

# AN T-OGLÁC

THE OFFICIAL ÓRGAN OF THE IRISH VOLUNTEERS.

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## THE FUTURE.

ALL the greatest things in the world have arisen out of unity of purpose, unity of spirit, and unity of action. Where there is not unity there cannot be any great creation, and the history of every Nation shows that it was greatest when it was most united in spirit. This is true of all times. It was small groups of Catholic Missionaries that spread Christianity through the world, and in our own country communities of these Missionaries were the centres of civilization and knowledge. These Christian Missionaries were able to alter the whole form of European civilization simply because they worked as a single man, were animated with the same purpose, and gave absolute obedience to their Superiors.

This is only one example out of thousands. All great achievement comes inevitably out of unity, and if our failure to achieve liberty until the present day is attributable to any one cause it is that we never were able to move as a united Nation. Our history warns us solemnly against the danger of disunity. Our enemies have accused us of being incapable of acting with the harmony of purpose shown by great Nations, but during the last six years the Irish nation has displayed immense powers of resistance, and has shown a solidarity which is in itself a decisive proof of the inherent greatness of the nation.

Those who care for the future of Ireland will realise that the continuance of national unity is essential, that if ever there is to be created in Ireland a Gaelic civilization as rich and as noble as we have hoped, there must be no lasting cleavage in the Army and no break within the national movement.

If all the forces which have enabled us to hold up English civilization and to drive the English

from Ireland continue to co-operate, then our future is secure, and we are bound to fulfil our destiny. For ages all national development, all part in the great movements of thought which have swept across Europe, has been denied to the Irish people. We were enslaved spiritually and physically, but our faith was that when we would become a free people our country would be one of the chief centres of civilization and culture.

## Unity in the I.R.A.

Such a future is dependent altogether on our unity as a nation. National unity will follow on Army unity. Consider the last six years. The struggle of the Army against a powerful enemy had the character of a crusade. Our soldiers felt that their cause was a holy one and fought as brothers. Only those within the ranks of the Volunteers can ever understand or appreciate the comradeship, the personal loyalty, the mutual understanding that existed in the I.R.A. There was perfect harmony amongst the men and a similar harmony and co-operation between Battalions, Brigades, and Divisions. Such was the brotherhood of the Volunteers that even personal bitternesses were very rare. Except for this co-ordination we would certainly have been defeated. It was essential to our success, and will be equally essential to our future success. The whole frame-work of the Volunteers depended on this unity.

At present there is a disposition amongst certain Volunteers to congratulate themselves on what they have done. The time has not yet come for such self-congratulation, but one thing we can certainly take pride in is that our Army worked and fought voluntarily. We have reason to be proud of the fact that our men, instead of receiving remuneration, actually paid for the privilege of fighting against the national enemy. Every thoughtful soldier of the Irish Army

well that our unity was the deciding factor in the struggle against England, and nothing can justify the breaking up of that unity. Yet we cannot close our eyes to the fact that since the evacuation of the British troops, Army solidarity has been fast breaking up, and if the Army breaks up the national movement falls to pieces and the last six years' work is undone. The process of Army dissolution has been going on so fast recently, that certain officers, with a more highly developed sense of responsibility, have awoken to the fact that it must be stopped, and that if it is not stopped this generation of Irishmen will have failed. It is certainly time that the good sense of responsible Army Officers should begin to assert itself. Good Volunteers have watched irresponsibles creating a more and more dangerous situation.

As it is the situation is grave. Things have gone altogether too far, and men have been allowed to gamble with the life of the nation and the life of the army. There can be no doubt that a great deal of responsibility, though some Army Officers cannot be exonerated, rests on outsiders. Politicians have interfered in Army affairs with disastrous results. Certain soldiers have attempted to dictate to the Dáil, and certain politicians have been altogether too much engaged with Army affairs. Army unity was largely wrecked by influences from outside the Army.

#### The Mallow Meeting.

General Headquarters have made every effort, humanly possible, to preserve army unity, but Mr. O'Connor and others have attempted to make the Volunteers a political organisation, and have frustrated every effort for unity on the part of G.H.Q. Previous to the Convention there were several conferences in Dublin, at which a possible basis of unity was discussed, and all those conferences were called by G.H.Q. The Minister for Defence went to the furthest possible point, consistent with the sovereignty of the Irish people, to secure unity, and it seemed at one time as if he had succeeded. The following agreement was arrived at between the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Staff, and 1st Southern Division Staff:—

on Thursday, 23rd March. Such meeting to select from among the Divisional and Brigade Commandants, a council of eight, commissioned to frame definite proposals for associating the I.R.A. with any Government elected by the Irish people, and to put such proposals before the Divisional and Brigade Commandants for agreement preparatory to putting them before the Government."

But the O/C. 1st Southern Division did not bring that agreement before the Divisional and Brigade Commandants of his side, and those who were responsible for withholding that agreement from the meeting referred to, were the real authors of the Army split.

What is perfectly clear is that the Minister for Defence and G.H.Q. have done everything possible to maintain the unity of the I.R.A., and that the cleavage has been deliberately forced by certain officers. The Sectional Convention held by dissentient officers gave definite shape to these differences, and since then the situation has rapidly drifted towards actual war amongst brothers.

