

AN T-ÓGLÁC

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THE ENEMY'S FAILURE

It is now generally realised and even admitted by the enemy that his new campaign of intensified terrorism, massacres and burnings and drastic military measures has proved a hopeless failure. The high hopes treasured by the champions of savagery have not been realised. Their confident predictions of an early break-up of the Irish Republican Army, of a disintegration of Republicanism, of a rapid breaking of the spirit of the people of Ireland, have not been fulfilled. Every device of civilised and uncivilised warfare, every cruelty, every cowardly meanness that could be conceived by the most depraved minds has been resorted to against the Volunteers and the Irish people. It was expected that these methods would bring the enemy triumph months ago. To-day the Irish people's spirit remains unbroken, their loyalty to the Republic undiminished, to-day the Army of the Irish Republic is stronger, better armed, more efficient and more active than ever before. Each day sees a fresh successful action, a fresh enemy defeat. So striking are the facts that the enemy has taken to hushing up reports of his defeats whenever possible, concealing his casualties, and reporting "successes" and "finds of arms" which never occurred. Those in charge of the enemy forces dread the effect of the truth not merely on the Irish people but upon the English public. Those of the English public who are not moved by sentiments of justice and humanity would at least be influenced by the realisation that their warfare in Ireland has proved a costly failure. Realisation of this has already sunk into the minds of those in touch with the facts; a general realisation of failure cannot be long delayed.

Despite the energy and increased efficiency which the enemy has thrown into his operations the offensive remains with the Republican Army and in those parts of the country where the enemy's hold had been thrown off there is not the slightest sign of his being able to

regain control. He can only compel obedience to his orders from the unarmed non-combatant population by his actual presence in a place, by threats and terrorism; he cannot move about from place to place in safety unless in very great strength. His forces consist of men in barracks expecting attacks and men in lorries looking out for ambushes; and it is hard to see how he can get any further while the Volunteers keep up the offensive.

In other parts of the country, however, things are still very unsatisfactory. It effects no credit on the Volunteers in these districts that they should leave the gallant men of the South to bear all the brunt of the enemy's activities and thus help to make the military problem much simpler for the enemy. If the Volunteers throughout Ireland were as active as in parts of Munster and a few other places, the enemy would require a very much larger force than he has in Ireland at present; and this would cause him very serious embarrassment. It would also relieve the strain on the gallant men in the "gap of danger."

The Volunteers who have been giving such fine examples of valour and efficiency have been greatly helped and encouraged by the attitude of the people generally. There can be no doubt that the people of Ireland as a whole have behaved splendidly under cruel persecutions and trials such as few peoples have had to suffer. It is doubtful whether any other nation has given a finer example of staunchness and unbroken national spirit in a time of terrible suffering. The sympathy and help of the people generally has been of immense value to Ireland's fighting men. The enemy, unable to strike effectively at our armed forces, has sought to wreak his vengeance on our unarmed population. This cowardly cruelty has not broken their spirit nor quenched their loyalty to the Republic. It should however, help to show those young men of military age who were hitherto content, while professing loyalty to the Republic, to look idly on and take no part in the War of Freedom, that their

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place is in the ranks of the Volunteers. The enemy's proclamation that "there is no neutrality" should help them to realise their position.

Every Volunteer should throw himself with whole-hearted energy and enthusiasm into a work on which the fate, the freedom and happiness of the nation depend. The more vigorous and widespread our offensive is at the present time the nearer shall we be brought to that period when Volunteers can rest, their purpose accomplished and when the people of Ireland shall be saved from the sufferings and persecutions which they have so undauntedly endured.

THE SPANISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

For six years the Spanish people maintained a War of Independence against Napoleon, from 1808 to 1814. In the end they not only vindicated their own freedom, but they broke the French Empire in the process. The Spaniards in their struggle mainly adopted the guerilla method of war—and when they departed from it they were beaten. The following passages from Oman's "Peninsular War" show how extraordinarily like to our own was the Spanish War.

