluammeala taréis dom pillar o'fágail sa cois.

"Bíod sé de tualgas ar mo mac Seán mo corp do coméad os cionn talman ar fead sé lá go, a n-óirdeanta tar éis mo báis; agus démead Srao Nic Eannraic mé do tannacao agus bíod cúis scillingí le fágail aici de bárr a n-óibre.

"Cuirtear mo corp dá tórram ar an mbórd mór daraige sa seomra donn agus tugtar cuireadh do daoine Éireannach teacht go dtí mo tórram agus tugtar dá cáirt de'n uiste beata is fearr do gach fear acu agus leagtar scian nó 'oirce' a comair agus nuair beir a scurt oíge ólta acu spicéaltar mo cómhra agus cuirtear mé sa ché as do tángas.

"Is é seo m'uaireacht. Féin' láimh ag so an 3ú lá de mhárta sa mbliadhain 1674."

Seán Lamglí.

O'fiapruig duine éigin de Lamglí 'de'n cúis a leitéir sin de tabairt amach a beir le beir ann do Éireannais—daoine nár ghráduig sé riamh.

"Mar" ar sé sin "nuair beir ar meisce marbóid a céile agus beirte réir leis an méir sin de na droc-síolraig sin; agus dá ndéanamh gach doimne an cleas céadna in a uaireacht ba gairr do mbeimis réir leis an ngráitín go léir."

Deire.

TO SUBSCRIBERS.

To ensure prompt delivery of each issue of "An tOglach" you are requested to notify any change of address to:—The Manager, "An tOglach," 2 and 3, Yarnhall Street, Dublin.

Immediate notice should be given of any delay in receipt of the Journal.

SPORTING NOTES.

By COMMANDANT C. McALISTER.

LIEUTENANT COUGHLAN'S PROGRESS.

IN these notes it was previously pointed out that Lieut. Coughlan's successes in the Athletic arena were a source of pride to his comrades in the Army, and an inspiration to his fellow athletes. He enlivened the proceedings at General Headquarters' Annual Sports on the 2nd June last by a splendid win from virtual scratch in the Half Mile. Running from the six yards mark behind a field of over twenty, he returned 1 min. 56 3/5th secs., and won in the last stride. He displayed nice judgment, and had something in hand at the finish, and when it is remembered that the back marker must "go round" the field, all the while adding distance, his time caused a good deal of surprise.

All doubts as to his performance were, however, set at rest by a really remarkable race on Saturday, June 9th, at the annual Inter-Club contest in College Park. Here for the first time in a half mile he defeated Norman McEachern after a great struggle, and incidentally, broke the Irish record by returning 1 min. 56 1/5th secs. The previous record had been undisturbed since 1905, when G. Morphy placed 1 min. 56 4/5th secs. on the books. McEachern's judgment in this event has been criticised, and while it is agreed that he may have run just the sort of race to bring the best out of the Army man, this cannot detract from the latter's achievement. At all the prominent Athletic Meetings for the past two years the rivalry between the two has provided the *pièce de résistance* of the programme, and until Saturday last McEachern had remained supreme.

The stop-watch is an immutable judge of an athlete's consistency, and it is a tribute to the conscientious way in which these fine runners have prepared for their engagements that they have invariably finished inside two minutes. If all our representatives are imbued with the same desire to do honour to their country we might yet upset calculations at the Amsterdam Olympiad.

BOXING.

The Championships have come and are gone leaving the Army with two titles—those of the Fly and Light Weights. This is an improvement on last year's performance so far as we are concerned, but no more than was expected. McDonagh, the new fly champion, boxed superbly throughout. His progress through the Championships was really a series of boxing lessons. Nevertheless, the diminutive, but hefty Corporal can be very disappointing, as he undoubtedly was at a subsequent International Tournament, when the national title-holder was well beaten by an almost unknown boy from Scotland. McDonagh regained some of his prestige at the recent Tournament in which we had the Danes as visitors.

Our most pleasing success in the Championships was that of O'Shea in the Light Weights, and the final with Wright will always be remembered as a hurricane yet scientific affair. Wright, last year's champion, was thought well capable of holding the title, but in a close fight, which necessitated an extra round,

O'Shea won well. His success is all the more meritorious when it is considered that he was opposed to one of the most capable and experienced boxers in the country.