Since the Sectional Convention, G.H.Q. has shown itself consistently anxious for peace, and acted on the defensive, and has only intervened to protect the people in the exercise of their national rights. This was the duty of G.H.Q., and G.H.Q. had no alternative but to do its duty to the Dáil and the people, or resign. The Executive set up by the Convention has not shown the same anxiety for peace, but has continued to force the situation, to attack troops loyal to Dáil Eireann, and act as if Army unity was of no consequence.

We are all pledged to establish the complete independence of Ireland, and we never had any doubt that the best soldiers would take care not to prejudice the attainment of that independence. A free Ireland will not come through civil war, and when Ireland is free it will be the work of the Irish Volunteers fighting shoulder to shoulder. The real effect of a war of comrades would be to leave Ireland crippled and broken for generations. Hatred and bitterness and revenge, would replace comradeship and love for Ireland, and for a certainty, Irishmen would believe that whatever set brother against brother was not a good thing.

" A meeting of Divisional and Brigade Commandants with G.H.Q. Staff to be held in Dublin,

There can be no surer way of discrediting our national ideal than by making it the cause of a civil war. Those who cause a war of comrades will have a terrible responsibility to this generation and to the generations unborn. They will be the real destroyers of our ultimate independence

### THE IRISH VOLUNTEER TRADITION.

It is less than a decade since Padraic Pearse and his comrades called the Irish Volunteers into being. A glorious tradition has been already established by them, which cannot fail to be an inspiration to the Army of Ireland now and in the days that are ahead. This was not achieved without sacrifices and a heroism unsurpassed in any land.

In all their efforts the I.R.A. had the whole-hearted co-operation of the civilian population. That co-operation, which meant so much to the Irish Army, was not obtained through force or terrorism. The Irish people came to love and respect the soldiers of Ireland because they recognised in them, not alone the defenders of the nation's territory, but also the custodians of the nation's honour.

In those days of stress the Irish Volunteer stood out in sharp contrast to the enemy forces, as everything which a soldier of liberty should be. By his courage, discipline, integrity, and courtesy he earned for himself and the Army to which he belonged the unshakeable devotion of his countrymen and the admiration of other nations.

"We believe," said Pearse, speaking as an Irish Volunteer, "that the highest thing anyone can do is to *serve* well and truly, and we purpose to serve Ireland with all our fealty and with all our strength." That is the ideal which should be ever kept in mind. The Irish Volunteer is the servant of the nation, and "the people are the nation."

Servants of the people! That is the high tradition which the Irish soldier of to-day has to transmit unsullied to those who follow him, as he received it untarnished from those who went before him.

### NEW ROADS TO FREEDOM.

#### ROBBING THE IRISH PEOPLE.

On Monday, May 1st, armed members of the irregular forces entered several branches of the Bank of Ireland throughout the country and forced the manager, in each case, to deliver up large sums of money, of which an incomplete list is appended.

In the reports, available so far, £95,984 is accounted for, and, in all, well over £100,000 must have been seized.

Clonmel	....	£17,000
Rathluiric	....	15,000
Sligo	....	14,000
Wexford	....	10,000
Castlebar	....	10,000
*Ballina	....	£500 to 10,000
Tuam	....	7,000
Boyle	....	6,000
Ballinrobe	....	5,000
Limerick	....	3,500
Fermoy	....	3,000
Westport	....	2,673
Mitchelstown	....	1,000
Claremorris	....	900
Enniscorthy	....	410
Mallow	....	350
Bagenalstown	....	151
Ennis	....	unknown
Waterford	....	unknown
Tipperary	....	unknown
Roscrea	....	unknown
New Ross	....	unknown
Gorey	....	unknown
Tralea	....	(Notes cancelled)

\* Estimated.

All this money is the property of the people of Ireland.

# IRISH ARMY POSITION REVIEWED.

## MINISTER FOR DEFENCE OUTLINES POLICY.

### To Render I.R.A. Efficient.

#### THE BANE OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE.

In the following memorandum, presented by the Minister for Defence to Dail Eireann on April 26th, the whole Army position is reviewed. It will appear from the document that those responsible for the control of the I.R.A., at present, are acting in the best interests of the country, and purely as soldiers in the highest significance of that word.

#### THE MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.

Since the inception of the new Ministry the policy with regard to the Army has been to strengthen it in every possible way, in arms and equipment, and in the solidification of the material and organisation that existed.

It was arranged with the Provisional Government that all evacuated military and police posts passing into their hands as a result of the Treaty would be taken over by the Army for purposes of their maintenance and safeguard; the expense entailed by such occupation being charged to Provisional Government funds. Volunteers were asked for to undertake to give full-time military service for a period of 18 months.

By the utilisation of these barracks for organisation and training purposes we have been able to materially increase the strength of our organisation and the efficiency of our forces. By the employment of these buildings we have been able to relieve, to some extent, unemployment existing among Volunteers.