"Small parties, or even single officers bearing despatches, could ride safely for many miles through an Italian or Austrian district without being molested. *It was not thus in Spain:* the Emperor was to find that every village where there was not a French garrison would be a focus of active resistance, and that no amount of shooting or hanging would cow the spirits of the peasantry. It was only after scores of aides-de-camp had been killed or captured, and after countless small detachments had been destroyed, that he came to realise that every foot of Spanish soil must not only be conquered, but also held down. If there was a square of ten miles unoccupied, a guerilla band arose in it. If a district 30 miles long lacked a brigade to garrison it, a local junta with a ragged apology for an army promptly appeared. 300,000 men look a large force on paper, but when they have to hold down a country 500 miles broad they are frittered away to nothing."

"If the Emperor had been told, on the day of his entry into Madrid, that even three years later his communications with Bayonne would only be preserved by the maintenance of a fortified post at every tenth milestone, he would have laughed the idea to scorn. Still more ridiculous would it have appeared to him if he had been told that it would take a body of 300 horse to carry a despatch from Salamanca to Saragossa."

Only when the Spaniards made the mistake of

assembling in big masses were the French able to engage them with any chance of success. This is a mistake we have not made and have no intention of making: our aim is to be "everywhere all the time, and nowhere at a given moment." And we must not forget that a modern army can be harassed in ways in which an army of Napoleon's time could not be. The French Emperors baggage-mules and ox-waggons did not need the same kind of roads that the English motor-lorries must have if they are to be of any value: There were in those days no telegraphs or telephones to be disorganised and interrupted. In short, every modern development offers a new means of worrying the enemy, and means so much extra that has to be guarded by him.

The enemy is only begining to realise that he is up against a people fighting a War of Independence against him, and using its resources to break his power. Such a national force cannot be beaten: where Napoleon failed it is scarcely likely that Macready, Greenwood, Tudor, Strickland, and the rest of them can succeed. The Black-and-Tans are hardly equal to a task beyond the Old Guard.

ENEMY INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

The following instructions, issued to officers of the enemy's Fifth Division last autumn deserve to be carefully studied by Volunteers. Several interesting points will be noted—the dissatisfaction with their Intelligence System; the distrust of the R.I.C., who are to be spied on and reported as "untrustworthy" or otherwise; the instructions as to the compiling of a "black list" for murder purposes; and the advice as to having "some obvious busness, such as fishing or shooting or visiting friends or some other excuse." It is the business of Volunteer Officers to study this revelation of their methods and see how they can apply the information obtained thereby:—

1. (a) Our Intelligence System, although working under great difficulties is not as good as it ought to be.

(b) Unit and Brigade Intelligence Officers must get about the country as much as possible. They must be struck off all other duties so that they can devote their whole energies to their Intelligence work.

2. It is useless to depend entirely on the R.I.C. for information. Certain class of persons will not and do not communicate to the Police matters of importance which come to their knowledge. Members of the R.I.C. themselves will not communicate to their immediate superiors what they know and they certainly will not always communicate in writing if they can help it.

3. Information, therefore has to be dragged out of individuals of all classes by personal interview.



quite recognised that at times this may be a dangerous matter. It may be necessary to interview people at night.

4. It is essential that while Intelligence Officers work in close co-operation with the police, they should also have independent sources of information throughout their districts.

5. Intelligence Officers should therefore move freely in their districts, and stay for short periods, when necessary, in important areas. As a rule unless uniform is necessary mufti should be worn when on intelligence duty and each Intelligence Officer should carry a General Authority from his G.O.C. or O.C. stating his identity etc. for use when interviewing Police Officers on matters of duty as the latter officers will of course only answer the queries of duly authenticated persons.

6. It is specially necessary that Intelligence Officers should keep in touch with various authorities, naval and police, in the coastal counties, vigilance being particularly directed to the unlawful landing of arms, attempts to do so, or reported attempts.

