

AN T-ÓGLÁC

THE OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE IRISH VOLUNTEERS.

Vol. III. No. 42.]

JANUARY 13 1922.

[Price Twopence

NO CHANGE.

Dail Eireann, the sovereign representative body to whom the people of Ireland owe allegiance, has by a majority taken a definite decision on a matter around which political controversy has raged and the result has been the election of a new President and Cabinet. The situation as far as the Army is concerned remains unchanged. Our Army remains the Army of the Irish Republic which Republic will continue until such time, if ever, as the Irish people at a General Election shall decide on some other form of Government. The Army will remain in command of the same officers as heretofore and any attempt to impair its discipline and solidarity by introducing political controversies into its work will be sternly resisted. All who have the interests of the country and the honour and strength of the Army at heart will co-operate in ensuring this. The country is at the present time, as a result of the recent war, the later political divisions and the proposed British evacuation in a chaotic state, exposed to danger from foreign and domestic enemies of peace and its great hope in this moment of need is the splendid discipline and ordered organisation which has characterised the Irish Volunteers. The British forces are preparing to evacuate Ireland; the duty of securing public order and public safety will rest on the Irish Army and all its units must co-operate loyally in this work. Words are not strong enough to express the reprobation due to any officers or men of the Army who in this critical juncture fail in their duty in this respect. The Irish Volunteers were established "to safeguard the common rights and liberties of all the people of Ireland." They are the servants and defenders of the nation and can never be made the organ of a party or faction. No units of the Army

can ever be allowed to use force or intimidation in furtherance of their political views. It must be clearly understood that those in control of the Army will tolerate no indiscipline, no insubordinate or mutinous conduct, no intimidation of civilians at the present time and that they are prepared to take strong steps should the necessity arise. We do not believe that the necessity will ever arise. Those officers and men who have stood by the nation so bravely and loyally during the recent glorious war will never allow the honour of the Army to be dragged through the mud of political controversy.

The Army is of the people, for the people, an instrument of the will of the people constitutionally expressed. The Army is a voluntary one, and no person who did not agree with the policy of Dail Eireann during the late war was ever compelled to join its ranks. The "Volunteer spirit," as we have frequently pointed out, is the antithesis of the spirit of militarism. It is the spirit of the good citizen soldier, a member of the fighting manhood of Ireland enlisted to defend the common rights and liberties of Irishmen against foreign aggression and internal disorder. In that spirit those in command of the Army will continue to carry on its work and they rely confidently on the loyalty of all the officers and men in this work so necessary to the nation.

NOTES ON SCOUTING. I.

The acquisition of information about the enemy has always been considered one of the most important elements of success in War, and if a scout is engaged on duty with no definite instructions, he must judge for himself in how far the information he is acquiring is likely to be of use to his chief, and to

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TACTICAL SCHEMES.

The difficulty in carrying out active operations successfully is in the heat of the moment to decide correctly the proper thing to do at the moment, and nothing but practice in tactics will help you to get over this difficulty.

You should always take every opportunity of discussing with your comrades little tactical situations which have occurred, or those which may occur. In talking over the former do not do so with the object of passing censure, but merely with a view of learning what to do, and what not to do, should you find yourself in a similar situation.

Whenever you have an opportunity, carefully explain the situation to your men. This is necessary if you expect them to co-operate intelligently in bringing about your designs.

In the solution of any little scheme you may set to your subordinates, insist on definite orders being given, and do not be content with vague disquisitions.

When any little problem you have set has been unsatisfactorily solved, let another officer fall in and take command, and do it again properly. This is the best way to ensure the proper solution being thoroughly understood and remember, for application on a future occasion.

The following essentials should be borne in mind when drawing up a tactical scheme for the training of your Unit.

- (1) Know clearly what particular Operation you intend them to practice. It is useless making a jumble of three or four different operations. It is far better to take one only, and do it thoroughly from start to finish.
- (2) The most important part of the training is the discussion amongst the officers after the day is concluded, and the next most important factor is reasonable and sensible umpiring.
- (3) To make the Operations appear realistic, it is essential to have a "general idea" and a "special idea." The enemy must also have a "special idea."

In compelling the "general idea" make it as simple as possible. It should be limited to the knowledge essential for intelligently carrying out the proposed scheme, and for making the two special ideas appear feasible and realistic.

A special idea will include:—

- (1) Secret information known only to the Commander concerned.
- (2) The objective to be attained.

It will usually take the form of an order.

The following is an example of how a tactical scheme should be arranged:—

Reference Map, O.S. 1/2" ——— District.