The increase in the effectiveness of the Army that was hoped for, while it has been very considerable, has been seriously interfered with by an attempt to divide the Army on the Pro-Treaty—Anti-Treaty question. This attempt began as early as 11th January, 1922, and a statement has already been made in the matter.

#### Spirit of Dictatorship.

Together with the Chief of Staff I travelled to Mallow on Monday, 20th March, and met there the Divisional Staff of the 1st Southern Division, together with the Brigade Commandant of that Division, and after discussing the situation there we made the following offer:—

Offer made by the Minister for Defence at a meeting of the 1st Southern Division on 20th March, 1922.

1. A meeting of Brigade and Divisional Commandants with G.H.Q. Staff.
2. To select from among the Divisional and Brigade Commandants—
  - (a) A Council of, say, eight Commissions.
  - (b) To frame definite proposals for associating the I.R.A. with the Government elected by the Irish people.
3. To put these proposals before a subsequent meeting of the Divisional and Brigade Commandants, for agreement preparatory to
4. Putting them before the Dail Cabinet. (Suggested dates:—First meeting, Thursday, 23rd March; second meeting, Saturday, 8th April.)

The officers of the 1st Southern stated that they were not prepared to give an answer until following day, Tuesday. On Tuesday the O'Connell

1st Southern and Adjutant submitted the following terms to which they would agree :—

1. A meeting of all Divisional and Brigade O/C.'s to be held on Friday, 24th instant (February), for the purpose of selecting a Council of 8.
2. This Council to be commissioned to frame definite proposals for associating the I.R.A. with the Government elected by the Irish people.
3. These proposals to be put before Divisional and Brigade O/C.'s on April 8th.
4. When agreed to these proposals would be put before Dail Cabinet.
5. In view of the above, the Convention fixed for March 26th is postponed to April 16th.
6. That recruiting for the Civic Guard be discontinued.  
(As 5 and 6 could not be agreed to, the proposals failed.)

The Dail Cabinet could not agree to 5 nor 6.

As far as is known, this offer was turned down without any reference to the general body of officers who had been collected to the Anti-Treaty side.

On 23rd March a summons to a Sectional Convention was issued, signed by five Divisional Commandants and 29 Brigade Commandants out of a total of 14 Divisional and 71 Brigade Commandants.

The Sectional Convention was held on 26th March. An Executive was set up, and the policy disclosed itself that the Army was to be split, in order that at least some portion of it might be drawn away in the spirit of Dictatorship, with a view to suppressing by force the pending elections.

### The Limerick Episode.

The Limerick episode disclosed the extent to which, even as early as the beginning of February, the movement to split the Army had gone, and the extent to which those who were driving this split were prepared to go.

In the matter of handing over barracks for occupation by local Volunteers, the fact that the local O/C. might not agree with our policy had not been allowed to make any difference; even to the extent that, where in the Tipperary No. 3 Brigade there was very definite indiscipline on the part of the Brigade Staff, and serious interferences with local persons and property, barracks were handed over to the local troops, in the hope that, with responsibility placed upon them, the rank and file of the Army in that area could be relied upon to exert an influence sufficiently strong to reduce that indiscipline.

When the barracks in Limerick came to be occupied on 23rd February, the position was such, that this policy had to be departed from.

On Saturday, 18th February, the Brigade Commandant of the Mid. Limerick Brigade, in whose area the city was, issued a Proclamation repudiating the authority of G.H.Q. The nearest Commanding Officer, namely, the O/C. of the 1st Western Division, was instructed to occupy these barracks.

### Secessionists' Tactics.

Seceding Volunteers under what is known as the Executive, have interfered with our officers and men in their work of organisation, by :—

- Attacks on persons,
- Shooting of persons,
- Seizure of posts,
- Attacks on our transport,
- Systematic attacks on our military posts,
- Seizure of stores.

They have been helped in this matter by the fact that they are countenanced by a section of the Dail Opposition who, in spite of their acts, their repudiation of the authority of the Dail, and in spite of their declared aims, portray them as the only true followers in Pearse's footsteps.

In many districts the difficulty in holding the Organisation in any way intact has been very great. Hundreds of men from Cork, Kerry and Limerick, have been intercepted by armed bands while on their way to link-up with G.H.Q., at Dublin, and they have been imprisoned and ill-treated. Mails are regularly interfered with in order to intercept correspondence passing between outlying units and G.H.Q.

Nevertheless, it is possible to report a very satisfactory and a daily growing grip on practically the whole country.

### Obstruction of Police Work.

In addition to the work of strengthening the Army and occupying evacuated military posts, we have undertaken the work of policing the country, and to this end, have occupied a large number of evacuated police barracks. Owing to the secession of some senior officers, this work of policing has suffered very much in some parts of the country. Many cases have arisen in which the local authorities, or local committees, have desired to set up a local police force, and in some cases, have desired to finance this force from the rates.

The actual position in this matter is, that there would be no difficulty in properly policing all areas if there were no repudiation of the Dail authority on the part of the seceding Army officers. Funds are available for the purpose, and it should be generally understood, that in these areas where there is difficulty with regard to police at present, the policing of the areas shall have proper attention, as soon as a proper and responsible command is established in these areas.