ALL-ARMY ATHLETIC CHAMPIONSHIPS.

I have already expressed the disappointment that was felt generally at the performances of Army athletes at the Annual Athletic Championships. With one or two exceptions we have no outstanding men, and this is surprising since the material and the opportunity to exploit it are both available. I feel that somewhere hidden there are men who could, with a little development and experience, hold their own with the best in the country. It is only natural that this should be the case, and yet we could get no one last year who could improve on 5 ft. 7 ins. in the High Jump, and 20 ft. in the Long Jump. At a recent meeting in Baldonnell, Cadet Ó Cathain carried off six events, which included the 100 yards, the 440 yards, and two field events. While his performance was a great personal triumph it was not complimentary to the opposition. In first-class athletics a 100 yards man would not even attempt the 440. I do not mean to say that we should specialise in each event, but if the standard was at a reasonably high level it certainly would not be possible for any man to win the 100 and 440 on the same day. I know that some people will say that Sean Lavan has already done it. In fact, if at the same meeting Sean Lavan had attempted the half mile there is no one to say that he would not have won it as well. All this shows that we have one or two good men, while the rest are very poor indeed.

It is hoped that at the coming Championships there will be an improvement in the times and distances, in view of the proximity of the Tailteann Games.

IRISH CROSS-COUNTRY CHAMPIONSHIPS.

In this field at least we have no reason to be despondent, and it has been proved that I was not unduly optimistic when I stated that our Army teams would do well in the Irish Senior and Junior Cross Country Championships. In the former we did not win team honours, but this can be accounted for by the fact that we had so many teams entered. There were no less than eleven army runners, from different clubs, unfortunately, in the first 35 home. As it was, the team from Collins Barracks alone was unfortunate not to win, being narrowly beaten by a city club with a much larger membership. If the Army had entered but one team of the best men no other Senior Club in the country would have had a chance. It is argued, however, and rightly so, that it is better for the sport to act as we did.

In the Junior Championships the Limerick Brigade provided not only the first man home, but team honours as well. If these teams can be held together for another year there is no doubt whatever that they will carry off both events.

“THE YOUTH OF IRELAND.”

IN connection with our remarks in the October and January issues of AN TÓGLACH regarding Boys' Movements in Ireland, our attention has been drawn to a report of the proceedings at the inaugural meeting of the Civil Service Debating Society, held on March 20th last, when the Auditor read his inaugural address on “The Youth of Ireland.”

In introducing his subject, the speaker pointed out that to an audience with the practical training of the Civil Service, the subject cannot be approached with the “beating of drums” or the “blaring of trumpets.” It must be examined dispassionately in the light of cold reason. Up to the present the appeal to emotion has helped: it has brought partial success to the aspirations of the Nation. But now reason alone will enable us to consolidate our position and secure the ultimate end.

He suggested that the attitude of an Anglicised minority, the apparently hobbling step of the majority, the loud-voiced denunciation of the efficacy of our native language as a means of education and general utility, the superior attitude adopted towards our national games, dress, costume and literature were all tending to obscure the vision of the ultimate end.

All this, he pointed out, may have little effect on our adult population, “who can easily discern between the real and the make-believe. The real danger lies in the misdirection of our Youth, our boys and girls who are growing up during the period of the swing of the pendulum to the opposite of National Idealism.”

He proceeded to point out how the pages of History bore witness to the gallant part the Youth of Ireland—the Vanguard of the Nation—had played in the defence of our heritage, and how the invaders down through the centuries recognised this and strove with all their power to destroy the national mind in our youth. He stressed the importance that our ancestors attached to the early training of the Nation's manhood, tracing the proud story of Cuchulainn and his Red Branch Knights, of Fionn and the Fianna, of the young disciples of Patrick, of the youthful warriors of the Dail Cais, and of Brian their King in his early days.

“ Brian the youngest
Is bravest and strongest,
And nobler than any other.”

From the days of Glory, he brought his hearers down through the days of Darkness, through the reigns of Henry the Eighth and Elizabeth, when the settled policy of perverting the Youth of Ireland really became systematic, the days of the forced abductions of the sons of the “wild Irish” to be educated in England, and he pointed out the failure as a whole of this policy as a result of the oft-tried staunchness of the Youth of the Nation.