7. Intelligence Officers should, as far as possible, conceal from the public the fact that they are acting as such until disclosure is necessary. Therefore when going into country localities it would be well to have some obvious business, such as fishing or shooting, or visiting friends, or some other excuse.

8. Intelligence work will tax all the energies and resources of Officers who realise their responsibility. Tact and discretion and courtesy in dealing with all and with the general public are absolutely essential.

9. In addition to the recognised Brigade and Unit Intelligence Officers, every Officer commanding a Detachment (or other officer with the Detachment) should do Intelligence work.

10. (a) Not only should an Intelligence Officer (or Officer doing Intelligence work for a Detachment) know as much as possible under the following headings, but he should always try to find out more. Keep his finger on the local "pulse" and let his immediate superiors have the information he manages to collect. He should keep in touch with neighbouring local Intelligence Officers.

(b) Here are some of the headings but they can be added to:—

(1) Local political feeling of the population. What do various classes of the population want. (2) Who are the Sinn Fein Leaders in the district. Are they members of I.R.A. or not, where do they live, what is known about them. (3) Secret Societies—Irish Republican Brotherhood—Local Organisation of the I.R.A. Officers—Headquarters drillings—ex-officers and ex-soldiers—uniforms—arms, where concealed, addresses of Officers—passwords and signs. (4) *Black List*. Additions or corrections to residence of individuals on the black list. They may be classified under (2) (3) or (4) above. Who are the really dangerous men.

(5) Motors and motor vehicles and cycles. Intelligence Officers should know to which County the prefix letters to a registered number refer. Local garages. (6) Civilian petrol stocks—how replenished. (7) R.I.C.—state of feeling of—location of Barracks—liaison with R.I.C.—are they to be depended upon—who are the reliable ones. State the defence of R.I.C. Barracks. (8) Feeling of civil population towards the soldiers—boycotting of the troops. (9) Feeling of civilian population towards R.I.C.—boycotting of the police. (10) Sinn Fein Intelligence System—method of carrying despatches—women despatch riders—holding up of mails—wireless, signalling tapping, telegraphs and telephones—attitude of railway and Post Office employees. (11) Sinn Fein Government, Arbitration Courts, Criminal Courts, members of these courts, Local Councils and Boards. (12) Newspapers. (13) Agrarian troubles. (14) Ordinary crimes—intimidation—threatening letters. (15) Sinn Fein Clubs.

11. In the past a considerable amount of information has been collected in all parts of the country by Brigades, by Battalions, and by individuals, the best use of which has not been made. Individuals especially often hear and pick up valuable information which though in itself may seem insignificant, yet when considered with other information from different sources, may provide the key to a problem. It is necessary, therefore, to impress on all ranks, especially *all Officers*, the importance of reporting incidents or scraps of information at once to the nearest Regimental Intelligence Officer. Brigades should collect all such information, sift it, collate it, and forward it to the Divisional H.Q. in the usual manner.

In forwarding reports the source of information, without giving away the individual identity by mentioning his name or his official position, etc. should always be stated and also whether the information has been verified.

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GENERAL NOTES

The enemy at the present time attaches at least as much importance to propaganda as to military or extra military measures. His whole aim is to dispirit and cow the Irish people; and consequently every effort is being made to hide the truth and publish falsehood. Special notices have been sent to British officers to study the "Freeman," "Independent" and local papers and forward to G.H.Q., contradictions of reports unfavourable to them. This only shows the necessity of Volunteer officers also watching newspaper reports with regard to their activities and to O'Connell.

step possible to get false statements contradicted.