### Evacuation by the British.

**Police.**—The evacuation by the R.I.C. has been completed, except that there are still a number awaiting demobilisation at the demobilisation stations at Collinstown, Gormanstown; Depot, Phoenix Park, and at Dublin Castle. In all about 250 positions have been taken over.

**Military.**—The number of military positions taken over is approximately 40.

The following places, outside the Six-County Area have yet to be evacuated by them:—Cork, Ballincollig, Youghal, Curragh Camp, Naas, Richmond Barracks, Dublin; Royal Hospital, Dublin; Portobello; Royal Barracks, Island Bridge Ordnance; G.H.Q., Parkgate Street; South Dublin Union, Royal Infirmary, Magazine Fort, Baldonnel Aerodrome, some hutments at Queenstown.

In the Six-County Area troops are stationed at the following points:—

Derry, Omagh, Enniskillen, Armagh, Newry, Ballykinlar, Hollywood (Down), Belfast and Antrim.

### Compensation for Irish Soldiers.

Arrangements are being made to initiate a scheme of compensation for losses arising out of war services rendered, and under the following heads:—

1. Dependents of Volunteers killed.
2. Disabilities resulting from wounds received, or from ill-health attributable to service.
3. Educational and other programmes interrupted by military service.
4. Grievous distress occasioned by forced neglect of means of livelihood owing to service.

No lands held by the British War Department in Ireland have yet been formally handed over, with the exception of the Remount Department at Lusk. The handing over of these lands is being pressed for.

### Irish War Debts.

Certain sums are properly owing to certain Divisions and Brigades, in respect of debts incurred by them. In respect of these areas whose senior officers have repudiated the authority of the Dail, consideration for the payment of these debts is held up until the necessary command has been solidly established in these areas, and until it is clear, that the payment of these debts would not be a prop to mutiny.

On 14th February, the sum of £3,900 was paid to the Adjutant of the 4th Western Division, for the payment of debts due to traders in the area Westport, Galway, Clifden, Oughterard. The debts were to have been cleared, and all receipted vouchers submitted to the Chief of Staff by 14th March. The vouchers have not been submitted, and it is not known to what extent, if any, the debts have been cleared.

## OUR AIM AND HIS.

### AN EFFICIENT IRISH ARMY.

“The brave Irish who rose in '98, in '48 and in '67 failed because they were not SOLDIERS; we hope to train Irish boys from their earliest years to be soldiers.”

PADRAIC PEARSE.

### The New Irish Army.

Apart from the very serious political aspect of the doings of the seceding section of the Army, the economic aspect of their doings is very serious. They have been raiding monies, raiding properties, destroying properties, commandeering goods, interfering with the press, commandeering buildings, and much of this work is done under cover of the declaration of the Belfast Boycott.

- (a) Raids on Post Offices, 331.
- (b) Interference with Railways, (Northern), 110
- (c) Interference with Railways (D. S. Eastern) 40.
- (d) Destruction of Property, in bulk (Port and Docks), £100,000 damage.

- (e) The passage from the Belfast Boycott to private property:

The Minister here read a letter from Messrs. Porter, Sons and Co., Ltd., Mullingar, in which they notified the seizing of goods at their premises, to the value of over £150 by armed men. The shop was completely denuded of sugar and butter, and Messrs. Porter threatened to close down if such acts continued. The Minister also instanced the case of Messrs. Donnelly, Bacon Curers, Dublin, to whom £213 12s. was owing by headquarters of the irregulars, Dublin.

- (f) Extensive damage has been done to the *Freeman's Journal* printing plant. Their papers had been previously seized in thousands all over the country.

Daily, at present, the *Independent* is being seized in thousands.

72 cases of commandeering and interference are reported within the Dublin City area since 1st April.

The Shell Motor Spirit Co. have been so seriously interfered with, losing over 4,000 gallons of spirit between 3rd and 19th April, that they have threatened to close down their firm temporarily.

The Irish people in definite localities, or as a whole, must, some time, bear the cost of all this loss and destruction.

**False Motives Attributed.**

A propaganda is going on attributing militarism to the forces of the I.R.A. acting under the Dail. The Labour Party, in their statement the other day, say that they have ample evidence "that men in both forces are guilty, in many instances, of inexcusable aggression, and a desire to domineer over the unarmed people. We have demanded that this state of affairs should cease, and that the military forces should be brought to recognise the sovereignty of the people."

We have asked the Labour Party for any evidence that they have to produce with regard to any individual acts of aggression by any of the forces, or any acts that would show that our forces do not recognise the sovereignty of our people. As far as this assembly is concerned I hope that I need not remind the assembly, those who have been associated with it for the last two or three years, that those responsible for the direction of the Army during that time have protested over and over again that the Army had a special sphere of its own.

Together with this type of propaganda pushing over on the I.R.A. proper the discredit earned by

the seceders, there is "dope" being given out about "soldier politicians" endeavour being thereby made to brand those who at present command the Army with a nebulous kind of brand, attributing to them some of the mental sleight-of-hand attributed to low-class politicians, with a view to undermining the confidence of the Army in them.