The audience was then introduced to the days of Cromwell, who, more than any other, realised the impossibility of conquest if the youth of Ireland remained true, as evidenced by his famous dictum: “Nits will be lice.”

He pictured the days of '82, the dissatisfaction of the youth of the country at their leaders' apathy or worse, their answer in the founding of the United Irishmen and its glorious sequel in '98. He reminded his audience of the baptism of

the nineteenth century in the blood of one of Ireland's noblest martyrs—Robert Emmet—the resultant period of despair, the splendid response of the youth to Davis' well-known lines: "When boyhood's fire was in my blood," and the heritage the Young Ireland Movement has left us to-day in our Flag.

He pointed out that the Young Ireland and the Fenian Movements both failed "not because of lack of spirit, but because that spirit had not been properly directed, and because no adequate organisation had existed for the training of the Youth."

Finally he made the deeds of our own times live again and reminded his hearers of the boys of our day who played such a noble part in them, the lads of the third Fianna, Howth, the bloody streets of Dublin in '16, and the glorious years that followed.

The moral is obvious. "As the future depends on the Youth, the Youth must be trained, trained not only in the protection of our Nationality, but in the art of building up our country." Despite MacDonagh's proud boast "that the generous youth of Ireland will never fail her," the danger of failing was never so great as at present. Provision must be made for the future of the Youth of Ireland; they must be saved from the hands of the jazz artist, the cinema villain, or the even more dangerous atmosphere of certain boys' organisations, "particularly the Boy Scouts' organisation and those bodies, secular or otherwise, affiliated directly or indirectly." The speaker agreed that these may be all excellent organisations in their own way, but they are not suitable to Ireland. A five-minute examination of their aims and objects would convince anyone that such organisations are most dangerous to Irish aspirations.

We should learn from the past, and from the example of contemporary organisations to pay attention to the present-day youth "to ensure that it is properly trained in the best interests of the country, that it is mentally and physically fit to inherit the traditions of our ancestors, and the responsibilities of the present."

In conclusion the auditor pointed out that "The future, whether glorious or otherwise, is in the hands of the rising generation. To ensure that it will not be otherwise, it is our duty to organise the Youth, to bring all the boys of the Country together in one solid body, and organise them above class, party, or sectarian interests, in an organisation that will guide the footsteps of Youth on the path of Nationality, that will train it in the ideals of Pearse and the practical patriotism of Connolly, that will teach good citizenship, native language and history, the importance of home industry, the necessity of supporting National games and pastimes, and last but not least, the development of true brotherhood amongst all sections.

"Truly, if we make the rising generation appreciate and practise the proud boast of the Ancient Fianna: "By the strength of our arms, the purity of our hearts, and the truth of our lips, we come safe out of every danger," we shall have done a great work.

In summing up, the Chairman aptly pointed out that the secret of the success of such bodies as the Baden-Powell organisations in Ireland was due to the fact that they did not talk imperially, but *acted* imperially, while the Youth of Ireland to-day talk nationally but do not act nationally.

REVIEWS.

CANADIAN DEFENCE QUARTERLY. Vol. V., No. 3.

This Quarterly is of special interest to Irish readers, as the military problems of Canada during the last century, while far from being identical with, are strongly akin to the problems that confront Ireland to-day. In this number "The Canadian Militia—Universal Service," by Colonel C. F. Hamilton, should appeal to all interested in the future military organisation of this country. Canada has, of course, solved many of its military problems, and the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* is possessed, in consequence, of a more than local appeal. The present issue includes a very readable section devoted to Foreign Notes of Military Interest, while quite a number of technical books and magazines come under review.

Because of the fortuitous association of Canada and Ireland in the recent trans-Atlantic flight, and the possibilities inherent in this association, the "Air Services in Canada," by Group Captain J. S. Scott, M.C., A.F.C., P.S.A., R.C.A.F., will be read with great interest.

While many of the articles are highly technical, the tendency to heaviness is relieved by a judicious addition of historical and narrative articles in lighter vein.

The following quotation appears in an article entitled "The Trench Magazine," by Captain W. W. Murray, M.C., R. of O. :—"Our readers realise the difficulties we experience each time we get back to billets, for it is the editor's pride that at no time has the work of the *Gazette* interfered with the military duties of those responsible for it."