A number of fights in Limerick, Tipperary and Cork in which the enemy suffered heavy casualties and their lorries were captured have never been reported in the papers. In other cases, the enemy official reports issued completely mis-state the facts of the case. Attacks on barracks were described, for instance, in which "the attackers were compelled to retreat" whereas the attacks were only feints in connection with other military operations in the same area. In several cases ambushing parties were much less numerous than those attacked, but were described as 200 or 500 or the like. It would be impossible with our limited space to deal in detail with the many lying or misleading enemy reports which have appeared in recent times but steps will be taken to expediate the early contradiction of such reports when considered desirable.

In a recent article of Mr. George Bernard Shaw's in the English "Sunday Times" appears the following passage:—"May I add a word as to the complete change in the military possibilities of Ireland, and of all other relatively small and poor countries, which the War Office and Marshal Foch have evidently impressed on the Prime Minister and on Mr Winston Churchill with terrifying effect, Ireland being now described by Mr. Churchill with perfect seriousness as a 'fearful danger' to the British Empire. This change has been produced by the war, which has proved that the most formidable armaments are not those costly battleships and big battalions which rich and populous countries can afford, but cheap submarines and aeroplanes, cheaper bombs and floating mines, and still cheaper poison gases. These things unquestionably make small communities far more dangerous to large ones than they were ten years ago. But they are not a reason for subjugating small communities, because it is part of their danger that they elude mere subjugation, and can be removed only by extermination."

It is reported to us that a number of young Irishmen who have gone to England in recent times have represented themselves in Irish circles there as "Volunteers on the run" and have obtained credit, succour and financial assistance thereby. In some cases at least these men were impostors; if they were really Volunteers their proper place was in Ireland, and they had no right to leave it without the special permission of their superior officer and a passport from Dáil Eireann. Wherever possible our Irish friends in England should be made to understand that Volunteers from Ireland who take refuge in that country unless there by the sanction or orders of their superior officers are simply deserters and deserve no help or sympathy. Ireland wants every fighting man available at the present time, and if men are not prepared to take risks in the fight for freedom then they had no business joining the Volunteers.

An amusing example of enemy military stupidity is the atrociously savage sentences which his so-called "courts martial" are inflicting on Republicans men and women, combatant and non-combatant on all sorts of "charges" at the present times. He seems to imagine that these ferocious "sentences" will act as a deterrent to sympathisers with the Volunteers. He does not seem to see how these extravagant terms of imprisonment are defeating their own object. Even the most timid non-combatant is being made to reason that "he might as well be hung for a sheep as for a lamb." The English savagery is only helping to swell the ranks of the insurgents, for it is obvious to the young man of military age that it is safer for him to be an active Volunteer than a non-combatant at the present time.

NOTES ON PISTOL & REVOLVER SHOOTING

The Officer in command of one of our Active Service Units has submitted some instructive notes as to the relative merits of different types of pistol. Only pistols of .45 calibre were reported on; and the types concerned were the Colt, Webley, and Smith and Wesson revolvers of that calibre and the Colt Automatic Pistol of the same calibre.

The Webley and Smith and Wesson revolvers are classed together as having the same general characteristics. The Officer making the report says: "They are deadly as far as our men can be trusted to hit. They are ideal weapons for the average Volunteer. They are also easy to adjust for cleaning purposes without fear of injury to the revolver itself." The Colt revolver has a longer barrel, is very strongly made and is more powerful and accurate than the others.

The Colt automatic pistol is recommended "if a man has a high standard of training" by reason of the accuracy and speed of its fire. On the other hand this weapon is not recommended for the average man because such a man is not so well fitted to clean and take care of the delicate mechanism of the arm. With reference to the Colt, also, attention is called to the difference between the grip of this pistol and that of the revolver. This difference in grip causes a different alignment and at first a man trained in the use of one weapon cannot be expected to shoot well with the other. Consequently allowance must be made for this.

It is also recommended that when men are being instructed in the use of the pistol, they should get hints on drawing the enemy by feints etc., and thus getting him out of cover and being able to use their own firearms to the best advantage. 'Revolver Tactics' might be called 'Revolver Tactics'.