There is very clear documentary evidence available to show that those responsible for the control of the Army at the present time act in the best interests of the country, and act purely as soldiers in the highest significance of that word.

**GUARDS AND SENTRIES.**

**Questions and Answers.**

- Q.—When is ammunition served out to guard?  
 A.—Before going on duty.  
 Q.—When should the standing orders of the guard be read and explained to men?  
 A.—As soon as the guard has mounted.  
 Q.—When is every relief to be inspected?  
 A.—Before going out, and also on returning.  
 Q.—What are the orders with regard to removing any article of clothing or accoutrements by non-commissioned officers and men while on guard?  
 A.—They are not to take off any article of their clothing, or accoutrements, but the wearing of great coats will be optional.  
 Q.—How often must the Commander visit his sentries, at what specified periods, and for what purpose?  
 A.—At least twice by day and twice by night, to ascertain that they are alert on their posts and acquainted with their orders.  
 Q.—By whom else will sentries be visited?  
 A.—By a non-commissioned officer with a file of men.  
 Q.—Are Commanders allowed to quit their guard?  
 A.—No, except to visit their sentries.  
 Q.—What are the regulations with regard to non-commissioned officers and men quitting their guard?  
 A.—They are not allowed to do so without obtaining leave from the Commander, which is to be granted only for special purposes.

**PROMPT REPORTS.**

Officers of the I.R.A. should promptly report all matters which might prove suitable for publication in "An t-Oglach." These would include appointments and promotions in the various areas which had received the sanction of G.H.Q. and other matters of Army interest.

## SITING OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION.

A properly organised Defensive Scheme consists of three Zones:—

1. The Outpost Zone.
2. The Main Battle Position.
3. Defended Localities and areas in rear of Main Battle Position in which reserves can be accommodated, and which are capable of being held as a battle position in case of necessity.

The object of the Outpost Zone is to secure the main battle position and strong points in rear from the mass of the enemy's fire concentrating on them, and to split up the enemy's attack before it reaches the main battle line. The outpost line usually consists of sentry groups, a picquet line and support line, but is not so well organised as the main battle line. The depth of the outpost line will depend to a great extent on the nature of the ground and on the arms which the enemy is using against the defenders. In open country, where the enemy has artillery, the outpost line should be of good depth.

### Main Line of Resistance—Battle Zone.

1. The general line is decided by considerations, such as the defence of a port, line of railway, some area of country, certain towns or the like, which determine the approximate distance at which the line must run to adequately protect the piece of country in question, or it may well be the blockade of certain towns, ports, etc. This general line can be drawn on an uncountoured map.

2. This being settled, a countoured map is got, and the main line of resistance which fulfils the conditions of the general line is sited on it. This line is marked, with due regard to the features of the country, as shown by the contours on map.

3. Important tactical features should be decided on first, and treated as localities or groups of trenches; the lines connecting them are altogether subservient, and must be fitted in as best they may. Any attempt to make a continuous line strong everywhere will probably lead to it being a compromise and ineffective.

In dealing with woods, the line must be taken either outside them, well inside or behind them; they harbour gas, and it is always difficult for the enemy to emerge from them, particularly if the edge is entangled.

Villages afford concealed approaches and cover from machine gun and rifle fire, but as they are usually well shelled, the line should run well in front of them as a rule.

### Observation Posts and Machine Gun Positions.

4. The ground is now visited, and suitable observation posts for artillery selected, also suitable machine gun posts, and marked on map. If the position is likely to be attacked with only a small proportion of field artillery, and with little or no heavy artillery, the advanced machine gun positions may be pushed well forward in the defensive system, so as to engage the enemy with direct fire as soon as possible, and so break up his organised system of attack; but machine gun defence is always essential. The necessary information to get out the final siting of the trenches is now available.

5. The main line of resistance can now be sited in detail. Generally speaking, it should never run behind an artillery observation post, and certainly never behind an important one.

6. The line selected should be marked out on the ground by flags or stakes. It can then be divided among officers for the siting and construction of individual trenches. The great point is to site the fire trenches, remembering that a man normally fires on a line at right angles to the parapet. The traverse can be put in afterwards, provided that enough space is left.

### Selection of Fire Trenches.

7. Trenches should be sited in general conformation to the contours so as to give mutual enfilade fire. This ensures converging fire being brought to bear on valleys which are the most likely avenues of attack and penetration.

Enfilade fire is most demoralising to an attacker, and also most heartening to the defender, for he is shooting at men not attacking him, and, perhaps, does not see the men advancing on his own particular trench, who will be dealt with by other trenches on the flanks. Great care must be taken, therefore, to ensure that plenty of flanking fire is provided. By this means, if any portion of the front is penetrated, enfilade fire from the flanks will prevent the enemy from reinforcing or exploiting the penetration.

The general alignment of the trenches will, therefore, be very irregular, following the lie of the ground, forming alternate bastions and curtains, running forward in spurs and back in the valleys. In addition to increasing the fighting

strength of the system, this course also adds considerably to the difficulties of the enemy artillery barraging it.