Special Idea—Irish Army

It is essential that the enemy from A ——— are

held up until the enemy in B—— have been forced to surrender. The O.C., Irish forces at B—— therefore detaches 50 men to take up position between B—— and the river C—— 2 miles east of B—— and delay the enemy as long as possible.

Special Idea—Enemy.

An Enemy force from D—— has been ordered to land at A——, and at once relieve their troops which are invested in B——. They reach A—— at 7.30 a.m. on the 28th. Nov. 21, and at once commence to move on B—— at 9.30, a.m. their scouts reach the line of the river C——.

Secret.

Operations in the Field.

General Idea.

A general attack is being carried out by the Irish forces, upon enemy forces in Co.——.

In order to relieve the enemy Garrison in E—— an enemy force 100 strong moved up from F—— to B—— where they been attacked and surrounded by Irish forces.

Special Idea—Enemy.

The enemy in B——, having taken refuge in houses are holding out desperately.

At 8.30 a.m. on the morning of the 28th. Nov. 21, the O.C., Irish forces at B—— received information that an enemy force of 200 strong landed at A—— at 7.30 a.m. that morning, and is now moving on B——.

Operation Order.

To:—

Copy No.——

Reference Map O.S. 1/2" ——— District.

(1) Enemy are reported N. W. of the river C—— strength 300 men in 26 Lorries accompanied by one Armoured Car.

(2) They must be prevented entering B—— for two days.

(3) Our forces consist of 50 rifle men, 70 revolver men, one machine gun, and 200 unarmed men for working parties.

(4) The O.C. Scouts will reconnoitre the ground between the lines—

B—— and H——

and the line of the river west of the C—— river from where it cuts the 200 contour line North of the A in H——a—— to its south.

(5) He will report to the O.C. Irish forces, in B—— by ——— p.m. to-day the best position to be occupied and obstructions to be carried out in the area.

(6) The O.C. unarmed men will have them ready outside ——— shop in B—— by ——— p.m. to move out for working parties.

Copy No. 1. to O.C. Scouts, No. 2 O.C. unarmed men, No. 3 to be retained.

(Signed)

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Ogligh
na hEireann
DEFENCE FORCES IRELAND

The Discussion and How To Run It.

The discussion is the most instructive part of a field day if properly organised. It should be conducted with impartiality, and officers whose action are criticised should not be mentioned by name, but with reference to the party they commanded. It should be held as soon after the operation as possible.

(1) The director asks O.C. No. to read his orders, and if necessary to explain them, (i.e., appreciate the situation.) He will then ask the O.C. of the other force to do likewise.

(2) The officer commanding each force will then narrate shortly what he thinks actually occurred, judging by messages received, and various umpires, decisions. The umpires will correct or corroborate any statements made.

(3) Subordinate commanders at important places may then if necessary be asked to give their dispositions.

(4) The chief umpire on each side should then be asked for any further comments he may wish to make as to what actually happened, his reasons for various decisions given, and what he believes would have happened on service.

(5) The director will then sum up the result of the day's training under the following heading:—

- (1) The lessons it was intended to learn.
- (2) The lessons actually learnt.
- (3) The principal tactical mistakes made.
- (4) The results those mistakes would have involved on service.
- (5) Criticism of the conceptions of the opposing commanders, of their orders, of the way the orders were interpreted and executed.
- (6) Remarks upon inter-communications, sending back information, etc.
- (7) A guarded expression of opinion as to which side achieved its object.

If possible a typewritten report thereon should be subsequently issued to all officers who participated in the discussion.

INDEPENDENT SCOUTING.

There is no part of military duty which demands higher qualifications than that of an independent Scout. Of all the aids to excellence in War there is only one thing, and that is training, which will assist the aspirant to skill in independent scouting.

On the value of training, and especially self-training, he may count and general knowledge of the military art is essential to him, but for further aids to success, he must rely on resolution, on keen perception, and on quick understanding. Without resolution he will seldom be in a position to find out anything, without perception he may fail to find that which lies within

his view; without understanding he may not grasp the meaning of that which he has found.

The possibility of acquiring information of great importance should be always in the mind of a Scout. He must never forget that the success or failure of his mission may mean the success or failure of the Company or Battalion he belongs to. When a poorly trained scout is sent out on a definite mission, and successfully accomplishes it, there is still no certainty, if the man has no military knowledge, that further valuable information has not been missed. He may not understand what he sees; he cannot be expected to appreciate the bearing which a seemingly unimportant matter may have on the conduct of an operation. He may see the enemy, but may be quite unable to guess at what the enemy is doing; He may see them filling in a trench, or repairing a blown-up bridge, but fail to connect this work with the probable desire of the enemy to use this road or bridge. He may see supplies for the enemy at an unexpected point, without thinking of the men they are destined to feed.