8. Communication trenches should be numerous and capable of being fought. They should be always sited with the idea of the possibility of their defence in combination with the fire trenches. Thus dealt with, they may convert a few scattered trenches into useful tactical points.

9. Drains for all trenches must be considered and marked out when the trenches are sited in detail. They should be dug simultaneously with the trenches, and should be completed to the full depth and width, even when the trenches are left to be deepened subsequently.

10. Machine guns should have several alternate positions sited to suit the different phases of the fight. In the first instance, some should be well forward, so as to engage the enemy at long range, but in addition they should have concealed positions, distributed in depth, from which they can flank neighbouring defences and bring fire to bear on all main avenues of approach.

#### Strong Points.

11. LOCALITIES.—Positions which lend themselves for a stubborn defence should be developed *in and behind* the main line of resistance.

Such localities should have strong all-round defences. They should be mutually supporting. The flanks should be protected by defences in rear as well as on flanks. Such locality should be provided with:—

- (1) Wire; (2) protection for garrison; (3) organisation, including water, rations, ammunition, and tools.

Concealment from direct observation is most desirable.

To sum up, a defensive position will consist of:—

(a) An outpost zone, consisting of sentry posts, picquet posts, etc., eventually developed into an outpost system; the trenches forming the system need not be continuous, although the occupied fire trenches may be connected by shallow lengths, to facilitate supervision and concealment. In same way the communication trenches will be dug to full depth where absolutely essential, and in other place may be shallow. This zone will be fought as long as possible, but is not manned normally in any great strength.

(b) Main battle zone, consisting of tactical localities, areas, etc., connected together by trenches, which will be somewhat as follows:—

1. Main line trenches, with a local observation line in front of it.
2. Support trench, about 200 yards in rear of main line.
3. Reserve trench, 500 yards in rear of support trench, from which counter attacks may be launched. This trench should be well concealed.

(c) Defended areas and localities in rear of the main battle zone, in which reserves can be accommodated, and capable of being held as a fighting position in case the main line or part of it should be lost.

## TRAINING FOR WAR.

“Training is the preparation of the officer and the man for the duties which each will carry out in the war.

“To defeat the enemy in battle is the ultimate aim of all training.”

### I. *The Man.*

“His duty in war is to carry out the orders given by his leader so long as he remains under his control. Should he find himself beyond the control of a leader, he must act intelligently in accordance with the spirit of the orders which he has received.

“... The development of intelligence and self-reliance, combined with discipline and skill with arms, will, therefore, form the principal features of the training of the man.”

### II. *The Non-Commissioned Officer.*

“He forms the connecting link between the officer and the man. He should be proficient in the duties which are performed by the rank and file, such as shooting, gun-laying, riding, scouting, etc., and should be capable of instructing them in their duties. He must also receive special training in leading and command in the field, and be given opportunities of practising these duties, so that he may be fitted, if necessity arises, to take the place of the officer.”

### III. *The Officer.*

“The officer is the leader and instructor of his men. He must always remember that to maintain discipline he must possess the confidence of the men in his professional ability.

... But since in war he may be called upon to assume responsibilities beyond those of his rank, he must prepare himself by a sound system of training in times of peace to acquire the habit of quickly and correctly appreciating a situation, or arriving rapidly at a decision, of translating that decision into suitable orders, and of ensuring the rapid and well-reasoned execution of those orders in the field.

... In the absence of war experience, the constant study of military problems and experience in handling troops in the field can alone give the officer the capacity for instantly grasping a situation and deciding on the best course of action.

... But it is not sufficient to know what is the best course of action; the determination to put it into execution at all hazards is also vital... the more difficult the situation the greater the need for resolute action.

... In war, officers who will resolutely attempt the seemingly impossible, when the occasion demands it, will often snatch a victory in circumstances in which more cautious methods will fail."

#### VALUE OF MORAL FORCE.

"Moral force in modern war preponderates over physical force as greatly as formerly.

"Factors such as the feeling of self-confidence and power which springs from a thorough training, the spirit of the offensive, the determination to conquer at all hazards, patriotic feelings, pride in the profession of arms, *esprit de corps*, the power of endurance, all tend towards the attainment of moral force, and it should, therefore, be the constant aim of all ranks to cultivate them during the period of training in peace."

#### SOME HEALTH SUGGESTIONS.

Feet should be inspected twice a week.

Hair should be cut close and should be frequently washed.

Water should be taken at meals.

Socks and shirts should be washed frequently and changed as often as possible.

Men should not drink on the march without permission from an officer.

Men should report promptly all ailments to O.C. Unit.

Boots should be well fitting and rendered as waterproof as possible.

Wet clothes should be dried before going to bed. Baths should be taken at least once a week and feet should be washed at least once a day.

Teeth should be cleaned at NIGHT and after each meal.

## CLOSING UP THE RANKS.

### MOVE TOWARDS UNITY UNDER G.H.Q.

The following statement was issued from Dail Eireann Publicity Department, May 1st, 1922:—

"We, the undersigned Officers of the I.R.A., realising the gravity of the present situation in Ireland, and appreciating the fact that if the present drift is maintained, a conflict of comrades is inevitable, declare that this would be the greatest calamity in Irish History, and would leave Ireland broken for generations. To avert this catastrophe we believe that a closing of the ranks all round is necessary.

#### "In the Best Interests of Ireland."

We suggest to all leaders, Army and Political, and all citizens and soldiers of Ireland, the advisability of a unification of forces on the basis of the acceptance and utilisation of our present national position in the best interests of Ireland, and we require that nothing shall be done that would prejudice our position or dissipate our strength.

We feel that on this basis alone can the situation best be faced, viz.:—

- (1) The acceptance of the fact—admitted by all sides—that the majority of the people of Ireland are willing to accept the Treaty.
- (2) An agreed election with a view to—
- (3) Forming a Government which will have the confidence of the whole country.
- (4) Army unification on the above basis.

"DAN BREEN.

"TOM HALES.

"H. MURPHY.

"S. O'HEGARTY.

"F. O'DONOGHUE.

"SEAN BOYLAN.

"R. J. MULCAHY.

"OWEN O'DUFFY.

"GEAROID O'SUILLEAVAIN.

"MICHAEL O COILEAIN.

### AN APPEAL TO ALL RANKS.

The following statement, signed by same army officers, was issued by Dail Eireann Publicity Department on May 2nd, 1922:

"Following the Conference of yesterday, the undermentioned officers of the I.R.A. met again to-day.

"It has been arranged that representations will be made to the Dail at its session to-morrow (Wednesday).

"In the meantime, we earnestly appeal to all ranks to act towards one another in the spirit of yesterday's appeal.



## FROM DAY TO DAY.

On Monday, May the 1st, members of the irregular forces carried out extensive raids on branches of the Bank of Ireland, in three Provinces, and seized well over £100,000, so far as can be ascertained. In each case the bank was entered by an armed party who demanded a definite sum "to pay war expenses." The money seized is the property of the people of Ireland, and the robberies may result in serious financial difficulty, if not bankruptcy for many of the community. Even in the most strenuous days of the recent war the I.R.A. never resorted to this method of obtaining funds. They did not do so because they realised that the road to Irish freedom did not lie through the bankruptcy of the Irish people. Those in control of the irregular forces seek to justify the robberies on the grounds that the Minister for Defence had refused to pay the debts contracted by those who had repudiated his authority and that of Dail Eireann. It has been urged that it is in order not to "penalise our countrymen" that the expedient of robbing them has been resorted to.

\* \* \*

At the inquest on Brigadier-General Adamson, who was done to death on the streets of Athlone, the jury returned a verdict of wilful murder. A similar verdict was returned at the inquest on Adjutant Columb, who met his death in an encounter with irregular forces in Mullingar. Captain Casey, who was sent unarmed to demand the release of certain members of the I.R.A., seized while unarmed, and detained by the secessionists, was fired on by the latter. The regular troops replied from various parts of the town, and in the engagement the Adjutant was mortally wounded. When Irish officers and men were murdered by enemy forces during the late war the crimes horrified the Irish people. It was thought that 'twere impossible for men bearing the honourable name of soldier to so degrade their calling. That similar methods should be adopted by our countrymen against their brothers in the Army of Ireland must be a cause of shame and pain to all who hold sacred the traditions of chivalry and gallantry associated with the name of the Irish Volunteer.

\* \* \*

During the British régime in this country the suppression of newspapers, with a view to stifling public opinion, became a matter of frequent occurrence. At present this policy has been adopted by some of those who profess to be out

for the most absolute National liberty. The *Nationalist*, Clonmel, is the latest newspaper to come under the ban of the military dictatorship which has resulted, in some isolated districts, from the Irregular Convention. On Friday night, April 28th, armed men entered the offices of the *Nationalist* and informed those in charge that the distribution of the journal would not be allowed. Doubtless, this was carrying into effect one of the decisions at the mutinous Convention to gradually suppress the Irish press. Such acts are criminal, inasmuch as they tend to pauperise those who obtain a livelihood in newspaper work. For this reason alone, apart altogether from the recognised right of the press in all countries to freedom of expression, one would imagine that such deeds would not be countenanced in Ireland.

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Some of the Irish daily newspapers have also been seized and burned in various places. Notices have been served on newsagents, in some instances, warning them not to distribute or expose for sale certain daily papers. Individuals have received notices from leaders of the irregular forces in southern districts threatening them that should any interference with the secessionist forces take place there, the latter would hold responsible those upon whom the notices had been served. Such tactics, savouring as they do of foreign militarist tactics, cannot fail to earn for those who adopt them the condemnation and disapproval of every genuine soldier of freedom.

### THE SECTION COMMANDER.

The special duties of the Section Commander are :—

- 1.—If time permits before his section advances, to explain clearly the objective of the manoeuvre about to be carried out, and the methods he proposes to adopt.
- 2.—To adopt the best method of advance.
- 3.—To select the successive halting places and fire positions of his section.
- 4.—To see that the general direction is maintained.
- 5.—To control the fire of his section.
- 6.—To co-operate with neighbouring sections, and to use the fire of his section to support them to the best advantage.
- 7.—To indicate the way from fire position to fire position.
- 8.—To discover as much as possible of the course of the action around him, and to send intelligence to his Company Commander and to neighbouring units.