With the case of the well trained scout all this is different. When he succeeds to some purpose, and even when he fails in his main object, he will usually, in the course of his otherwise abortive effort, pick up some details, or form some opinions which will be of use to his chief.

Apart, however, from the value of general military knowledge, there are some particular points to which the attention of scouts working with active service units should be specially directed. These are principally connected with the interpretation of signs of the enemy.


A scout should know the measurements of the wheel tracks of the different enemy motor lorries, and any peculiarity in the shoeing of horses. He should be able to judge by the state of the ground on which the tracks are found, whether the lorries were full or empty, or whether a large or small force has passed.

The track of an enemy patrol may inform a Commander that the position of his force has been observed, and that the element of possible surprise of the enemy must be given over.

The dust caused by motion is one of the most useful indications of the enemy. It can be seen at great distances, and its volume gives some idea of the strength of the force which causes it. The dust raised by motor lorries moving rapidly can easily be distinguished from that which accompanies a cavalry column; it rises higher, and is more transparent.

The chief importance of these signs is, that dust often betrays the movements of troops who are otherwise concealed, and usually the direction of the movements can be discerned.

There is one detail of information about the enemy on which scouts should always be able to report with accuracy that is, efficiency of his system of communication. It is with the enemy outpost line, or covering troops



that the scout usually comes in contact first, His success depends very much on the penetrability of the barrier which is designed by the enemy to ward off intrusion, and prevent surprise. He can hardly fail to discover whether the enemy's outposts are vigilant, or are careless, and this knowledge may be of great importance to the commander of a force. A slackness in an enemy's outpost line which permits a scout to achieve a successful reconnaissance, may also enable a commander of a Unit to achieve a victory by surprise, and the report as to the neglect which enabled the scout to succeed may be of more value than all the rest of the information which his success enabled him to gather.

Therefore, the report of a scout who comes into contact with the enemy, should include information as to the efficiency of the enemy's protective screen.

NOTES ON SCOUTING (Continued from page 1)

enable him to so judge he must have some military knowledge. The better his education as a soldier the more valuable should be his information, for general military knowledge will not only enable him to recognise unhesitatingly any important information but will point out to him the direction in which further investigation may be most profitably undertaken.

For example, a scout discovers the enemy posted in a continuous line across his front. If the scout be a man of little military knowledge he will probably return and report that at such a place and time he found the enemy across his front. But if a scout happens to be a well trained soldier his investigation would take a different form, and would have a different value. A continuous line of hostile posts would to him mean outposts, and his first endeavour would be to discern or divine what these outposts covered.

If the ground favoured the idea of a defensive position, he would look for signs of men at work behind the outpost line, the regiment they belong to; the arms etc., they could have with them. He would now consider how, if he were the enemy he would occupy the ground; he would look for the key to the position, for its strong and weak points of

defence, for favourable or possible lines of attack; he would try and discover the extent of the position and to locate the enemy's flanks.

It is not impossible that a well-trained scout might form a valuable opinion on all these points without approaching any closer to the enemy or running any greater risks than the scout who, from lack of military knowledge, had to return with nothing but the certainty that he had met the enemy.

When once the first stage of the education of a scout—the taking care of himself—is complete, then his value is likely to increase in proportion to the extent and accuracy of his military knowledge.

There are several sources from which a scout may hope to obtain information. There is the civil population, prisoners who may be captured, deserters from the enemy who may be met with, and documents which may come into his possession.

With regard to the civil population, the possibility of extracting useful information from them depends almost entirely on their attitude towards us. Most valuable information can be got from individuals who are friendly disposed. The scout when possible, should take measures to enable the Intelligence Staff of his Battalion to get into communication with any person whose information he thinks may be valuable, and if there is no possibility of this, he should gather as much as he can, and forward it on.

The type of information he may expect from friendly inhabitants is, a fair notion of the lie of the land, or he may secure a guide who will bring him around and show him all the bye paths in the district; who will let him know if the enemy forces are near, and perhaps their strength; if they are active, and their customary mode of procedure.

From hostile inhabitants a scout may expect neither information nor aid. His safest course is to consider hostile inhabitants as part of the enemy, and avoid them altogether.

Scouts should not have too much to do with enemy deserters, for spies often assume the guise of deserters, and such men should be observed as much as possible, and what is seen of them should be reported, and the more that is known of them, and especially the method in which they left the enemy's camp, the better.