## I BHFOCHAIR BUACHALL NA gCASOG n-UAITHNE.

An Troid i Mullionn Cearr.

### Coga Nua in Éirinn.

Tá coga nua ar siúl in Éirinn indiu. Tá fothrom na ngunna, feadúfól na bpiléar agus pléasca na bpléascán le clos arís ar fuaid na tíre. Tá fuil dearg á dorta ar gach taobh. Beirtear ar oifigigh airm na poblachta agus coimeádtar fé ghlas iad. Tá úasáid á dhéanamh den stailc ocrais aca d'fhonn saoirse do bhaint amach arís. Chun sgéal gairid do dhéanamh de, is beag ná fuil Fianna Fáil chómh mór i gconntúirt a nanama anois agus do bhíodar bliain ó shin. An uair seo, ámh, ní hiad na Black and Tans is cionntach leis an droch obair uath-bhasach so. Is oth linn a bheith orainn admháil gur daoine a thugann Gaeil agus tírgráitheoirí ortha féin atá i mbun na hoibre. Agus sé áiféis an scéil gur in ainm naomhtha an tSaoirse a deintear o í.

### Fogha fen Sgeich, Wellington, 7r1.

Le tamall anuas tá fogha agus amuis á dtabhairt fé shaighdiúirí na nGael agus fés na barraicibh agus na tigthe eile na bhfuilid ag cur fútha. Oíche Domhnaig Chásca, tugadh fén Sgeich, árd árus airm na poblachta. Ar feadh fiche nóimid bhí clagarnach na bpiléar ar siúl. Tugadh fé Wellington leis agus fé gach post atá i seilbh an airm.

### Dun-Mharu Mic Adaim.

Ac an bheart is gránda do thuit amach fós, bé dún-mharu an tsaighdiúra chalma chróga úd, an Ceannphort MacAdaim in Ath Luain. Is deacair do creidiúnt go bhfuigheadh aoinne ann féin piléar marbthach do sgaoileadh fé na leithéid de laoch.

### Amus ar Theachtair Airm.

Loitead teachtaire airm leis in aice tighe na leath slí ag Croimghlinn an lá fé dheire. Bhí sé ag rothuocht thart nuair do scaoil fir armtha abhí i mórthrucaill ar thaobh an bhothair leis. Lean sé air ámh go dtí gur shroish sé Carnán Cloch. Bhuaidh lagacar tré, cailliúnt fola air annsin agus thuit sé. Do haistrigheadh go hosbuidéal láithreach é. Tá sé ag dul i bhfeabhas i naghaidh an lae.

Tá fíor choga ar siúl 'na lán áit ar fuaid na tíre fé láthair. Seachtain ó shin i Mullionn Cearr do thárla an chéad troid idir saighdiúirí an dá arm. Do rug na forsaí nea dhleáthach ar triúr fear den arm riaghalta agus coimeádh fé ghlas iad i mbaraice na bpóilín. Chuir Ceannphort an airm riaghalta teactaireacht go dtí an baraic ag éileamh go sgoilfí na fir gan aon ró mhoill. Sé rud do dhein an gárda neariaghalta na caitheamh fé an teachtaire. Cromadh ar sgaoileadh ó gach taobh annsin i dtreo gur marbhuigheadh fear ó gach taobh agus loiteadh triúr nó ceathrar.

### Cuis Naire do Gael.

Cúis náire agus ceann fé do Gael an t-éirleach so gan cúis gan adhbhar. Tá cuid des na fearaibh atá i gculaith an airm ar na laocha is fearr a rugadh riamh. Beidh innsint scéil ar a neachtraí agus ar a ngníomhartha in Éirinn fad is beidh uisce ag rith le fánaidh. Beag an coinne a bhí ag aoinne bliain ó shin go dtiocfaidh lá go sgoilfeadh a sean pháirtidhe urchar fútha.

### TIPPERARY BARRACK BESIEGED.

#### Gallant Defence by Small Garrison.

The gallant defence of Annacarty police barrack by a small garrison of regular troops of the I.R.A. should prove a useful lesson to all Volunteers. The small party of twenty-one who held the building were assailed on Sunday, April 30th, by several hundreds of the irregulars, who took up positions over a wide area surrounding the barrack. Despite the superiority in numbers of the attacking party, the defenders held their position until the following Tuesday, when shortage of supplies forced them to yield, after stoutly defending their position for three days. Comdt. Carew, the O.C., was fired upon and seriously wounded outside the building a short time before the attack developed. However, he succeeded in getting back to the barrack, and took part in its defence. He is at present in an hospital in Tipperary, where a party of armed men surround him. Lieut. J. Ryan and Volunteer Patrick Dwyer, who were wounded in the engagement, were being removed to Limerick, when they succeeded in evading their captors and made good their escape to Thurles. The remainder of the little garrison were taken to Clonmel.